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PREFACE
Thirteen years as a merchant seaman and the desire to under­
stand the dynamics of the changes the shipping industry has undergone 
in the last three decades provided the impetus for this research.
While there is no lack of literature concerned with the sea and shipping, 
it tends to reflect either the romantic notions of the landsman and 
the challenge of the elements, or the pride and traditions of being an 
island nation. There is, however, a paucity of analytical work on the 
shipping industry which is in part due to the tendency to romanticise 
about 'going to sea'. Also the industry, by its very nature, is 
separate from the shore with its own language and attitudes and, there­
fore, any researcher has the problem that it is surrounded by an air 
of mystique. This is compounded by the fact that there is a tradition 
of secrecy which stems from the closeness engendered by the structure 
of family ownership and the practice of small groups of owners acting 
together to limit competition.
I have been extremely fortunate that my sea-going experience 
has provided both an entree into the industry and a basic understanding 
of its complexity. Nevertheless, this work would not have been possible 
without the cooperation of the employees' organizations, and the 
General Council of British Shipping, formerly the British Shipping 
Federation. In particular I should like to thank Mr, Rice Oxley,
C.B.E., of the British Shipping Federation for his help and advice.
The General Secretaries of the Merchant Navy and Airline Officers 
Association, Mr. E, Nevin, and the National Union of Seamen, Mr, J. Slater, 
provided valuable assistance in permitting personal interviews and 
allowing access to documents. Mr. J. Kinahan, Research Officer of the
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N.U.S.( was unfailing in his patience not only with my many questions 
but also with my lengthy presence in his office. The work could not 
have been undertaken without the cooperation of the Clerk of the 
National Maritime Board.
I am indebted to Professor H.A. Clegg and Professor C.S. Bain 
for their encouragement and constructive criticism during the preparation 
of this thesis. My work has been made less arduous by the willing 
support of the staff of the Public Record Office and the librarians of 
the City of London Polytechnic at both Moorgate and Tower Hill.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The shipping industry has undergone a period of rapid and 
fundamental change during the three decades since the end of the Second 
World War. While these changes have been experienced world-wide and 
have promoted the implementation of technological advances and the 
growth of the world fleet, they have occurred during a period which has 
also witnessed a substantial relative decline in Britain's maritime 
position. It is the aim of this study to analyse their effect on 
industrial relations in the U.K. shipping industry,
Maritime industrial relations in the U.K. have their roots in the 
nineteenth century technology and the three-departmental hierarchy of the
steam ship. This is reflected in both the employees' organization and 
the collective bargaining machinery, the National Maritime Board 
(N.M.B.). The N.M.B. was established during the First World War, with 
governmental participation in the spirit of the Whitley Report, mainly 
in order to solve one of the central problems of maritime industrial 
relations, the supply of ratings.
The importance of supply is perhaps greater in shipping than 
shore-based industry because of the nature of the workplace. The 
employer is concerned with being able to get the ship to sea insnediately 
in order to take advantage of commercial opportunity. While for the 
employee, and especially the rating, control of supply is the only way 
effective organization may be maintained. It was in order to satisfy 
both these needs that the joint control of supply became a central 
aspect of industrial relations in the industry.
The structure of industrial relations appears to .iave remained 
substantially unchanged since the establishment of *\.e N.M.B. as a 
bi-partite organization in 1920. This is surpr'jing in view of the 
depth of change the industry has experience . and the implications these 
have had for employment opportunities <tnd manpower planning.
Looking at the industry as a whole the most obvious effect of 
change, in the period since the Second World War, has been the dramatic 
contraction in the number of seafarers employed, from a peak of 152,000 
in 1957 to 69,000 in 1980. There has been a similar fall in the 
number of U.K. registered vessels (over 100 G.R.T.) from 6,025 in 1948 
to 3,181 vessels in 1980. This is partly due to Britain's loss of 
supremacy, but of more importance has been the change in technology.
This latter point is illustrated by the massive growth in tonnage 
during the period, particularly deadweight tonnage, from 23,500M 
d.w.t. in 1948 to 43,OOOM d.w.t. in 1980, Graph ltl highlights these 
contrary trends.
The impact of these changes in the size of the U.K, fleet and 
the labour force it employs has not been uniform throughout the industry. 
This has gone some way to undermine the homogeneity of shipowners and 
to threaten the traditional positions of the employee organizations.
In spite of this there hsve only been relatively minor modifications 
to the industrial relations structure, as in the case of the joint 
supply scheme, and until 1966 no major official strikes. The lack of 
strikes is in itself remarkable in an industry which is regarded 
internationally as strike prone.* It is necessary to question this 
record of harmony because effective industrial action is precluded when 
the employee la at sea and the legal constraints are such that the sea­
farer may only strike when unemployed, This is simply one illustration
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of the need to appreciate what may be regarded as the peculiarities of 
maritime industrial relations arising out of the nature of the workplace.
In order, therefore, to make a proper assessment of the effect 
of the dynamic changes which have taken place, it is necessary to be 
fully cognisant of the ways in which the shipping industry shapes its 
own industrial relations. This has implications for the individual and 
for the organizations and institutions which are, of course, shore- 
based. This is further complicated by the extent to which the industry 
and its manpower are covered by the law in the form of the Merchant 
Shipping Acts. The law is perhaps the one area in which shipping 
undoubtedly stands apart from shore-based industry; the extensive involve­
ment of the law arises out of the strategic and economic importance of 
shipping and the dangers which are inherent in being at sea. Like the 
structure of collective bargaining, the law was framed in the context 
of the steam technology and low status of seamen in the late nineteenth 
century. These legal constraints have increasingly come to be regarded 
as an anachronism in the second half of the twentieth century.
While there has been explicit reform of the law, due in part to 
social pressures external to the industry, it is not possible to point 
to a similar impact on the collective bargaining machinery. It could 
be argued that, since only minor modifications have occurred, the 
industrial relations organizations have been able to adapt successfully 
to the altered industrial environment without changes to the law.
The degree of the success of this adaptation and of the 
functioning of the N.M.B. are difficult to measure with any exactness.
The most tangible product of collective bargaining is probably financial 
rewards and coats. An attempt has been made to assess the achievement 
of the N.M.B. and its constituent organizations in this area, The task
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is complex partly because of the diversity of the industry's pay 
structure and partly due to the nature of seagoing employment which 
does not permit of easy comparison. Even if a conclusion can be drawn 
in relation to rewards and costs it has to be modifed to take account 
of other factors such as hours and working conditions. Labour costs 
assume a particular importance because they are the one element in 
operating costs which may be determined nationally and therefore are 
to some extent within the control of the U.K. owners; all other costs 
are set in the international market.
Success may also be measured in terms of industrial peace and at 
least superficially the N.M.B. may be regarded as being successful in 
this sphere if official strikes are used as the measure. As has already 
been stated, however, the usefulness of this conclusion in respect of 
seafarers is limited because of the problems of strike action. Further­
more, the 'official' strike does not in itself reflect the amount of 
potential and 'unofficial' conflict which may exist. Nor should conflict 
in itself be regarded as a sign of failure.
i
A study has been made of the experience of the ratings in the 
period in regard to unofficial and official agitation, From the late 
1940s until the mid-1960s there were a number of examples of unofficial 
industrial agitation all of which produced surprisingly similar demands.
These were concerned with a reduction in hours, a redrafting of the 
Merchant Shipping Acts snd the right to plant level, that is, ship­
board representation. This agitation was in all instances as much 
directed against the ratings' own organization, the National Union of 
Seamen, as against the employers or the collective bargaining machinery.
The reiteration of the demands over a period of fifteen years and the 
support they achieved indicates the existence of considerable amounts 
of underlying discontent.
J
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In many respects the official strike of 1966 may be seen as an 
inevitable outcome of the previous disputes and the pressure they had 
created within the N.U.S., although it was distorted by the government's 
commitment to its incomes policy. While only one section of the labour 
force was directly involved in the strike, it resulted in a major long
I
term reappraisal of maritime industrial relations.
The fact that there have been no significant changes in the
r
N.M.B. and the functioning of joint supply is not an indication of a 
lack of recognition, by both employers and employees, of the implications 
the loss of job opportunity and changing technology have had for man­
power planning. While there have been attempts to find ways of 
matching the needs of the industry to those of its personnel during the 
1970s, any recooraendations have always been seen in the context of the 
existing nineteenth century based structure.
In view of the importance of shipping to the British economy it 
is surprising that it has attracted so little research and no serious 
study has been made of maritime industrial relations. The main 
contribution to any broad discussion of maritime industrial relations 
has been initiated by government inquiries. This is not to deny that 
there is a certain amount of general maritime literature but this 
tends to be somewhat subjective and biased towards the traditional 
romantic view of the sea.
The two government inquiries, the Court of Inquiry into certain
matters concerning the shipping industry, chaired by the Rt. Hon.
2
Lord Pearson, CBE and the Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, chaired
3
by the Rt. Hon. the Viscount Rochdale, OBE , were related to the official 
strike of 1966. The first, Pearson, was directly concerned with 
industrial relations and especially the causes of the strike and its 
solution, which was seen to imply a reconsideration of the Merchant
Shipping Acta. The second inquiry, Rochdale, arose out of a promise 
made by the Prime Minister during the strike to initiate a wide 
ranging examination of the industry, and while it discusses manpower 
generally it makes no specific reference to industrial relations.
These inquiries did engender certain ancillary research, the most 
important being that undertaken by the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations into the sociological aspects of seafaring,^
In addition to these secondary sources the present analysis 
has been based on the Minutes of the National Maritime Board from its 
inception; documents from the Shipping Federation, the General Council 
of British Shipping, the Mercantile Marine Services Association, the 
Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association, the Radio and 
Electronics Officers' Union, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, 
and the National Union of Seamen. Reference has also been made to the 
Minutes of the Hull Sailors and Marine Firemens Amalgamated Association 
and the Ships' Stewards, Cooks, Butchers and Bakers Union, together 
with the papers of the Board of Trade held at the Public Records Office.
The international comparison of wage and other costs is based in part 
on surveys undertaken and information provided by the International 
Labour Office and the International Transport Workers' Federation,
This thesis falls into three sections: the first section (Chapters 
2, 3 and 4) fulfils a descriptive side setting out the base from which the 
effect of change may be assessed; Chapter 2 examines the distinctive features 
of maritime industrial relations, the workplace and the shipping 
industry's relationship with the law, while Chapter 3 looks at the way 
the collective bargaining institutions have been shaped by these 
factors and the industry's historical context. Chapter 4 outlines the 
Internal and external changes which have occurred during the period 
under discussion.
mmm O f t  III III nMTMlttitfrt *«*
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The second section (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) analyses the effect 
of these changes and the implications for industrial relations. Chapters 
5 and 6 trace the impact on the quantity and quality of labour demanded 
and make a comparative examination of the effect on pay and costs. The 
industry's claim to an unusual degree of harmony is then considered with 
a detailed analysis of the experience of the ratings and the events 
culminating in the official strike in 1966.
The study concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the 
industry has thought it appropriate to modify its industrial procedures 
and manpower policy under increasing competitive pressure and finally 
an attempt is made to forecast future trends.
r
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THE WORKPLACE AND THE LAW
The shipping industry has a number of characteristics which set 
it apart from shore-based industry. What is fundamental in respect of 
industrial relations is the fact that employment in the industry 
necessitates going to sea in a ship. Superficially this would appear to 
be a trite statement but it is this which influences every relationship 
within the industry for both the group and the individual and presents 
problems for the effective organisation and representation of employers 
and employees.
While every industry has special labour needs and its own individual 
environment, this is perhaps particularly true of the shipping industry.
As Hohman points out:
Seafaring is something more than just another kind 
of job, it is a separate and distinct way of life . . .
The nature of the seaman's work inevitably dominates his 
entire pattern of life, both on and off the job.
In order to understand industrial relations and institutionalised collective
bargaining these must not be abstracted from the working environment since
they will be shaped by and reflect the needs of the particular industry
with which they are concerned. In respect of shipping the two most important
factors are the hazards of the sea and the strategic importance of the
merchant marine. These have resulted in a quasi-military division between
officers and men (ratings). This hierarchical structure of the labour
force is more complex than a mere division in terms of seniority since it
extends to the departmental organisation of the ship.
The three departments of the ship - deck, engine, anJ catering - 
are directly related to steam technology. The deck department is concerned 
with navigation, the general maintenance of the vessel and its cargo, and
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was the only department under sail. The engine department came into being 
with the introduction of steam and is concerned with propulsion and the 
maintenance of engine and ancillary equipment. In both these departments 
recruits enter as either officers or ratings and there is minimal upward 
mobility between the two groups. The development of a catering depart­
ment was due to the increase in crew size with the steam ship and the 
contemporary growth of passenger sea transport. Officers are generally 
promoted from ratings on the basis of experience and length of service.
Within this structure the seniority and authority of the officers 
are not directly related. For example, although the Chief Engineer 
would be next in seniority to the Conmander of the ship, the Master, he 
would not be the next in the authority structure. A seafarer may only 
become a Master by promotion through the deck department, of which he 
is always perceived to be a member. Once the vessel is at sea the Master 
assumes complete responsibility for the ship even to the extent at times 
of overriding shore management.
The deck department is the one through which the line of command 
runs; for example, if the Master became ill the First Deck Officer (Mate) 
and not the Chief Engineer would assume that post. To take an extreme 
case, in a lifeboat a Third Deck Officer (Mate) would take precedence in 
terms of authority over the Chief Engineer. The Catering Officer would 
be considered to be at the bottom of this hierarchy in terms of both 
seniority and authority.
The hierarchical structure is also reflected in the attitude of
the ratings to their own place in the ship organisation. It must not be
assumed that all ratings necessarily have a common interest since there
2
are numerous grades and rates of pay in addition to the departmental 
divisions. The deck ratings are regarded and regard themselves as senior 
to the engine room ratings and both regard themselves as senior to those
- 12 -
involved in catering.
The division between officers and ratings is emphasised by the way 
they enter the industry and the training they undergo. Deck officers 
enter the industry as cadets with some formal academic qualification and 
they train both at sea and ashore, and they have been almost invariably 
recruited through the shipping companies. Entry as an engine room 
officer has generally been through craft apprenticeship or a similar 
craft qualification. The training of officers and the qualifications 
they obtain are regulated by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(formerly the Board of Trade) within a system of certificates of competency.
These cover both foreign and home trade and promotion is related to the 
certificate held and the length of sea service.
Ratings are recruited and trained largely by the employers' 
association, deck and catering recruits entering the industry between the 
ages of 16 and 17}, with catering ratings receiving a short period of s
sea training and deck ratings following different courses after the first 
four weeks. Following the initial qualification, again under Department 
of Trade regulations, promotion is based on experience and length of sea 
service. While the catering ratings will have an opportunity to become 
officers by promotion, for deck ratings this is extremely rare. Promotion 
beyond Able Seaman to become a Petty Officer depends on ability, experience, 
the dictates of the employing company, and luck. There is, at least in 
theory, no obstacle to deck ratings obtaining a Department of Trade 
certificate of competency to become a deck officer. However, the number 
who do so is extremely small. It has been estimated that only 5 per cent 
of deck ratings obtain even a Mates Certificate.
Recruitment of ratings to the engine room follows a different i'
pattern. In the first place, the recruits are older, between 18 and 30,
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and they are given a three-week induction course in simple engine room 
procedures, lifeboat work, and fire prevention.
The size of the workplace is such that each grade of personnel 
will tend to be isolated from his equals in the industry, unlike, for 
example, the army or the police which have similar structures. For the 
officers there will only be a single representative of each grade, apart 
from the most junior, and on small vessels this may also be true of some 
ratings. Advances in technology mean the size and number of vessels 
where this is true are growing. In the case of radio officers there will 
only ever be one operator.
A diagrammatic representation of ship structure is shown below.
The proportion in each deparment will, of course, depend on the type of 
vessel, method of propulsion, and trade. For example, the catering 
department in a coastal tanker would be totally different from that of a 
foreign-going passenger liner where approximately 60 per cent of the crew 
would be concerned with catering.
On Hoard Structure
<
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The ship differs from the factory or workshop of shore~based industry 
in that it operates as a 'total institution' - a place within which its 
members, the seafarers, often for long periods of time, have to find 
all aspects of their life fulfilled, albeit away from their own family 
ties and background. The industry makes unusual demands on its labour 
force, with the seafarer facing varying periods away from home, lack of 
regular communication with the outside world, and perhaps irregular work 
patterns. These factors are reflected in the seafaring labour force which 
tends to be younger than the shore average with a high rate of turnover.
The age distribution of the maritime labour force over the last 
fifty years is shown in Table 2.1. The basic and rather obvious point
TABLE 2.1
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SEAMEN 1931-1971 (UK RESIDENTS AND ALIENS)
Age Group 1931
Z
1938
Z
1951
Z
1961
Z
1971
1
Under 20 9 10 13 14 11
20 - 24 16 14 22 23 22
25 - 34 33 27 27 26 26
Over 35 42 49 38 37 41
Total 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: Census
emerging from the table is that seafaring is predominantly a young man's 
occupation, with 50 per cent being less than 35 years of age, a percentage 
which rose in the post-war years to over 60 per cent, whereas ashore only 
40 per cent of tlte employed population come into this group. The young 
element was emphasised in the 1951 and 1961 census where the groups under 
24 years grew considerably, mainly at the expense of the over 35 years.
•4
Ai
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A number of influences were present in this trend but the existence of
, A
military conscription must be of importance. A comment in the 1951
Census gives some credence to this view:
It is interesting to note that a similar age redistribution 
did not occur after the First World War and the proportion, 
in each age group were nearly the same in 1921 as in 1911.
Conscription was not, of course, imposed post 1919. The 1971 census
suggests a trend moving back towards the inter-war situation, the over-
358 gaining at the expense almost wholly of the under-20s. While the
most stable group, 25 - 35, remains remarkably constant throughout the
period under consideration.
When manpower is split into the different major sectors of the 
industry - foreign trade and coastal/home trade vessels - the latter 
has an age distribution much closer to shore industry. Presumably the
older man remaining at sea avoids, as far as possible, long voyages 
and the family separation implied in foreign-going ships. Table 2.2 
illustrates the extent of the difference between age and department.
TABLE 2.2
ACE DISTRIBUTION AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1968
Section of Coastal/Home Trade Foreign Trade
Industry To 34 Over 35 To 34 Over 35
Z Z Z Z
Deck 42.8 57.2 64.8 35.2
Engine 37.4 62.4 63.9 36.1
Catering 45.2 55.8 62.2 37.4
SOURCE: Rochdale
All the other censuses consistently illustrate similar trends, all three 
departments attracting younger men to the foreign trade which employs the 
majority of seafarers.
«
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The age distribution is reflected by the age of recruitment to and 
departure from the industry indicated by a relatively short length of 
service. One third of all entrants leave within their first year, a 
figure rising to one half or more before the end of their second year.
Only 25 per cent of any year's recruits remain in the industry for five 
years, a figure halved, to 12 per cent, ten years after signing their 
first articles.6 It is not surprising to find that officers tend to 
remain longer in the industry than ratings since officers have a greater 
commitment through longer training.7
Three factors, all related to the nature of the industry, appear 
to explain the relatively short period of service of all groups. Firstly, *
the inability to survive the act of going to sea; for example, the 
largest number of ratings, some 13 per cent, leave immediately after
8
completing their first voyage, unable to overcome the induction crisis.
Secondly, the perception of seafaring as a way of becoming a 'man' and
*
achieving security in the short term rather than as a life-long career, 
young men see in shipping adventure and a method of seeing the world 
whilst being paid. The importance placed on this factor in the industry 
is reflected in an employers' pamphlet aimed at encouraging recruitment 
entitled 'A Passport to Adventure'. Another major motivation is economic.
There is an old adage 'where there arc rich farmers there are not seamen'; 
in other words, where there is booming industry and full employment men are 
reluctant to go to sea.
Seafaring is also perceived as a method of achieving emotional
f
security. A fairly high percentage of recruits come from broken or 
inadequate homes, and presumably see the crew of a ship as a substitute 
family. Many orphanages have traditional connections with shipping, 
perhaps not only perceiving the industry as a substitute home but also
at
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as providing a secure environment in which an individual may have an
opportunity to mature and develop. Other groups and individuals may use
it for this 'moratorium' pupose.
There may be value for young people in having a period away 
from home in which to mature and develop before making more 
final commitments in life. For some this period may be 
provided by University, for others by service in the Merchant 
Navy. A few jjeafarers explicitly compare their service with 
a University.
For these reasons, therefore, seafaring is not perceived essentially as 
a career; a limited survey undertaken by Gallup found that one quarter 
of the entrants interviewed expected to leave the industry within five 
years.
j|
Obviously, some entrants must see seafaring in career terms but 
there is evidence that in the long run they will be under considerable 
social pressure either to return ashore or to take seagoing employment 
which permits frequent shore contact. The latter is likely to curtail 
career opportunities. The extent of social pressures is perhaps indicated 
by the work the Gallup Poll did on the most frequently mentioned reasons 
for leaving the sea. Family commitments, the decision to marry, was the 
paramount reason (26 per cent), together with the needs of children (12 
per cent). If these reasons are combined with insufficient leave, on the 
assumption that the individual with his own family would place more 
emphasis on leave than a single man, over SO per cent of the reasons for 
leaving pivot around family involvement; this is particularly applicable 
when there are young children.'0
All these factors result in a 'casual' approach to the industry, 
particularly among ratings. What emerges is a high movement of labour not 
only out of the industry but within shipping itself. The longer a man 
remains in the industry the greater the proportion of time spent ashore.''
The Pearson Inquiry gave examples of passenger liner companies whose labour
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turnover within a year was 150 per cent, and of tankers where under half
. 12
the ratings stayed over twelve months. Hill's research estimates that the
vast majority of seamen leave a vessel after one or two voyages, with a
minority staying longer. For example, in excess of 50 per cent of all
ratings serve on, at the very least, eight vessels during their first five
years in the industry, and 75 per cent of all seafarers are unlikely to
remain on the same vessel for more than two or three voyages. There
also appears to be a correlation between the frequent vessel changes and
a lack of long-term commitment to seafaring. This mobility is not
confined to the national fleet since seafarers are part of an international
labour force. Not only will UK seafarers, particularly officers, sail ,
under foreign flags but UK employers will recruit a considerable number
of non-European ratings, and when labour is short are in a position to
, , 13
use the international pool at Rotterdam.
The casual nature of seagoing employment is not only related to
'
individual attitudes to seafaring and the type of labour force but directly 
to the needs of the industry as a whole. Shipping ia subject to fluctuations 
in demand which are less predictable than in moat other industries and 
employers require a pool of labour to be available at any moment in order 
that they may take advantage of every commercial opportunity that is 
offered. The joint supply of labour which developed is an attempt to equate 
the employers' need for flexibility with the protection of the interests 
of the UK employee for security of employment. This degree of flexibility 
tends to be incompatible with the need for the recruitment and retention
4
of highly skilled personnel. Recognition of this problem was given in the 
late 1950s by an attempt to develop a pension scheme. This was seen as a 
way to
encourage seafarers to make a career of the occupation and spend
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as much of their working life in the industry as possible 
and not in apjj out taking up other occupations at their 
convenience.
These factors mean that the industrial relations organisations 
and institutions are concerned with a labour force that is distant, 
fragmented, and highly mobile. Furthermore they have to operate, unlike 
shore-based industry, in an explicit legal framework because of the 
strategic and economic importance of the industry and the dangers of 
seafaring. Indeed, one of the main grounds on which the shipping 
industry has been regarded as unique is the extent to which it is 
directly governed by statute. If this is the only ground on which 
uniqueness is judged, then it cannot be denied that the shipping industry's 
relationship with the law is exceptional. There is no doubt that the 
law appears to have a more direct and constraining influence than is 
perhaps found in the industrial relations of any other industry.
Until 1970 the shipping industry was governed by the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 (MSA), and indeed much of this legislation remains in 
force. It is important in the context of this research since it sets out 
the legal parameters as constraints within which the various maritime 
industrial relations organisations and institutions had to develop. The 
1894 Act was a piece of consolidating legislation which brought all 
the law regarding shipping under the umbrella of one Act of Parliament.
In this Act the Board of Trade was designated 'the department to under­
take the general superintendence of all matters /jhy italics/ relating 
to merchant shipping and seamen'.** Its comprehensive nature cannot be 
in doubt since 'all matters' ranged from the rights of the shipowner to 
register under the Britisli flag, the standards both owner and master must 
adhere to in respect of the seaworthiness and manning of their ships, the 
competence, discipline and working conditions of the crews, and the
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question of lighthouse management and pilotage.^
While the MSA does not specifically legislate for industrial 
relations procedure it does place restrictions on the freedom of the sea­
farer when ne is in dispute with his employer. Under the MSA to strike 
while employed would be regarded, for example, as either desertion or 
mutiny and therefore as a criminal act. Seafarers do not have the protection 
of the provisions of the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 
and the 1906 Trade Disputes Act. The MSA has undoubtedly influenced 
the nature of collective bargaining and the attitude of the employer and 
seafarer to relationships within the industry.
The extent of this influence is extremely difficult to quantify 
but it is perhaps best illustrated by the status the Act gives to the 
Master. The Act places his total command of the ship in an unquestionable 
position and reinforces the hierarchical structure of the ship. The 
Master is not only placed in an unusual relationship with his fellow, 
if subordinate, employees but he also to some extent usurps what would 
be accepted as the normal position for the employer in any other industry.
The contract of employment, i.e. the articles of agreement, are made with 
him, albeit as the representative of the employer, and in most cases of 
breach of this contract he is the judge and final arbiter.17 Thus if 
a comparison of the Master's role is made with shore-based industry his 
situation is analogous to that of a plant manager but the power he 
possesses, however that may be justified in terms of safety, far exceeds 
any management function in other industries and indeed that of the 
employer ns well. This type of management removes the employer and 
employee from each other and whilst not necessarily intruding in their 
relationship, must affect it.
In a much more direct way the Master's legal right of command
I#
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makes the withdrawal of labour by the crew impossible, an important point
since their 'right to strike' is not legally protected as is the case
with shore-based workers. Similarly, the provision that the crew should
18
not combine to disobey a lawful command inhibited not only industrial 
action but also any kind of plant level organisation.
The quasi military type discipline created by the Act and based 
on the 'lawful command of the master' establishes a divisive element 
within the labour force. This together with the administrative hierarchy 
of officers and men makes the employer/employee relationship less clear- 
cut. The officers in many respects might be regarded as having, until 
recently, more community of interest with their employers than with their 
fellow seafarers.
Obviously not all the provisions of the Act impinge on industrial
relations, although any restrictions on the freedom of the employer or
employee may well inhibit the freedom of negotiations, for example in
the case of manning and safety regulations. Nevertheless much of what
might be regarded as the province of voluntary industrial relations came
within its purview, thus not only circumscribing the freedom of the
participants in the organisations but directly influencing the shape
of its formal institutions. This is perhaps best illustrated by its
coverage of matters such as supply, conditions of work, and methods of
19
payment.
The Act's regulations worked in two ways: either by setting fixed 
rules only some of which could be waived by the Board of Trade under
exceptional circumstances, or by setting minimum standards which could, 
of course, provide the basis for negotiation by the employer and employes.
In the matter of supply the regulations were specific and had to be 
strictly adhered to:
•If
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110. The Board of Trade may grant to such persons as the Board 
think fit licences to engage or supply seamen or apprentices 
for merchant ships in the United Kingdom, and any such licence shall 
continue for such period, and may be granted and revoked on such 
terms and conditions as the Board think proper.
111(1). A person shall not engage or supply a seaman or apprentice 
to be entered on board any ship in the United Kingdom, unless that 
person either holds a licence from the Board of Trade for that 
purpose, or is the owner or master or mate of the ship, or is 
bona fide the servant and in the constant employment of the owner 
or is a superintendent.
The penalty for contravention was a fine of 120 for each seaman or 
apprentice supplied.
The form of the seafarer's contract of employment was specifically 
approved by the Board of Trade and had to be entered into in the presence 
of a superintendent in the case of foreign-going vessels. A copy of 
the agreement was retained by the Board of Trade and any late alterations 
in the crew had to be notified to them before the ship left the United 
Kingdom; clearance of the vessel could be denied if the regulations were 
contravened. Whilst the Act did not specify the exact details of the 
rate of pay and hours of work etc., it did state exactly how and where 
the seamen should be paid, what allotment of pay could be made to 
relatives, and these provisions had to be included in the articles of 
agreement. The main terms the agreement was to contain are given as 
follows:
(a) Either the nature, and, as far as practicable, 
the duration of the intended voyage or engagement, or 
the maximum period of the voyage or engagement and the 
places or parts of the world, if any, to which the voyage 
or engagement is not to extend:
(b) The number and description of the crew, specifying «
how many are engaged as sailors:
(c) The time at which each seaman is to be on board or 
to begin work:
(d) The capacity in which each seaman is to serve:
(e) The amount of wages which each seaman is to receive:
M
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(f) A scale of the provisions which are to be furnished to 
each seaman:
(g) Any regulations as to conduct on board, and as to fines, 
short allowance of provisions, or other lawful punishment for 
misconduct which have been approved by the Board of Trade as 
regulations proggr to be adopted, and which the parties 
agree to adopt.
The approved agreement included coverage of requirements concerning 
medical supplies, the quality of food to be provided, and the acconmodation 
to be occupied by the crew. These were subject to minimum standards 
set out by the Board of Trade and a scale of compensation was laid 
down if food and accommodation were inadequate.
The extensive influence and range of legal provisions mean that 
much of what might be regarded as the province of voluntary industrial 
relations comes within the purview of the MSA. Furthermore, this 
legal framework circumscribes the freedom of both employees and employers. 
This problem is faced by all groups; for the employees the law denies 
any form of effective industry-wide shipboard organisation, an important 
deprivation because of the diversity and isolation of the workplace.
An effect exacerbated by the casual nature of the labour force; there 
will be little continuity of participation in their organisation's 
affairs which may to some extent lead the officials to discount rank and 
file opinion. This is perhaps less important for the officer and his 
professional organisation than for the rating and his trade union. For 
the employer, who is shore-based, there is no direct communication with 
his employees and his relationship with them is complicated by the 
position which the Master holds ar.d the function lie fulfils.
The greatest problem to be faced, therefore, is one of effective 
communication. One major hurdle to solving the communication problem 
is antipathy which is felt by all seafarers for the shore. Since the 
employer, all the industrial relations institutions, and their officials
I
<rl
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will be shore-based and no longer active seafarers, a problem of
identification is created. Indeed, it is this point concerning alienation
from the shore on which there is the greatest consensus among seafarers.
It is perhaps emphasised by the fact that all levels express the view
that between the shoreside officials of the shipping company and the
seafarer there is a 'wall' that is extremely difficult to penetrate.
'Shoreside', it is said, 'just don't want to know.' They 
treat you 'like bits of machinery' and so long as they man 
. the ships so they can sail are relatively indifferent to
the sailor's needs. They don't tell you when you are sailing, 
where you are going, how long you will be away, when you can 
go on leave, etc., etc. Moreover it is noticeable that 
these complaints that the sailor is treated as less than 
human are not only widg^pread today, but appear consistently 
in historical records.
It is just this 'wall' that the collective bargaining institutions 
must penetrate during consultations and negotiations if the system is to 
function at all. The relationship is not, however, a straightforward 
employer/eraployee one because of the constraints of state involvement 
and legislation and the complex structure of the ship. Collective 
bargaining must, therefore, also adapt itself to represent that structure, 
and since the ship is a total institution it must concern itself with 
a far wider range of conditions than would be considered appropriate 
in shore-based industries.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NATIONAL MARITIME BOARD
Industrial relations institutions and organizations reflect and
cater for the needs of the particular industry with which they are
concerned. While one of the major elements in industrial relations in
any industry is the supply of labour this assumes far greater importance
•in the shipping industry. The employer is concerned that he does not
lose control of supply because of his vulnerability at the point and
time of the vessels departure, and his desire to have flexibility in
his response to changing market conditions. For the employee, especially
the rating whose bargaining power in terms of skill is limited,1 the
question is fundamental since, without at least some control of supply,
any long-term collective industrial organization is impossible. The
fragmentation and casual nature of employment even within the industry
militates against effective organization unless there is some form of
institutionalised control in which they participate. The weakness of
the employees is compounded by the position in which they are placed by
the law, not least that they may only strike when they are unemployed.
The control of supply had been a matter of contention and
indeed confrontation between the employers, through their organization,
2
the Shipping Federation, and the ratings union, the National Sailors' 3
3
and Firemen's Union, since their formation in the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century. With the more impartial attitude towards 
employers' right of control by the Liberal Government after 1906, the
$
issue became and continued to be of crucial importance to both sides.
In this context the post-war collective bargaining structure, the 
National Maritime Board (N.M.B.) developed.
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This bi-partite organization was a modification of the machinery 
for negotiation set up by the Ministry of Shipping in the Autumn of 
1917. This was itself the outcome of earlier attempts to overcome 
delays in shipping caused by demands for increased wages, labour 
shortages in vessels carrying troops and stores for the Army and Navy. 
The public outcry against profiteering shipowners undoubtedly also 
played its part as did the submarine attacks on British and Allied 
shipping which severely exacerbated existing shipping problems.
The immediste problem in 1917 was the settlement of local 
stoppages, generally by ratings, on the North East coast which later 
spread to the Humber, Thames and South and West coast ports. These 
were 'adjusted after discussion with representatives of men and owners'^ 
but it became increasingly obvious that standardization of wages was 
essential if future disruption was to be averted and the supply of 
seamen was to be properly organized.^ To this end the Ministry of 
Shipping set up a Conciliation Committee with representatives from the 
National Seamen and Firemen's Union, the main ratings union, and the 
Shipping Federation, the organization which represented the large 
majority of employers. The idea being to encourage the setting up of 
a permanent committee to settle differences that might arise.
By late August a draft constitution had been agreed, for the 
formation of a Board whose aims would be to establish better cooperation 
for aattling differences, the Introduction of standard rates of pay and 
improved conditions of employment of seamen. Since control of supply 
had always been a major Issue between the employers and the ratings' 
union, and was a matter of prime importance to the government in war­
time, it was realized that any permanent solution to labour problems 
in the shipping Industry would require the matter of supply to be 
faced squarely. The statement made on these negotiations is perhaps a
29
nice example of civil service understatement and compromise:
Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding 
a satisfactory basis on which both parties would co­
operate, but these were eventually overcome by 
mebodying in the constitution a statement of the 
principle which each party considered vital to their 
interests.7
What emerged was a scheme for joint supply under which the shipowner 
would have the right to select his crew at any time through a jointly 
controlled supply office, with special arrangements, where necessary, 
for the coasting trade and the shipping of substitutes. On the other 
hand, the seamen were to have the right to select their ship. This 
scheme meant that the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union established 
itself as the main representative of ratings in any negotiations, and 
what is more, there was full acceptance of the union membership of 
seafarers.
The Shipping Federation represented most, but not all, the 
British shipowners, the most notable exception being the Liverpool 
Steamship Owners Association. This group was invited to join the 
negotiations but they declined as they were opposed to the principles 
underlying the function of the Board. Whilst the ratings were the prime 
concern and indeed the motivation for the formation of the Board, 
other grades of seafarer were soon involved. In October 1917 the tri­
partite N.M.B., with representatives of the employers, employees and 
the government, was constituted in four panels, and it also provided 
for the setting up of District Boards for the appointment of Port 
Consultants.
What is most remarkable about the N.M.B. is that it was 
reconstructed after the war with very little modification to its original 
constitution or the principle of joint supply for ratings. The main 
changes which occurred were related to the withdrawal of the Government
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which had acted as final arbiter when agreement could not be reached 
and had been responsible for the Board's finance, the provision of a 
secretariat, the appointment of chairmen. The new constitution 
embodied clauses enabling the bi-partite Board to fulfil these functions
g
for itself. However, the government remained indirectly involved in 
that Board of Trade Marine offices were still used for the joint 
supply scheme.
There was a relatively smooth transition from war to peace in
the shipping industry for a multiplicity of reasons. The plans for
reconstruction laid down by the government made it obvious that some
form of institutionalised collective bargaining was to be established
in most industries. In April 1918 the Ministry of Labour approached the
Shipping Federation with regard to the setting up of an Industrial
Council for the industry and they expressed themselves
Sympathetic towards the proposal. It is thought that 
the National Maritime Board and the District Maritime 
Boards which are now in operation ¿which included 
joint suppl^ will satisfy the objects of the Whitley 
Report so far as seamen are concerned.9
Even before the war some shipowners had recognized that 'whether we like
it or not collective bargaining has come to stay',*® Following their
experience in the war both the Shipping Federation and the seafarers
associations had come to appreciate what this would have to offer.
For the employees institutionalised collective bargsining, such 
ss that envisaged by the Liberal Coalition, necessitated national 
recognition of their organizations. This was something for which 
they had been striving for a number of years. For example, the 
engineering officers were pressing for recognition of their association 
as early as 1913.11 National negotiation could, of course, only be 
to their advantage since it increased their strength and made it more 
difficult for individual employers to lower wage rates. Furthermore,
m m  r n ^ m t o M  S * * » a* * * * s« <*
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as a result of the war the negotiations in the N.M.B. had been widened 
to include conditions of employment and this was an advantage they 
would be anxious to retain. A view not shared by the employers who 
pointed out to the Chairman of the National Maritime Board, a government 
official in 1918:
It must, however, have become quite obvious to you, 
as it has to them, £the representatives of the Shipping 
Federatioq7 that the various representatives of the 
employees have been as much concerned about the 
establishment of conditions of service not hitherto 
generally recognised as about the mere questions of
wages.12
The employers were concerned that the concessions made in war
time should not be regarded as setting precedents for the time when peace
and 'normal' conditions returned.
The truth is, therefore, that shipowners will be 
presented when their business is returned to them, 
with a condition of affairs in which labour is entirely 
demoralised and under which artificial rates of pay 
are enjoyed, based upon an unnatural condition of affairs 
entirely inconsistent with the principles of political 
economy. Whether or not natural conditions can be ..
restored without a fundamental dislocation of the trade.
This they saw as depending to a large extent on the leaders of the men,
both officers and ratings, but particularly the latter. The Shipping
Federation also recognized the importance of unity within their own
ranks. This was needed to ensure the proper implementation of uniform
wages and conditions in the normal times of peace and what became
increasingly important in view of events in the mining industry and on
the railways to ensure a smooth transition from war to peace:
The shipowners need first a complete and cohesive 
organisation based on those principles of sound democracy 
which are now receiving world-wide recognition, This 
they possess in the Shipping Federation though it is 
earnestly to be hoped that an important though comparat­
ively small minority (Liverpool Steamship Owners 
Association) which has hitherto thought it policy to 
maintain an independent association, will, in this 
crisis, throw in its lot with the majority of its fellow 
shipowners... shipowners owe it to themselves and the
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nation to put into the background their individual views 
and predilections, where they conflict for the moment 
with those which their representatives laid down as the 
essentials of a sound national policy. Individuals and 
independent effort will mean a disastrous dissipation 
of strength, unless directed on common lines.14
At a more specific level the Federation had experienced the
advantages of the Ratings Joint Supply Scheme which not only strengthened
their position as the employers' representatives but also gave some
assurance, particularly in times of potential industrial unrest, that
vessels would sail unimpeded. In addition, it would strengthen the
position of the main ratings union and they had learned they could rely
on that union's President, Havelock Wilson, for loyal cooperation.^
Again an important point in view of the threats to industrial peace and
the claim of the less amenable unions to represent the ratings.*® The
employers also wanted, as they stated in May 1919, tot
Secure the smooth and complete working of the Scheme in 
order that stability of labour conditions may be 
preserved during the critical period of reconstruction 
which lies a h e a d .17
Both the Shipping Federation and the National Sailors' and 
Firemen's Union were anxious to make sure they had at least some say in 
supply and so they were prepared to compromise on other issues, under 
pressure from the government, and establish the industry's bipartite 
collective bargaining machinery in 1920.
It is, however, unlikely that the employers would have co­
operated so readily to establish a permanent negotiating machinery and 
joint supply had they not felt under considerable external pressure.
On the one hand in the immediate post-war period, nationalization was 
a very real threat and furthermore the Shipping Federation was clear 
that:
The system of Industrial Councils recommended by the 
Whitley Report is one which all employers in the country 
will be expected to adopt if they are to avoid the 
suspicion of reactionary tendencies and escape the
responsibility in the public mind for any breaches of 
industrial peace which may occur in trades in which 
this machinery has not been adopted. 18
It was against this background that the reconstituted Board came
into operation on 1 January 1920 'as a Joint Industrial Council on the
linea of the Whitley Scheme, disassociated from the Ministry of Shipping'
19
with a wider representation than before. The Constitution stated that:
1. OBJECTS - With a view to securing closer co-operation between 
the employers and employed of the British Mercantile Marine 
in the maintenance of the maritime supremacy of the British 
Empire there shall be constituted a Board known as the 
National Maritime Board and District Panels for the purpose of:-
(a) The prevention and adjustment of differences between 
Shipowners and Masters, Seamen and Apprentices;
(b) The establishment, revision, and maintenance of a National 
Standard rate (or rates) of wages and approved conditions 
of employment in the Mercantile Marine;
(c) The establishment of a single source of supply of sailors 
and firemen jointly controlled by employers and employed 
in accordance with the following general principles:-
i. The Shipowner shall have the right to select his own 
crew at any time through a jointly controlled supply 
office.
ii. Equal rights of registration and employment must be
secured for all Seamen. Raw recruits to be registered 
as such.
iii. The Seamen shall have the right to select their ship.
2. CONSTITUENT PANELS - The National Maritime Board shall consist 
of the six following Panais, vi«i-
a. Shipmasters' Panel;
b. Navigating Officers' Panel;
c. Engineer Officers' Panel;
d. Radio Officers' Panel (added in 1942);
e. Sailors' and Firemen's Panel;
f. Catering Department P a n e l . 20
The Constitution also stipulated in its final clauses 'that the 
parties will neither assist nor encourage strikes or lock-outs, nor pay 
any Indemnity or strike pay, until such times as the differences or
dispute between the Shipowner and the Seaman have been referred to and 
dealt with by the Port Consultant, the District Panel and also should
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it prove necessary the whole N.M.B.',
The machinery was based, therefore, on a series of Panels which
directly reflected the on-board structure of the ship (see diagram).
The Shipping Federation had actively opposed an alternative
suggestion that there should be mixed committees to represent officers
and men. This suggestion had come about following the formation early
in 1919 of the Seafarers' Council which claimed to represent all grades
of sea-going personnel. The Shipping Federation took the view that:
The whole principle underlying this combination is, of 
course, destructive of discipline on board ship, and, 
if the policy of the Seafarers' Joint Council is 
successful will undoubtedly be productive of a great 
deal of trouble and disorganisation among crews.
They, therefore,
insisted that they would only take part in an industrial 
council upon which the various sections of the personnel 
were represented separately and independently on Panels 
which would deal with matters appertaining to the grade 
which they represented.22
This involved both the separation of officers from men and officers from 
officers since there were two separate panels for deck and engine room 
officers.
Within this panel framework the N.M.B. could operate on three levels 
the most important being that of the individual panels. The Master's 
Panel did not exist in the original government-sponsored N.M.B. Their 
organicstion pressed for one but the shipowners objected on the grounds 
of the unique position the Master held as a confidential employee. Such 
a position should, therefore, not be the subject of discussion within 
the Board. The 1919 Constitution made provision for a Masters' Panel, 
but the influence of the previous objections is much in evidence. For 
while there were six representatives elected from the three Masters' 
organizations of the day a further six representatives had to be sea­
going Masters 'elected by Masters by means of a ballot amongst seagoing
Masters, in accordance with a system to be mutually agreed between
23
organizations representing Masters .... and Shipowners'. The scheme
21
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served to severely limit the activities of the Masters' Panel and it
explains why it did not meet between 1921 and 1943, There were a few
meetings in the late war years, but none from 1945 t- 1963. In that
year, with the cooperation of the Shipowners, the complicated electoral
procedure secured six representative Masters. A meeting was convened
at which the Panel was reconstituted on similar lines to the others with
twelve representatives of the Masters, the majority from the Mercantile
24
Marine Services Association (M.M.S.A.). One important difference «till 
remains, there is no N.M.B. scale of wages for Masters. These are still 
determined by the individual companies, although increases are usually 
related to those gained by Chief Engineers within the N.M.B.
The Navigating Off leers' Panel is comprised of the relevant
officers organization, currently the Merchant Navy and Airline Officers'
25
Associations (M.N.A.O.A.) and the M.M.S.A. for the employees, although
the latter does not recruit navigating officers below the rank of
Master. The Engineering Officers'Panel also includes the MNAOA and the
only essentially shore based union of importance within the industry,
26
the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.
The Radio Offleers'Panel, although part of the tri-partite
N.M.B., was not included in the reconstituted Board until 1942, This
is probably due to the bellicose attitude of the radio officers
representatives and in any event Shipowners hired the radio officers
from wireless companies rather than employing them direct. The Panel
was re-instituted as part of wartime modifications. It was at this
point that the Marine Wireless Employers' Negotiating Committee was
elected to the Panel on the employers side, the Radio and Electronic
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Officers Union representing the employees,
All the officers'panels may meet together as a Joint Panel 
which often negotiates as a body with the employers' representatives
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which are in all cases members of the Shipping Federation.
The ratings are not divided into deck and engine room as is the 
case with the officers; they are represented on a single panel, the 
Sailors and Firemen's Panel. This was the original Panel of the N.M.B.
The Ministry of Shipping experienced considerable difficulty in its 
creation for it meant some satisfactory basis had to be discovered on 
which the Shipping Federation and the Seamen's Union would cooperate.
The acceptance of the principle of joint control of the supply of labour 
meant the construction of this Psnel became possible. The N.U.S. 
continues to be the most important representative body of Deck and 
Engine-room Ratings, with one seat being allocated to an official of 
the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and 
Structural Workers. They are not party to the closed shop agreement 
and are there to protect the interests of carpenters and other skilled 
tradesmen whose conditions are regulated by this Panel.
The Catering Panel was instituted during the First World War.
The employees being represented originally by the National Union of 
Ships Stewsrds, Cooks, Butchers and Bakers, In the Spring of 1921 this 
organization called a strike to protest st the N.M.B.'s reduction in
28
wages and changes in conditions of employment and it left the N.M.B.
The vacancy was filled by the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union 
and the Marine Caterers' Guild, The latter soon collapsed leaving the 
national Union as the sole representative, despite the fact that their 
membership only Included a small minority of such rstings. The 
union sttempted to rectify this with numerous and expensive recruiting 
campaigns but found little response within the catering department, 
particularly of the large passenger liners. Eventually in 1942 an 
agreement with the liner companies brought catering ratings within the 
purview of the sailors' and firemen's pre-entry closed shop provision.
i
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Since then the N.U.S. has both represented and organized this depart­
ment. The Bakers Union, though not a party to the closed shop agree­
ment holds a watching brief in the negotiations of the Panel. The 
Joint Ratings' Panel is a combination of the Catering Staff and the 
Sailors and Firemen's Panels.
The Full Board of the N.M.B. is constituted by the Panels sitting 
simultaneously. Both the employers and employees are entitled to 
seventy representatives, which suggests the meetings might be somewhat 
unwieldy. However, the quorum requires only fifteen representatives from 
either side. In the original constitution it was intended that the 
Full Board should meet at least once every six months. Meetings are 
in practice only held when, in the opinion of either side of any panel, 
a question needs submitting to the whole Board.
In the case of all Panels and the Full Board the N.M.B. has a 
system of joint chairmen, and joint secretaries, one from either side 
and serving at alternate meetings. The N.M.B. itself has a very small 
secretariat, consisting of a General Secretary, sometimes known as the 
Clerk-in-Charge, and some clerical assistants.
The third tier of the N.M.B. is the District Maritime Boards, 
often referred to as District Panels or Comnittees. They were instituted 
to deal expeditiously with localised difficulties. The primary 
importance of the original agreement between the National Union and the 
Shipping Federation is emphasised here. For while the need for District 
Panels is made clear in the N.M.R. constitution, excepting the Masters' 
Panel, only District Panels for Sailors and Firemen were actually 
established, nn agreement being made some time later to allow the 
catering department to use the facilities. The structure of the District 
Panels is similar to that of the national ones, with joint chairmen and 
secretaries. These panels were empowered to appoint representatives.
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one or more from each side, to be known as Port Consultants. Their 
duties come under two broad and closely associated headings. Firstly, 
to ensure an adequate supply of seamen, in order to avoid any delay 
in vessels sailing, and secondly to prevent or settle any grievance or 
dispute at local level on either a temporary or permanent basis. Such 
settlement has to be achieved within the structure for Port Consultants 
have 'no power to alter, vary or amend any rules, rates, scales,
29
principles or procedures formulated by the National Maritime Board'.
If the Port Consultant fails to achieve a settlement he refers it to 
the District Panel and should it prove ineffective to the National 
Panel concerned, and finally, if necessary, to the Full Board,
The standard of uniform wage which had been implemented during 
the war was maintained by the reconstituted N.M.B, However, whilst in 
the case of ratings this became, and remained, the rate of pay for all 
ratings of any particular grade, for the officers it tended merely to 
represent a minimus. The reason for this was undoubtedly because the 
officers were neither included in the joint supply scheme nor was union 
membership by any means a matter of course; if anything the reverse 
was the case; therefore the bargain between employer and employee was 
for the officer a far more individual matter.
An examination of the minutes do, for the first year of its 
work, show that the majority of matters considered by the Board were 
single or Individual issues of dispute, which were most often settled 
at District level. There was discussion of wages and hours of labour 
by the Full Board, that is all the Panels meeting together but the 
Full Board only met four times during the year. The national panels 
of the Board met singly or jointly on eighty-two occasions during the 
first year, 'Two meetings of the Masters' Psnel; five meetings of the 
Navigstlng Officers' Panel; seven meetings of the Engineer Officers'
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Panel; ten meetings of the Sailors' and Firemen's Panel; and eight 
meetings of the Catering Department Panel - together with forty-six 
meetings of Committees constituted by the Panels singly or jointly'.30
In addition, the District Panels, which were concerned solely 
with ratings, met ninety times in various ports of the U.K. These 
meetings, together with the eighteen for ratings at national level, 
highlight two major points that need to be made about the early years 
of the work of the N.M.B.: firstly the prime concern in terms of 
labour was with the supply of ratings, especially seamen and firemen, 
and secondly the point at which the N.M.B. did most of its work was in 
the district. Most problems which arose were local ones, often 
involving a single ship, and these were resolved by the local represent­
atives of both sides. It was only when a solution could not be reached 
or where District decisions needed confirmation by the National Panel 
or Full Board that they were referred back to the central organisation.
The General Secretary's summary of the way in which the Board
measured its work for the first year makes these points very clearly:
In measuring the work of the various Panels it is necessary 
to bear in mind that in addition to 'progressive' legislation, 
the task of administering existing agreements and settling 
individual disputes not unnaturally attains considerable 
dimensions. Whereas in the case of many land industries, 
the scope of a National Wages Board may extend to no more 
than a fifty or a hundred factories, the pruview of the 
Nationsl Maritime Board covers some 7,000 individual 
'factories' afloat, with varying circumstances of trade 
construction, and complement. The magnitude of this branch 
of the Board's activities has varied, to some extent, 
according to the number of ratings affected in the case of 
each Panel, For example, while the Engineer Officers' Panel 
settled 69 claims affecting 30 vessels, and the Catering 
Department Panel 78 disputes in 65 of which a specific 
vessel was involved, the Sailors' and Firemen's Panel 
disposed of 206 cases, involving 175 different vessels,
Further, the local machinery of the Sailors' and 
Firemen's Panel has been of great utility..., (they) have 
during the past year settled disputes on 175 vessels, over and 
above the 150 cases which, for various reasons, they referred 
to the National Panel for decision.
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He concluded by saying with regard to the past and the future:
As regards the Board's work as a whole, the year has gone 
far to demonstrate the success of a Joint Council of 
Shipping resting on a purely voluntary basis and dependent 
on mutual goodwill between the Employer and Employed and on 
recognition of a common interest, the prosperity of the 
industry and all engaged therein.31
A statement which must have gratified the hearts of those in the Ministry 
of Reconstruction.
The work of the Board's early years concentrated on the problems 
of the supply of ratings and the avoidance of strikes by this group of 
seafarers. The situation was made more complicated by the fact that 
there were a number of unions claiming to represent ratings; for 
example the British Seafarers based mainly in Glasgow and Southampton, 
and the Hull Sailors and Marine Firemen's Amalgamated Association 
concerned with the Humber ports. Such societies were anxious to
participate in or at least influence N.M.B. proceedings, and this resulted
32
in a degree of inter-union rivalry. Theoretically these other organ-
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izations were represented where appropriate, but the N.S.F.U. was 
intent on using its superior position as the most representative national 
union to achieve a closed shop status. A situation to which most ship­
owners were not averse since the N.S.F.U. had shown itself very amenable 
to cooperation and dealing with one union on a national basis could 
only be advantageous in achieving peace and unity.
The closed shop for the N.S.F.U. was achieved during the 1920s.
The opportunity which first presented itself was the need for re­
organization of the Joint Control of the supply of ratings in 1922. The 
government was anxious to demonstrate its impartiality in regard to the 
joint industrial councils and, therefore, it discontinued the use of 
the Bosrd of Trade local marine offices for implementing the joint 
supply scheme. The N.M.B. then had to establish its own offices for
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this purpose to ensure that the scheme continued. To this end a
document, the Port Consultant No. 5 (P.C.5), came into being which
meant that separate offices did not have to be maintained except
in special cases. The P.C.5 was dispensed by the N.S.F.U. and had to
be signed by it and the Shipping Federation. A rating could not be
employed without this document and the system was said to be 'very soon
working smoothly, Generally a very favourable reception was accorded
to the system, which is recognized as a business like method of
regulating engagements convenient to shipowners and protective of the
34
interests of the bona fide seamen'. Initially it was not taken up 
in every port, and the other unions were obviously against its use since 
'bona fide seamen' soon came to mean only members of the N.S.F.U.
However, the need for change did provide the chance for the joint control
scheme to be implemented, at least in part, in ports which had hitherto
35
not been included satisfactorily.
The P.C.5 minimised the potential influence of rival unions and 
eventually was the method by which they were destroyed. Shipowners 
instructed their Masters to employ only men with P.C.5s. This agree­
ment was questioned by a seaman who was refused employment because of 
his membership of a rival union. In the case of Reynolds v. The Shipping 
Federation (1924), the Judge ruled the agreement to be legitimate on the 
grounds that it was not 'a malicious desire to inflict loss on an individual 
or class of individuals, but for a desire to advance the business
interest of employers and employed alike to maintain the advantages of
36
collective bargaining and control'. Thus the Shipping Federation was 
instrumental in legitimising the closed shop in Britain, with their 
participation it became progressively enforced and has since been 
strictly maintained for ratings within the industry. Soon after its 
implementation the use of the P.C.5 was combined with a registered rota
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system: the longest ashore was the first employed.37 These develop­
ments facilitated the N.M.B.s achievement in industrial peace, which 
was only marginally disturbed by unofficial action in the 1920s.
The inter-war years were a period of consolidation during which 
there were no organizational changes, although the panel structure was 
expanded to include a panel for the radio officers. These were changes 
in emphasis as the pre-entry closed shop for ratings became general, 
and the national decisions on wages and conditions more thoroughly 
implemented by the employers. Thus the necessity for intervention or 
conciliation by the District Panels lessened. By the mid-1930s there 
had been a very definite move to centralisation such as could be found 
in most other industries.
One of the main reasons why there was less pressure at District 
level was the high rate of unemployment that ensured an abundance of 
labour. The joint supply scheme was, therefore, during this period 
never fully tested. In the depression the casual nature of seafaring 
was not necessarily apparent since those leaving the industry tempor­
arily or permanently were easily replaced, and in any event demand was 
low. To be regarded as successful the scheme had to be capable of 
providing an adequate supply of labour in all economic circumstances.
In the improved economic situstion of the late 1930s with its increased 
job opportunities ashore, seafaring was a less attractive occupation 
and recruitment and retention began to create difficulties as demand 
rose. The problem was a shortage of manpower and it became clear that 
the N.M.B.'s joint supply scheme based solely on the use of the P.C.5
|
did not in itself ensure an adequate supply of labour in all circumstances.
It is pointless to speculate how the N.M.B. might have been 
modified to meet this demand for labour in the industry had it not been 
for the advent of war. War again meant that the government intervened 
in the shipping industry to ensure the proper and adequate supply of
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labour, on this occasion with legislation in the form of the Essential
Work Order and the Merchant Navy Reserve Tool, These regulations took
the matter of policy out of the hands of the N.M.B. which was left
merely with the administration of the Essential Work Order.
The ending of the war provided an opportunity to re-assess the
situation and to adapt to the demands and potential demands of the
post-war years. The main question remained one of supply, there was
no desire for the industry to return to the casualisation which had
always epitomised the seafaring labour force, in particular for ratings.
In addition the structure of the national labour market had altered
with the state's commitment to full employment which had implications
for the supply of all grades of maritime personnel.
The scheme of supply which was put into operation when the
Essential Work Order was repealed was far more elaborate than that which
existed before the war. The former joint control of the supply of
ratings now became merely part of a scheme which covered the whole
industry. The object of the new Established Service Scheme was to:
enable seafarers after a qualifying period of sea service 
to look to the Merchant Navy to offer them a stable and 
attractive career and greater regularity of employment 
and give Shipowners efficient and reliable personnel 
to man and maintain their ships at sea and in port.38
Under this scheme there were three categories of service which
applied to both officers and ratlngs:-
1. The established seafarer who accepted a two year General 
Service contract with the Administration.
2. The Company Contract men who signed similar contracts to the
I
above but with individual shipping companies. A form of contract 
which in the main applied to officers.
3. Unestablished men who had no wish to take part in the Scheme
or were newcomers to the industry and so forfeited the right 
39to these benefits. (
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The firat two groups qualified for preference of employment and 
payment while awaiting employment in addition to state unemployment 
benefit.
The responsibility for the working of the scheme was delegated 
to the employers* organizations, the Shipping Federation and the 
Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool. The employers in this 
role were designated as the Administration, although a Central Consnittee, 
with equal representation from the seafarers organizations and the 
Administration, determine
(i) the number on the General Service Contract from time 
to time;
(ii) the appointment of seafarers to ships or for relief or 
other duties; and
(iii) disciplinary measures.
Local committees were also to be established 'with such functions as may
AO
be delegated to them by the Central Committee'.
An important departure from previous practice in the scheme was
the inclusion of a disciplinary structure in the collective bargaining
machinery. As was argued earlier, maritime discipline is regarded as
a matter of prime importance necessitating legal enforcement to a
degree which would be unacceptable in shore based industry. This attitude
to discipline is reflected in the new agreement with responsibility for
for enforcement being spread across both the employers' organizations
and the seafarers societies.
Clause 6(q) DISCIPLINE - The Administration may impose 
penalties... if an Established Employee falls to carry 
out his obligations under the General Service Contract 
(including reporting as required by the Administration) 
or for inefficiency or misconduct or conduct prejudicial 
to discipline whilst employed by a Shipowner, or whilst 
attending an instructional course, even is fuch mis­
conduct has already been punished in accordance with the 
law..., a seafarer may appeal to the Administration
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against the punishment either on the question of guilt 
or severity of the punishment... The Head Office of 
the Administration after consultation with the Central 
Committee may at its discretion decide to interview 
the appellant and either vary or confirm its previous 
decision.
Hence the Established Service Scheme involved all the unions quite 
explicitly for the first time in the matter of discipline, superimposing 
as it did a new disciplinary structure on to the Merchant Shipping Act.
The final authority over the Scheme lay with the Central 
Administration, i.e. the employers, albeit in a role that was intended 
to be detached and impartial. It appears that the unique position in 
which the employers were placed by this agreement was accepted quite 
readily by the unions, which is perhaps remarkable in view of the 
N.U.S.'s commitment to joint supply. Presumably the pre-entry closed 
shop, which this agreement indirectly reinforced, and the partial de- 
casualisation were regarded as prise enough. For the officers' organ­
isations the agreement was much more of a departure and it meant a 
closer involvement in the collective bargaining institutions, which 
must have strengthened their overall position. At this stage they did 
not have and, indeed, many did not want a closed shop.
With the implementation of the Established Service Scheme on 
31 March 1947, there was a comprehensive structure governing the relation­
ships between employers and employees that extended beyond the boundaries 
of the N.M.B. (see diagram). The post war modifications had not 
altered the fundamental link between the on-board organization of the 
ship, the seafarers associations and their separate panel representation.
It also continued to be the case that, while the N.U.S. had a closed 
shop and negotiated only within the N.M.B., not all officers were 
members of trade organizations and the officers associations negotiated
both within the N.M.B., which set minimum wages and conditions, and with
I
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individual companies. Unlike shore-based industry no employees' 
organization possessed any form of shipboard, that is workplace, 
representation, and the role of the administration in the operation of 
the Established Service Scheme, with its new disciplinary procedure, 
strengthens the position of the employers.
It may be claimed that by 1947 maritime industrial relations 
had reached maturity. While the main impetus for the collective 
bargaining machinery and joint supply had been the needs of two major 
wars their institutionalisation offered important advantages of 
stability, unity and strength, to both employers and employees. The 
modifications embodied in the Established Service Scheme attempted to 
provide a flexible system of supply which would be capable of adjusting 
to all economic circumstances and particularly the problems which the 
policy of full employment could present to the shipping industry. On 
the one hand it provided for a large degree of decasualisation which 
it was hoped would ensure a stable supply of reliable well-trained 
labour, while at the same time the unestablished seafarers would be 
available to meet commercial vagaries and consequent short-term changes 
in demand at industry level. At company level the Scheme retained 
all the advantages of a totally casual market.
This recognition of the new needs of the industry after the 
Second World War did not mean certain fundamental assumptions about 
maritime industrial relations had been discarded. Firstly, the 
structure continued to directly reflect nineteenth century technology 
and secondly, the need for the legal enforcement of discipline 
remained unquestioned, at least at an official level, and indeed, 
had been underlined by the acceptance of Institutionalised industrial 
disciplinary procedures. This conversatism is hardly surprising 
since the increasingly centralised institutions had apparently served
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the industry well. Its disputes procedure had resulted in a complete 
disappearance of the many localised disputes on wages and conditions 
that had characterised the industry before its inception; further­
more no major national disruptions or official strikes had been 
experienced. What is remarkable is that these institutions have 
remained virtually unaltered in the last thirty years in sptte of the 
fact that during these years the industry has undergone fundamental 
changes which have had a direct impact on manpower.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT
Industrial relations institutions function in a dynamic industrial 
and economic context to which they are bound to respond and react. In 
the case of shipping the context is an international one and in the period 
since the Second World War the shipping industry as a whole has experienced 
a massive growth not only in terms of tonnage but also in the number of 
maritime fleets operating in the world market. This growth is a result 
of a similar increase in seaborne trade, a redistribution of trade 
patterns, and technological progress.
Against this background the British shipping industry has undergone 
a period of challenge and change which has been particularly intense since 
the late 1950s. Britain has lost her historically predominant position, the 
maintenance of which the N.M.B. has as one of its main objectives. Her 
percentage share of the world fleet has fallen in gross tonnage terms from
34 per cent in 1919 to 22 per cent in 1949 and to 7 per cent in 1979.*
This contraction of fleet size, together with the competitiveness of the 
newer fleets has important implications for employment opportunities, the 
cost and deployment of labour, and consequently for maritime industrial 
relations.
The decline is perhaps more significant than the figures indicate 
since it took place against a background of growth in world demand.
Throughout the post war years there has been a steady growth in the
volume of international seaborne trade from 360 million metric tons loaded 
in 1946 to 3,390 in 1978, This is related in the main to the massive 
growth in the gross national product of the industrialized nations 
(O.E.C.D.), countries which account for approximately 85 per cent of
world industrial production and about 75 per cent of world exports by 
value and 75 per cent of international seaborne tonnage imported. This 
has been allied to a redistribution of trade together with the growth of 
the movement of bulk commodities, in particular, oil. Furthermore the 
attitude of industry in general to transportation has undergone a radical 
change since the Second World War. Transport is no longer seen as a modal 
or collection of individual methods of the carriage of goods, rather it is 
now regarded as a total method of distribution where modes interlock in a 
process from point of production, of either manufactured goods or raw 
materials, to retail outlet. Shipping, therefore, has in some respects 
become merely a sector of a distribution system rather than an entity in 
itself; an example of this is the development of containerization. On 
the other hand shipping itself has become more specialized in the carriage 
of particular cargoes, for example the bulk carriage of gas, chemicals and 
grain. This development, aimed at achieving optimum efficiency on specific 
routes, involves a certain loss of flexibility since specialist vessels 
cannot be moved from trade to trade as in the case of traditional tonnage.
To some extent this may serve to explain why U.K. shipowners did 
not take advantage of the international growth in trade to the same extent 
as some of their rivals; the most obvious examples being the fleets of 
Liberia, Japan and Greece. Table 4.1 shows the growth of the principal 
merchant fleets since 1948. If Liberia and Japan are ignored (the growth 
of the latter's fleet being related to the expansion of the national 
economy and extremely liberal credit facilities which encouraged maritime 
development) and the comparison is made between the remaining countries 
in the table, all of whom has broadly similar financial and organizational 
arrangements, the U.K. fleet still has a slow growth rate overall. A 
comparison with similar maritime powers was made for the period 1958-1968 
and it was discovered that the fleets of Sweden, Denmark, Finland,and
Portugal had Increased by between one-third and two-thirds, while, in the
2
same period, the British fleet grew by 8 per cent.
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TABLE 4.1
GROWTH OF THE PRINCIPAL MERCHANT FLEETS 1948-1978 
¿100 GROSS REGISTERED TONS AND OVER)
Flag
Between
1948-58
(1948-100)
Between
1958-68
(1958-100)
Between
1968-78
(1968-100)
Between
1948-78
(1948-100)
U.K. 112 108 141 171
Japan 534 358 200 3,828
Norway 220 209 133 613
Greece 125 460 446 2,570
Germany - 161 149 (240)*
Liberia - 255 311 (796)*
SOURCE: Calculated from Lloyda Register of Shipping
* 1958-78
In comparison with the fastest growing fleets such as Liberia and 
Greece the British performance pales into insignificance. The development 
of fleets such as those of Liberia and Panama has been one of the most 
important features of world shipping in the post war years. These fleets 
which have also included Honduras and more recently Cyprus and Singapore 
have become known as flags of convenience. The nations concerned have 
opened maritime registries to encourage foreign capital investment and they 
offer the shipowners the advantage of low taxation, insurance and maintenance
3
cost, and, perhaps most important of all low labour costs.
This growth of the world's fleets took place in conjunction with 
major technological advances which were a response both to the strength of 
world demand and a concomitant pressure for a fall in unit costs. There 
was an overall growth in vessel size, an improvement in speed capability, 
together with an increasing use of automation. External to the industry, 
but very important to certain sections of it, was the development of civil 
aviation. All are factors with which the maritime nations had to contend
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or absorb. It could perhaps be argued that the newer maritime fleets 
were in a better position than that of the U.K. to take advantage of 
technological change but this by no means fully explains Britain's 
declining position or her failure to grasp the opportunities which were 
offered.
Developments in marine engineering have enabled a growth in the 
viable size of vessels. Tankers were in the vanguard of the movement 
toward much larger units but this has been followed to some degree by all 
types of vessels. Table 4.2 shows the amount of tonnage in the highest 
weight category in the world tanker fleet for selected years since 1938.
TABLE 4.2
TONNAGE OF WORLD TANKER FLEET IN HIGHEST WEIGHT CATEGORY 
SELECTED YEARS 1938 - 1979
Deadweight
Tons 1938 1953 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1979
25,000 ♦ 16.6
25 - 45,000 3.1
45 - 65,000 0.2
105 - 125,000 0.1
125 - 205,000 0.1
285,000 + 2.0 20.3
350,000 ♦ 24.9
World Total 
(million D.W.T.)
16.6 35.5 41.0 64.0 90.1 155.7 291.4 348,7
SOURCE: Maritime Transport O.E.C.D.
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The increase in vessel size has been matched by an increase in 
speed. Table 4.3 indicates a consistent trend towards vessels capable 
of higher speeds. This has again necessitated greater skill on the 
part of engineers with more complex methods of propulsion, while the 
navigators are not only handling far larger vessels but ones which are 
travelling at increased speed.
TABLE 4.3
ANALYSIS BY SPEED OF U.K. MERCHANT VESSELS OF 500 G.R.T. AND OVER
Knots
1949
Number of 
1959
Vessels
1969 1979
Under 10 137 347 51 7
10 - 12 1,076 854 353 167
12 - 14) 629 871 528 271
14) - 17 531® 640 775 540
17 - 20 208® 210 184
20 and over 85 136
Total 2,370 2,950 2,002 1,305
SOURCE: Annual Abstract H.M.S.O. 
NOTE: (a) and over.
Like most industries over the last thirty years shipping has 
experienced a general movement towards automation with specific 
implications for manpower. The steady decline in engine room manning is 
directly related to the change in fuel type, that is from coal to oil 
burning, and the growth of the motor ship. In addition, control of the 
engine running is such that it no longer requires a standing watch, with 
the result that apart from docking, sailing, or emergencies the engine
(
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room work may be regarded as day work. Navigation has undergone similar 
advances with the development of radar and self-steering directly 
affecting the deck rating. The automatic and electronic aids to 
navigation also modify the role of the navigating officer and could 
provide an expansion and a security of employment for the Radio Officer. 
Catering has also developed automatic techniques, thereby reducing job 
opportunities. The speed of turn round has been increased. This 
originally affected the tankers and bulk carriers but has now become a 
major factor in respect of the container, lash and roll-on-roll-off 
vessels whose prime object is to cut port time.
The impact of all these changes has been to alter the structure 
of the British fleet both in terms of ownership and type of vessel. 
Merchant operators, that is companies carrying primarily their own 
products and cargoes or those of associated companies, have become of
growing importance within the industry. At the same time liner and tramp
4
operators have diversified their activities in order to spread the 
commercial risk and no longer maintain a strict division of operation 
between trades for example with the movement of ownership into tanker 
tonnage.^ The period since the Second World War has witnessed major 
alterations in the make up of the fleet. The effects have not, however, 
been uniform in all sectors of the industry as Table 4,4 indicates.
As the table illustrates, the passenger liner has contracted dramatically 
in both tonnage and number. This was a sector to which the industry was 
heavily committed; in 1950 it made up approximately one quarter of the 
fleet in tonnage terms. Following the heavy losses of the war, a 
renewal programme was embarked upon with vessels totalling 1.5 million 
tons being completed between 1946 and 1962. However, in the period 
1958 to 1968, the U.K, passenger fleet fell from 2.511 million.
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TABLE 4.4
U.K. MERCHANT VESSELS BY NUMBER AND DEADWEIGHT TONS 1950-79 
of 500 G.R.T. and OveT — ~
{ÖÖÖ]
Vessel Trade 1950 1955 1961 1967 1970 1975 1979
Passenger No. 290 b 323 274 173 129 116 101
D.W.T. (3,916) 1,947 1,674 919 575 254 174
Cargo Liner No. 1,671 2,111& 1,047 813 762 514 346
D.W.T. (9,946)" 14,018 8,094 6,908 7,003 5,557 4,561
Tramp No. 844 559 410 307 262
D.W.T. 5,884 3,450 2,310 1,435 951
Bulk No. 155 190 267 203
Carriers D.W.T. 4,004 5,890 13,761 11,299
Tankers No.
475 b 607 643 481 486 478 393
D.W.T. (3,029)" 7,515 10,742 12,167 20,370 30,909 24,236
All No. 2,440 b 3,041 2,808 2,181 1,977 1,682 1,305
Vessels D.W.T. (16,891) 23,480 26,425 27,448 36,148 51,916 41,221
SOURCE: Chamber of Shipping ReporCe and G.C.B.S. British Shipping Statiatica. 
NOTES:
a. All dry cargo.
b. ( ) Gross Registered Tons.
c. Only 13 of these are deep sea liners - the remainder are short sea ferries.
approximately one quarter of the world's fleet, to 1.415 million tons, one 
fifth of the world total, although the Queen Elizabeth II, presumably the 
last of the large traditional passenger liners, was completed in 1968.
The experience of the world seagoing passenger fleet was similar: only 
considering vessels over 1000 tons. It contracted from 8,163 million tons 
to 6,734 million tons, The only traditional fleet to expand, due largely 
to government support, was Italy from 729 to 811 millions. This expansion
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was matched by other lower paidf but non-traditional, passenger carriers 
like Portugal, Greece and flag of convenience countries often under 
Greek management. Two further exceptions to the general trend were the 
U.S.S.R. and the high wage Norwegian fleet.
Basically the reason for the decline in passenger traffic is the 
unprecedented rise in competition from aircraft, whose development even 
the most optimistic observer could hardly have foreseen. The airlines 
achieved remarkable success on the most important of passenger routes over 
the North Atlantic, where there were no scheduled passenger flights before 
1946. On this route seasonal peaks, and the over-tonnaging that implies, 
were particularly important; travel by sea in the winter months being, 
in general, uncomfortable. Air transport thus entered an area of operation 
with not only the advantage of heavy demand, but also with long winter 
periods when sea competition was severely restricted. The extent of civil 
aviation's inroad into sea passenger transport is typified by the 
experience on the North Atlantic. The experience since 1955 is illustrated 
in Table 4.5.
Increasing demand for passages on the North Atlantic is associated 
with the higher income levels which have been generated since 1945. These 
initielly created a situation where, while the percentage travelling by 
air increased dramatically, the number taking passage by sea also continued 
to increase until 1957. A fsctor explaining in part the substantial 
investment in passenger tonnage during the period. Since 1957, with the 
exception of 1962, saa passages have declined steadily and often 
substantially. Preoccupation with the Blue Ribbon routes gives a somewhat 
misleading impression since other long distance passenger carriage continued 
well into the 1970s. For example, the Australian route was still under­
pinned by emigrants, taking a considerable quantity of luggage, and this,
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TABLE 4.5
DEVELOPMENT OF AIR AND SEA PASSENGER TRAFFIC 
BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE
Year
By Sea By Air
Thousand
Passengers
Per Cent 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Over
Previous Year
Thousand
Passengers
Per Cent 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Over
Previous Year
Air Traixic 
as
Percentage
of
Total
Traffic
1955 964 3 652 16 40
1956 1,018 6 785 20 44
1957 1,036 2 968 23 48
1958 957 - 8 1,193 23 55
1959 880 - 8 1,367 15 61
1960 865 - 2 1,760 29 67
1961 782 -10 1,919 9 71
1962 814 4 2,272 18 74
1963 788 - 3 2,422 7 75
1964 712 -10 3,069 27 81
1965 649 - 9 3,611 18 85
1966 606 - 7 4,198 16 87
1967 506 -17 4,987 19 91
1968 375 -26 5,258 5 93
1969 335 -11 5,996 14 95
1970 249 -26 7,202 20 97
SOURCE: Maritime Transport 1970 O.E.C.D.
plus the economics of aircraft use, meant that until 1967 sea passengers 
rose steadily; since then, contraction has been at a gradual pace. The 
main Initial impetus for the decline of routes to the East was the closure 
of the Suez csnal rather than air competition. The growth in the ability of 1
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airline* to compete has been at the root of the lack of investment in 
passenger tonnage, which is a corollary of the very low profit levels 
which are often not capable of covering depreciation. The fall in the 
level of profits reflects the decline in revenue from regular services.
In an attempt to compensate for this U.K. passenger companies became 
more active in the cruise trade.
The rising standard of living and income in most industrial 
nations, and in particular North America, which produced the demand for 
air travel also created an expanding demand for leisure activities, of 
which pleasure cruising has been an important sector. These cruises are 
broadly of two types. Firstly, those combining the carriage of some 
passengers with regular transport service operations. The ability to do 
this depends not only on the vessel being designed to cater for this 
type of traveller, but also the suitability of the route from the point 
of view of weather and destination. Liners trading to the Cape, some 
Far East routes and to Australasia 'round the world', have gained 
additional income from this traffic, but activity was prohibited to 
traders on the North Atlantic by weather conditions, and the design of 
the vessels to combat such conditions.
The second type of cruise is that designed specifically for 
holidaymakers. During the 1950s and early 1960s this trade was seen 
as a method whereby surplus vessels could be employed during the slack 
season on their normal service routes. Hence, much of the United Kingdom's 
Atlantic tonnage was used, despite it being unsuitable for tropical or 
semi-tropical conditions and its generally inadequate leisure facilities.
An additional disadvantage for most was their size and draft which made 
them incapable of entering or often even approaching the small port, 
typical of a cruise itinerary in the Caribbean, for example.
-  62 -
Since the late 1950s the tendency has been to build vessels 
designed not for a specific route, but for general world conditions, a 
factor in the contraction in vessel size, and, of more importance, 
building or extensively reconstructing tonnage purely for the cruise 
trade. Once in service these vessels often operate in conjunction with 
air services to eliminate the necessity for the vessel to take several 
days or more before arrival in regions of favourable weather. The 
nations traditionally owning passenger liners have not participated to 
the extent they might in this trade, the U.K. being no exception. Nations 
with no tradition of passenger capacity have been the most enthusiastic 
participants, for example, the Scandinavians and the Greeks, who under 
their own flag, or those of convenience, have expanded their activities 
in this area, often with refitted U.K. tonnage. Their competitora claim 
the basis of their success is cheaper labour as the passenger trade is a 
labour intensive operation. It has been calculated that on average the 
ratio of crew to passenger is 1 to 2.5, with 64 per cent of the crew 
in the catering department. The refitted tonnage has usually been 
designed to cut down labour unit costs. This has been done by making 
vessels single class, what traditional liners refer to as a tourist 
class, and with the introduction of cafeteria and other catering systems, 
which not only require less labour, but also less skilled labour. The 
traditional liner companies of the U.K. have, from necessity or choice, 
clung rather to the type of vessel split into two or more classes, each 
with their own catering requirements. This has substantially increased 
both their operating costs and their ability to compete with other 
less inhibited operators.
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The traditional commitment of U.K. shipping to the carriage of 
passengers has meant that its decline has had a serious impact on the 
job opportunities of a relatively high proportion of U.K. seafarers, 
particularly catering ratings. The dry cargo liner trade was another 
sector to which the British fleet was strongly committed. These 
vessels ply on fixed routes, according to a pre-determined time­
table, with a certain degree of flexibility to take account of 
unpredictable factora, like weather, but vessels do not generally 
leave their normal route patterns. Traditionally they were break 
bulk vessels, designed to carry heterogeneous cargoes, generally 
finished or semi-manufactured, in separate consignments. This type of 
vessel was related to an attitude to cargo movement which has changed 
dramatically since the mid-1960s with the advent of unit loading. As 
late as 1961 a little short of one half of the vessels and a third of 
the tonnage was involved in this trade; by 1979 the number of vessels 
had fallen to one quarter and the tonnage to approximately one tenth 
(see Table 4.A).
The nature of dry cargo liner trades makes it extremely 
difficult for shipowners in this sector to take advantage of the growth 
in vessel size and economies of scale. Firstly, they are in part 
constrained by the fact that they have to maintain a regular service 
with common carrier obligations and heterogeneous cargoes. Secondly, 
the size of vessel is to a large extent determined by the length of 
time it takes to load and discharge. The economic implications of this 
have seriously limited the size of the conventional liner, for to go 
beyond some optimum vessel size, broadly related to length of route 
and speed of turn round, necessitates protected cargo operation, with 
its increased costs, while the additional tonnage would only add
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marginally to revenue. A typical cargo liner spends only half of 
its time moving cargo and the other half waiting in port; one study 
estimated that some 25 per cent of costs were due to traditional 
labour intensive cargo handling methods, and of total round voyage 
costs some 60 to 65 per cent were incurred while the vessel 
was in port, much of this time spent not moving cargo.^
The problem has been overcome to some extent with the acceptance 
of the concept of unit loading. There are three main types: 
palletization, containerization and roll-on-roll-off, all of which 
aim at reducing unit cost. Palletization, that is standardizing 
consignments into stacks some six feet high on flat trays measuring 
40" x 48", was in fairly general use in overland distribution in the 
late 1940s, and was later extended to international trade.
The most important form of unit loading has been containerization, 
the use of standardized steel framed aluminium or steel covered 'boxes' 
generally compatible to through transit on most modes of transportation 
'from door to door'.
Containerisation affects the economic structure of the 
industry in three ways. It brings economies of scale to 
the stevedoring process, by making the process capital 
intensive rather than labour intensive, dramatically 
increases vessel utilisation by reducing port-to-sea ratios 
from 1:1 to 1:4, and makes possible the development of 
intermodal services by facilitating the interchange between 
carriers. Because of high fixed capital costs, unit costs 
per ton may be lowered to one-half of breakbulk operations 
assuming volume operations are achieved.7
Roll-on-roll-off is regarded as a variation on the container 
theme. While containers lose some 20 per cent of cargo capacity, due 
to the vessels cellular structure and the containers themselves, roll- 
on-roll-off loses some 30 per cent to 40 per cent largely due to the 
space below the axles being wasted. Against this must be matched the ^
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advantage of vessels specifically constructed with stern and 
occasionally stem doors, and cargo ramps, facilitating rapid loading 
and unloading of cargo.
The British shipowners were quick to realize the opportunities 
these developments offered particularly in relation to containerization. 
The large amount of capital investment necessary has in general 
caused the creation of loose consortia to operate container services.
The most prominant of these are Overseas Containers Ltd. (O.C.L.); 
Associated Containers Transport (A.C.T.); and Freightliners, owned 
by British Rail, which operate short sea services. By 1979 the U.K. 
container fleet numbered eighty-five fully cellular vessels of all 
generations totalling 1.8m tons or about 18 per cent of the world's 
container fleet. Not all liner cargoes are suitable for containeriza­
tion or may not be in sufficient volume to warrant the capital 
investment. Therefore, in spite of the U.K. fleets ready commitment 
to containerization, approximately one half of the cargo liner fleet 
remains traditional tonnage.
This area of operation has been an expanding one, reflecting 
the growth in world trade but unfortunately the U.K, shipowner has not 
benefited fully from this expansion, Most recently this has been due
g
to Britain's poor economic performance. In the long run the most
important factor has been the close ties between U.K. shipping and
U.K. and commonwealth trade, which has not grown to the same extent
as that of Northern Europe and the Far East. The U.K.'s traditional 
q
role as a cross trader, which until quite recently was a large 
freight earner, has been undermined by the building up of local fleets, 
which means cargoes are not so readily available for U.K. shipping.
The result has been a contraction in the U.K.'s participation in liner 
trades. This, together with the shift to containerization, where 
each third generation container vessel has replaced six or seven 
conventional ships has meant a serious decline in job opportunities 
in this sector of the fleet.
One section of the fleet which experienced expansion until 
the second half of the 1970s was that of tramps and bulk carriers.
Both of these types of vessel have taken advantage of the growth in 
vessel size and increases in speed capability. The tramp tonnage 
during the late 1970s constituted some 12 per cent of the world tramp 
fleet. These vessels are in general hired for a single voyage or on 
a time charter, and commonly employed in trading in full cargoes of 
homogeneous conmodities of sufficiently low value in relation to their 
bulk or weight that cheapness of transportation outweighs speed or 
regularity of delivery. Liner companies charter out their temporary 
aurplus tonnage to the tramp trade and when the need arises charter 
general purpose vessels to supplement their services. This is a 
trade denied to bulk carriers of all types, which have in recent years 
entered the tramp trade in increasing numbers, and are now included in 
the definition of this section of the industry.
Following the Second World War, there was a general reluctance 
on the part of British shipowners to invest in tramp tonnage. It was 
not until 1960 that, in tonnage terms, the fleet regained its pre-war 
level. This appears to have been due, in part, to the lack of fore­
sight concerning the opportunities this branch of the industry was to 
offer. The other important influence has been the continuing decline 
in British coal exports, from a post-war p*r annum peak of just short of
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14 million in 1953 (36 million in 1938) to approximately 2 million 
tons in 1975 - a decline which served to deny tramps an easily 
obtainable bulk conmodity as an outward cargo from the U.K, This 
further removed the British tramps' advantage by necessitating an 
outward run in ballast, and brought U.K. tramp shipping generally in 
line with the international fleet, which it has been estimated spend 
between 30 per cent to 40 per cent of their operating time in ballast. 
The loss of the outward cargo was also an element inducing U.K. 
tramp owners to participate further in the cross trade, which in 
recent years supplied two-thirds of tramp freight.
The loss of comparative advantages, together with the apparent 
lack of dynamism already mentioned, influenced the poor profit levels 
of the general purpose tramp.^ One reaction to these poor returns 
was a movement towards large bulk carriers, often of a specialized 
type. This movement was encouraged by comparatively new chartering 
arrangements, long term contracts of affreightment, whereby ship­
owners undertake to transport vast quantities of homogeneous product 
on a particular route or routes for a long period. Under the 
influence of such contracts, vast investments in tonnage have been 
made by Norway, Japan and flag of convenience countries. Despite 
the comparatively high profits in ore and other bulk carriers, the 
U.K. shipowners show a distinct reluctance to invest in this form of 
tonnage. The Economist pointed this out in 1970i 'highest returns 
have been earned in ore carriers (10 per cent) and other specialized 
carriers (5 per cent) but these have only attracted respectively 
4.5 per cent and 3.4 per cent of new investment until recently'.
This omission has to some extent been rectified in the years since
1969.
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A large part of this Investment was not made by traditional 
independent tramp owners, armed with long term contracts of affreight­
ment, but by liner operators and merchant owners. Liner operators 
have ventured increasingly into tramp operations since the Second 
World War, and into bulk capacity for the last decade. This, plus a 
contraction in the number of independent owners, has caused a 
fundamental re-organization of the ownership and management of tramp 
tonnage :
TABLE A.6
U.K, OWNED AND REGISTERED TRAMP FLEET 1968 
(000 D.W.T.)
Bulk
Carriers
Liner Operators 697
Merchant Owners 100
Other 3,306
Total A, 103
General Purpose
Tramps Total
502 1,198
321 421
1*630 4.935
2,452 6,555
SOURCE: Board of Trade.
NOTES:
a. General purpose tramp figures relate to vessels of 500 gross tons 
and over.
b. Bulk carriers figures relate to single deck vessels of 10,000 
deadweight tons and over, including OHO type vessels.
SOURCE: Rochdale p.142.
Table A.6 summarizes how far the radical nature of ownership 
reorganization has gone since the war, and the trend appears to be 
continuing. The inter-relationship of this trend with increasing use
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of bulk tonnage has had a further dynamic effect on the industry's 
structure, engendering the formation of consortia, including many 
liner companies. Seabridge, formed in 1965, was the first of these, 
its membership consisting wholly of U.K. companies. Since then a 
number of international consortia have been established; for example, 
Associated Bulk Carriers, whose members are P ft 0 and the Anglo 
Norse Group, the latter's vessels being registered outside the U.K.
The main, but not the only, objective of these consortia has been the 
organization, for its independent members, of long-term contracts of 
affreightment, in numerous commodities, using highly specialized or 
very large vessels.
These trends and the entry of surplus tanker tonnage into trade, 
like grain, have had a serious effect on the open market for tramp 
tonnage, the Baltic Exchange, and if the trend were to continue at the 
past rate, they would imply the demise of the small independent general 
purpose tramp companies. However, with the continuing expansion in 
international trade it has been predicted that some 15 per cent of it 
will continue to be shipped in 'handy' sized tramps of 10 to 20,000 
tons. Traditional tonnage, drawing only a moderate amount of water, 
with its own cargo handling equipment is able to enter the minor ports 
of the world where variable quantities of commodities appear at 
unpredictable intervals. It is in this area of trading where the 
U;K. general purpose tramp operators' future lies.
While large vessels in respect of the bulk carriers and the 
fall in the number of conventional tramps has lessened the amount of 
labour required, this is perhaps not the most important aspect of 
changes in this part of the Industry. The emergence of merchant 
owners has much wider potential implications for industrial relations.
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While these owners operate ships, their first consideration in labour 
matters may not be that of shipowners. For them ships are merely 
part of the production process in which questions of maritime labour 
may be insignificant.
The tanker fleet has had a similar experience to other sectors 
with a declining percentage share in the world fleet. The term 
tanker includes vessels carrying all forms of bulk liquid, such as 
chemical products and liquid gas, but by far the largest proportion 
carry crude oil.
There have been major structural changes in the oil industry 
since the Second World War which have had important repercussions for 
the shipping industry. In this period refineries have been relocated 
nearer the market and away from the 'well' for economic, strategic and 
political reasons. A movement which was given impetus by the Persian 
Government's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian refinery at Abadan 
in 1951. The change in refinery location brought in its train a total 
restructuring of tanker fleets, from concentrating largely on tonnage 
designed to distribute comparatively small parcels of refined products 
to tonnage dedicated to moving huge volumes of crude oil over long 
distances. In 1973 less than 20 per cent of the world fleet moved 
refined products and these were also solely engaged in the coastal or 
short sea trades. Crude oil carriage has encouraged the surmounting 
of technical difficulties, in order to build progressively larger 
vessels to take advantage of economies of scale. These economies are 
closely related to speed, time spent in port and length of voyAge.
The length of voyage factor became of major importance with the 
first closure of the Suez Canal in 1956. Even the canal re-opening,
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together with its widening, deepening and increased efficiency, did 
little to hinder the movement towards larger vessels, with voyages 
being made southwards through the canal in ballast and homeward to 
Europe round the Cape. The general over-tonnaging in tankers between 
1956 and 1966 appears not to have affected the trend to larger units 
either.
This trend has been affected however, by the massive increases 
in oil prices in the autumn of 1973 and 1979. As a result there has 
been the opening up of previously uneconomic fields and the search 
for other sources. The discoveries of deposits in the Far East 
which are nearer the Japanese market have shortened the length of the 
sea voyage. This, together with the increased bunker costs, has 
encouraged the use of medium sized tankers. There have also been other 
developments in oil carriage, such as the increased use of pipelines, 
particularly in relation to the newly discovered fields.
The U.K. tanker fleet has reflected these technological 
changes with a growth in vessel size, but it has not taken advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the growth in demand for oil which 
has been experienced over the whole period to the same extent as other 
fleets. Table 4.7 illustrates the massive growth of the tanker fleets 
of countries such as Japan and those of flags of convenience with an 
approximate twenty-fold and eight-fold increase respectively (1958- 
1978), while Table 4.1 shows that the U.K. percentage of world tanker 
tonnage has more than halved. The decline in the number of vessels r
in the U.K. tanker fleet, although limited to a growth in vessel size,
has had a detrimental effect on job opportunities since the larger
size of vessel does not imply a concomitant increase in the size of ,
the crew.
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TABLE 4.7
SIZE AND RATE OF GROWTH OF MAJOR TANKER FLEETS 1948/1958 TO 1978 
(2,000 D.W.T. and Over)
Flag
1948a
Million
G.R.T.
1958
Million
D.W.T.
1968
Million
D.W.T.
1978
Million
D.W.T.
Increase
1958-1978
(1958-100)
U.K. 3.8 8.7 15.4 28.4 326
Norway 2.1 8.1 16.4 26,7 321
Other Western Europe - 11.8 26.3 77.4 656
' Convenience'** 0.5 14.4 31.5 113.0 796
Japan 0.4 1.5 11.4 29.3 1,953
World TotalC 11.6 55.7 119.4 328.4 590
SOURCE: Lloyds Register. B.P. Ststistical Review,
NOTES:
a. 1948 figures over 500 G.R.T.
b. Panama - Liberia - etc.
c. World total calculated from more detailed table.
A further consideration is the extent to which tankers in the 
British fleet are owned by oil companies as opposed to conventional 
shipowners (see Table 4.8). Although this ownership pattern is less 
marked than it was in the early 1960s, there is still a significant 
proportion of the U.K. tanker fleet owned by companies for whom ship- 
owning is only a minor part of their total operation and, therefore, 
maritime industrial relations are not necessarily a prime consideration.
t
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TABLE 4.8
U.K. TANKER FLEET OWNERSHIP 1963 - 1978
(2,000 D.W,>T. and Over)
End of 
1963
End of 
1978
X Increase 
1963 - 1978
Private* 3.5 8.7 248
Oil Companies 8.5 18.8 221
Oil Companies as Z of 
U.K. Tanker Fleet 70.8 68.1 -
Z U.K. Oil Company 
Tonnage of World Oil 
Company Tonnage 30.0 16.8
SOURCE: B.P. Statistical Review.
NOTE:
a. Including a very small amount of Government owned tonnage.
All the sections of the industry discussed above are also 
involved in the coastal and short sea trade and tend in these trades 
to be in competition with other forms of transport to a greater extent 
than the deep sea, foreign going routes. It is difficult to give a 
precise definition of tonnage engaged in Coastal, Home, Middle or 
Short Sea trades, for the general small vessels involved in one trade 
can transfer to another with ease, perhaps during one short single 
voyage. The trades can be defined as follows: Coastal and Home trade 
limits refer to all ports within the U.K., the Republic of Ireland, 
as well as those on the European coast from the Elbe to Brest. The 
Middle trade limit encompasses all this, but widens the scope to 
include ports between Santander and Bergen and the Baltic. The Short
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Se* trade limit widens the area further to include the whole of 
Western Europe and ports in the Western Mediterranean. Larger 
foreign-going tonnage can of course occasionally enter in any of these 
trades, particularly the latter. There is no accurate calculation of 
the tonnage operating in the Short Sea trade, but it can be assumed 
that much of the tonnage shown in Table 4.9, which strictly speaking 
covers only Coastal and Home trade, also operates in the Middle and 
Short Sea and, therefore, it gives an adequate impression of these 
sections of the U.K. fleet's development.
As may be seen the experience of the Short Sea trade is very 
similar to that of the Deep Sea fleet. Table 4.9 shows that there has 
been a substantial contraction in liner and tramp tonnage. This is 
due largely to the increased efficiency of other sections of the 
transport industry: for example, road haulage with unit load and the 
like and, in particular, railway's development of bulk movement of 
goods in block and liner trains and company 'merry-go-round' trains 
offering highly competitive rates. These highly efficient methods of 
transporting large quantities has concentrated actively on a limited 
number of major ports, taking away business from many of the smaller 
ports which were previously served by coastal tonnage.
The decline of the coastal tramp is also closely related to 
the marked decrease in the coastwise movement of coal, mainly from 
England, North-East coast and Humber ports, to the Thames and South 
East. Coal amounts to more than two-thirds of all coastal dry cargo, 
and in the period 1956-1975 the amount seaborne fell by nearly 80 per 
cent, a contraction which appears to be continuing. Other bulk dry 
cargoes, consisting mainly of stone, sand, slag and china clay 
increased during the same period by some 1 million tons per annum,
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TABLE 4,9
COASTING AND HOME TRADE MERCHANT SHIPS OWNED AND REGISTERED
IN THE U.K. (000 G.R.T.) AND COAL TRADE (m i l l i o n l o n g
TONS) 1950 - 1973
Year 1950 1956 1960 1965 1970 1975
Liners
Number 374 340 292 251 170 170
G.R.T. 449 459 388 357 310 339
Tramps
Number 758 643 506 409 310 311
G.R.T. 623 655 514 452 338 282
Tanker
Number 83 117 140 120 107 118
G.R.T. 49 80 111 104 104 133
Total
Number 1,215 1 ,100 938 780 587 599
G.R.T. 1,121 1 ,194 1,013 913 752 754
Coal Shipped 
000. Tona
Coastwise 26.3 28.8a1 20.9 20.8 13.5 5.0
Exported 13.5 8.5 5.1 3.8 3.3 2.0
SOURCE: Chamber of Shipping and G.C.B.S, Reports. 
NOTE:
a. Post War Peak
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an increase which failed to compensate for coal's contraction.
On the other hand, the carriage of oil has been increasing over 
the last two decades and consists wholly of refined petroleum products. 
In 1968 some 30 million tons were conveyed, approximately 55 per cent 
of the total coastal trade. Not all of this was moved by coastal 
tanker; some was carried in Deep Sea tonnage, owned by the oil 
companies, or foreign flag vessels, in intervals between their normal 
trading. This type of tonnage was also engaged in the trans-shipment 
of crude oil around the coast. The petroleum product carrying coastal 
tanker is, of course, in competition with the U.K. pipeline systems 
which in 1968 had a through-put of 8 million tons and this had 
increased to some 20 million tons by 1975. There has not been the 
same expansion in tanker size as in the Deep Sea routes and therefore 
not quite such a large fall in job opportunities.
This consideration of individual sectors of the industry 
modifies the general analysis of the industry as a whole. The period 
since the Second World War has seen the loss of supremacy of the U.K. 
fleet and its inability and reluctance to take advantage of the growth 
and redefinition of world trade. Historically, the U.K. was committed 
to trades which have suffered decline in the last three decades and 
British owners were slow to transfer their capital to the areas of 
greatest growth. One exception to this has been the area of container­
ization where the U.K. has been a pioneer from the 1960s onwards.
The shipowners of other nations have been prepared, however, 
to grasp all the opportunities offered by changing world trade, 
particularly through the medium of flags of convenience. The increasing 
competitiveness of world shipping has resulted in a loss of job
opportunities for the British seafarer. A situation which has been 
exacerbated by technological advances which have reduced manning 
levels. These factors, together with the massive outlay of capital 
which is now characteristic of the industry, have necessitated a 
major restructuring of the fleet and placed increasing emphasis on 
the efficient use of resources, especially manpower.
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NOTES
1. See Appendix II.
2. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Shipping. Cmnd 4337 
(HMSO, 1970), para.214 ¿Rochdale/.
3. See Flags of Convenience - The Unacceptable Face of Shipping 
a report by the NUS, 1981; and K. Grundy, Flags of Convenience 
in 1978, Polytechnic of Central London, 1978.
4. N.B. Liner - a ship engaged in providing a regular service for 
passengers and/or cargo on given routes. Tramp vessels are 
generally hired for a single voyage or on a time charter and 
commonly employed in trading in full cargoes of homogeneous 
coinnod i ties.
5. Rochdale, op. cit., p. 35 table 3:4 and paras. 119-122.
6. ibid., para. 345.
7. J.R. Barker and R. Brandwein, U.S. Mercantile Marine in National 
Perspective (Lexington Books, U.S., 1970), p. 6.
8. Shipping Review, Phillips and Drew, July 1980, p. 6.
9. Cross trade - voyage undertaken which neither begins nor ends 
in the country of the ship's flag.
10. Rochdale, op. cit., p. 335 table 18:4.
11. 9 May 1970.
CHAPTER 5
INDUSTRIAL CHANCES AND THE DEMAND FOR LABOUR
The changes which have occurred within the shipping industry 
have had a profound effect on the nature of demand for labour in the 
industry and the way it is deployed. At its most simplistic, the 
demand for labour has fallen. This, however, masks a much more 
complex situation since the fall in demand has been uneven throughout 
the industry. In part this has been related to increasing competition, 
and in part to the technological advances which have affected 
shipping worldwide. The latter advances have made shipowners and 
operators more conscious of their particular manpower requirements in 
the light of high capital investment and increasing specialisation. 
Again this has not resulted in consistent trends, since different 
trades and types of vessels have differing cost structures and ship­
owners are more concerned with the needs of the trade in which they 
are engaged than with the needs of the industry as a whole.
The balance in the demand for labour has altered, and this of 
course, carried implications for the principle of central joint 
supply with its emphasis on the supply of ratings and the employers 
need for commercial flexibility and a degree of casualization. The 
job opportunities for officers have remained far more stable than 
those for ratings. In the case of ratings all departments have been 
under considerable pressure, with demand uneven both in respect of 
trade and size of vessel. The change in the structure of the labour 
force in this way is of particular significance since the setting 
up of the N.M.B. was directly related to the importance of the supply 
of ratings, then by far the biggest sector of the labour force, with 
a panel system related to grades rather than trade,
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Since Che inception of the N.M.B., it has, apart from the early 
1920s, been concerned with a declining labour force. This is an 
experience which shipping shared with other staple industries in the 
U.K, but they were slow to recognize the impact of the First World War.
In retrospect this trend is obvious using figures that were and are 
easily accessible, the Census of Seamen. These figures are not accurate 
in terms of numbers since they ignore seafarers not actually in employ­
ment; for example, on leave, sick or awaiting employment. However, 
since the basis on which they are collected has not changed substantially 
over the period, they do represent the long term trend in employment in 
the industry as a whole. The fact that they are collected only at long 
and sometimes uneven intervals does mask shorter and perhaps rising 
trends.
Table 5.1 illustrates the long decline in the total labour force 
which was relatively slow until the 1960s when there was a dramatic fall 
of just a third in ten years. The experience of U.K. resident seafarers
TABLE 5.1 
CENSUS OF SEAMEN
X Allens X LascarsYear
U.K.
Resident
1921 96,072
1926 129,289
1931 108,882
1938 107,088
1951 105,080
1961 95,549
1971 54,442
63.2 11,598
65.8 15,703
64.3 11,204
67.2 7,043
68.8 5,670
67.1 3,663
61.1 4.149
7.6 44,241
8.0 51,566
6.6 49,125
4.4 45,182
3.7 41,957
2.6 43,250
4.6* 29,191
X Total
29.1 151,911
26.2 196,588
29.0 169,211
28.4 159,313
27.5 152,707
30.4 142,462
32,7 89,156
* In this census the definition of alien changes to include some 
Conraonwealth citizens.
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has followed the general trend of a fall in numbers since 1926 with 
the 1960s showing the greatest fall. This is especially significant 
since it has taken place at a time when U.K. residents were also 
declining as a percentage of the total labour force,
The Lascars, that is seamen who are resident in Asia, East and 
West Africa and the West Indies and who are employed on agreements which 
are opened and closed in those areas, have shown a remarkable stability 
throughout the whole of the period. Although they do show a fall of 
numbers in the 1960s, they were increasing as a percentage of the total. 
This rise in percentage in the 1960s is also true of aliens but to some 
extent this is explained by an alteration in census definition.1 
Throughout the whole period aliens have only represented a small 
proportion of seafarers in the U.K. fleet and their decline has no 
special significance.
The N.M.B. and the industrial relations institutions are most 
directly concerned with the U.K. resident seafarer and more detailed data 
on this category are available in the form of the statistics collected 
by the Registrar of Seamen until January 1973 when the task was taken 
over by the General Council of British Shipping (G.C.B.S.), These 
statistice represent the available labour force, that is active sea­
farers whether in employment, sick or on leave. The figures tend to 
overstate the numbers involved because seafarers remain on the register 
for 12 months after completion of their last voyage; this is known as 
the 12 month rule. The Rochdale Committee of Inquiry suggested that
the Registrar consistently overstated the active labour force by some
2
13 per cent to 14 per cent. While the figures may not be regarded ns 
an accurate numerical guide, they do provide a reliable indication of 
general and particular trends over the last three decades.
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Graph 5,1 shows that for the first post-war decade employment
levels for U.K. resident seafarers were increasing but 1957/58 marks
a turning point. At this time a downward trend began which has only
been interrupted by a rise in the early 1960s and some stability in 
3
the mid-1970s. The vertical line in 1973 indicated the changeover from 
the Registrar of Seamen's figures and those collected by the G.C.B.S. 
Initial problems with collection resulted in a gap in accurate statistics 
which explains the discontinuity between 1973 and 1974.
The pattern of employment opportunities shown for the total U.K. 
labour force was not experienced by all seafarers. The number of officers 
rose until the late 1950s and then remained relatively stable until the 
mid 1970s whereas the ratings were comparatively stable until the late 
1950s when they began to decline seriously, losing approximately two- 
thirds of their available jobs in the two decades since 1959. The 
position was reached in 1974 when there were more officers than ratings 
among the U.K. resident seafarers.
The most recent research into shipping manpower has looked at 
the number of jobs at sea for both U.K. resident and non-U.K. seafarers
4
rather than merely the number of seafarers. Obviously these two 
criteria reflect the same trend but the decline in jobs at sea is more 
dramatic than the decline in number of seafarers. Graph 5.2, covering 
the period 1961 to 1977, shows a fall in the number of jobs of 59 per 
cent from 138,799 to 58,056. This is attributable to two main factors; 
the decrease in the number of ships and the reduction in manning levels.^ 
These two factors have affected the grades of personnel to different 
degrees, For officers the decline amounted to 43 per cent of jobs 
available in 1961, whereas the U.K. ratings lost 66 per cent but the 
non-U.K. ratings only 56 per cent, and between the beginning of 1974 and
JOBS AT SEA: TRENDS 1901-7/ -  84 -
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mid-1976 there were more jobs at sea for non-U.K. ratings than for 
U.K. resident ratings.
To return to the numbers of U.K, residents employed for both 
officers and ratings the contraction was not experienced in all depart­
ments. Graph 5.3 shows that the numbers of officers in both the engine 
and deck departments fell at the end of the 1950s although the engine 
room recovered slightly in the early 1960s, The deck officers' decline 
was rather more gradual with a long period of stability between 1969 
and 1975. On the other hand the engineers have undergone a more even 
but greater decline which was very rapid in the late 1970s.^
The number of radio officers appears from the graph to have 
remained little changed. However, this conclusion is reached on some­
what misleading evidence because of the scale of the graph. The radio 
officers only account for a very small number of seafarers and the fall 
in this category does not show up accurately. Reference to Appendix 
III (11) shows that the complement of radio officers has fallen from a 
peak of 3,510 to 2,330. The decline is directly related to the fall 
in the number of vessels. Although increases in leave have meant an 
increase in the number of officers available in a fall-back capacity, 
the increase in unit size has not involved the need for more than one 
radio officer.^
The fall in total ratings is more directly related to the decline
8
for all seafarers (see Graph 5.4). Throughout the period since the 
end of the Second World War the engineers department has experienced a 
steady contraction which is of course related to changes in methods of 
bunkering from coal to oil. The deck department remained stable in the 
first decade after the war and then declined steadily until the late 
1970s when stability returned, although the number of U.K. resident
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deck ratings had contracted by one half over the three decades. While 
catering ratings still remain the largest single category, they have 
lost their obvious predominance; their decline has been more uneven than 
other groups but they have suffered by far the greatest loss of employ­
ment. This is almost entirely due to the loss of the passenger liner 
trade.
The situation of the U.K. resident ratings is complicated by the
presence of what were known as Lascars (see Table 5.1 and Graph 5.2)
o
and are now categorised as non-European Ratings. Because of the 
existence of this group of seamen, the percentage decline in U.K. 
resident ratings is actually greater than the total for all ratings 
employed in the U.K. fleet. For example taking the census as a base, 
the percentage of U.K. resident ratings fell from 68.8 per cent in 1951 
to 61.1 per cent in 1971 whereas the non-Europeans rose from 27.5 per 
cent to 32.7 per cent in the same period, although both declined in 
real terms.
There has been a long tradition of the employment of non-European 
ratings, the main reason generally being to minimise crew costs.
These ratings were employed in what may be regarded as the 'Empire' 
cross-trades and their countries of origin reflect this fact, with the 
Indians and Hong Kong Chinese being predominant (see Table 5.2). The 
number of non-European ratings rose in the decade 1951 to 1961 returning 
to their pre-war level; since 1961 they have contracted with increasing 
intensity. This is true of all groups»but the Indians have been roost 
severely affected, accounting for approximately half the whole 
contraction. The decline in their employment may in part be seen in 
terms of a decline in the 'traditional' trades and the direct effect of 
technological advances. However, the most important factor has been
M l
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TABLE 5.2
NUMBER OF NON EUROPEAN RATINGS 1951-1980
1951 1961 1966 1971 1973 1977 1980
(a) (a) (b) (a) (0 (d) (e)
Indians • 24,376 18,600 14,682 14,000 )
)
)
)
4,862
Pakistan - 4,118 4,200 3,286 1,600 11,550 332
Bangladesh - - - - 1,000
(701)
665
Hong Kong 
Singapore
9,274 7,100 7,845)
)
)
555)
158*
)
)
)
)
)
1,118
" Chinese 
" Malays.
1,724
29
• 6,300 3,960
(20%)
817
85
West Africa - 2,042 1,500 1.037) 825 43
)
)
473 j
)
)
215 j
(5%)
Otherste) • 281 2,025 165 1,068
(1%)
West Indies - 855 - - 985
Total 41,957 43,250 31,400 29,191 24,925 16,500 8,990
SOURCE:
(a) Census.
(b) Rochdale Comolaaion.
(c) British Shipping Federation.
(d) Report of The Working Group on The Employment of Non-domlciled 
Seafarers^ This did not give figures; merely Z.
(e) G.C. B.S. - private information,
(f) Othera includes Philipinos, (435) Seychelles, (520) South Africa, 
Zulus, (35) Gilbert and Ellis Island, (21) Koreans, (57) the figures 
in ( ) 1980.
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the pressure on U.K. resident ratings. As the latter became aware of 
their own contracting job opportunities they also became more conscious 
of the extent to which non-Europeans might be regarded as depriving them 
of employment, particularly as the main reason for employing them has 
been to minimize cost.
The ratings' organization, the N.U.S., had an attitude of 
passive acceptance of this 'traditional' employment pattern until the 
mid-1960s. In 1965 they achieved a national agreement through the 
N.M.B. which provided}
(i) no existing ships manned by United Kingdom-domiciled ratings 
shall change to non-domiciled ratings; and
(ii) no new ship, or newly acquired ship, shall be manned by non- 
domiciled ratings without in each case the consent of the United 
Kingdom National Maritime Board.**
The traditional manning/trade concept remained but the 
managerial prerogative of British owners to man their 
ships with crews of whatever nationality they chose was 
curtailed to the extent that their intentions in this 
respect came under the scrutiny of the N.M.B. from 1965
onwards.12
In 1969 the N.M.B. implicitly recognized the claim of the N.U.S. 
that jobs on British ships were primarily the property of its members. 
Since then the N.U.S. attitude has hardened, due to the International 
Transport Workers Federation (I.T.F.) campaign for flag rates to be 
paid regardless of where the seaman is recruited, a campaign finding 
support among British and foreign dock workers and achieving some 
success, for in 1973 rates for A.B.'s signing non-U.K. articles were 
Increased first to £32 and later to £48 per month. The criterion of 
1969 was taken an important step further during the 1974 negotiations.
If the job belonged to their members the N.U.S, argued, why were they
-  9 1  -
not recompensed for their loss? The shipowners took the point and 
agreed to pay a levy of £15 per annum to the union for each non- 
European seaman employed. This was in recognition of the fact that 
while the union was permitting non-union members to work in U.K. 
vessels it was receiving no compensation. The new agreement, which 
came into force in January 1975, has had an annual yield of some 
£300,000.
This revision must be seen as part of the long term strategy of 
the union. Firstly, to raise wage costs in such a way as to make the 
employment of non-European seamen less attractive, and to marginally 
close the differentials gap between these men and U.K. seamen. Secondly, 
if non-European seafarers are to be recruited to man British vessels, 
they should receive the same pay and conditions applicable to British 
seafarers. Thirdly, full N.U.S. membership for those seamen concerned 
will follow as a direct result of implementing the equal pay and 
conditions policy. The fulfilment of such a policy has resulted in a 
further decline in the employment of non-European ratings as Table 5.2 
illustrates.
The discussion so far has been concerned with those seafarers, 
both non-European and U.K. resident, employed by the fleet as a whole. 
However, the U.K. fleet has not been affected evenly by competition and 
technological change. Some sectors have declined more rapidly than 
others and in the container,bulk carrier and tanker trades advantage 
has been taken of growth in vessel size and new methods of transportation. 
It might be expected, therefore, that this would result in a change in 
the balance of employment of seafarers between trades and type of 
vessel. Accurate up to date information on this pattern of employment 
is difficult to obtain. The only base which will indicste the long
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term trends are the census figures, the limitations of which have already 
been discussed, and which do not provide a detailed analysis since they 
are concerned only with total seafarers, that is officers and ratings 
from all countries of origin. Furthermore, since the census is decadal 
the latest available statistics are for 1971 making it difficult to 
assess what has happened during the last ten years which have been very 
important for industrial relations in shipping. The only accessible 
evidence of trends during that period is provided by the research 
carried out into jobs at sea referred to above and, although this base 
differs from the census, it does provide a useful guide to current 
trends.
Consider first the census figures of all seafarers employed by 
type of vessel and department (see Table 5.3). As a percentage of the 
total seafarers, those employed in the passenger liners have fallen 
most, from 28 per cent in 1951 to 21 per cent in 1971, whereas the 
percentage employed in all dry cargo only fell 3 per cent in the same 
period from 59 per cent to 56 per cent. The tanker sector shows a 
contrary trend, rising from 13 per cent to 23 per cent. These changes 
took place, of course, against a background of a fall in total sea­
farers employed of some 44 per cent.
The various departments did not experience similar detailed 
trends. For example, on the census figures the deck department has 
contracted to the greatest extent in both percentage and numerical 
terms and rather surprisingly, in view of the demise of the large 
passenger liner, the catering department appears to have suffered least, 
while the engine room has declined by about 50 per cent. Table 5.4 
shows the percentage change in distribution by department and type of 
vessel and this again illustrates the divergence of experience within
93
TABLE 5.3
NUMBER OF SEAMEN EMPLOYED BY GRADE AND VESSEL TYPE 
SELECTED YEARS
1951
T g ^ ^ f ^ M s e l Passenger Dry Cargo Tankers
No. of Vessels 269 2,563 487
No. of Seamen 43.211 89,749 19,705
Deck 10,339 42,639 9,197
Engine 8,400 31,016 6,944
Catering 24,472 16,094 3,564
1961 Cargo
Type of Vessel Passenger Liners Tramps Tankers
No. of Vessels 197 1,122 887 571
No. of Seamen 35,933 52,137 22,657 25,725
Deck 7,939 23,706 11,395 11,615
Engine 5,952 17,834 7,164 9,559
Catering 22,042 10,597 4,098 4,551
1971
Type of Vessel Passenger Container
Other
Cargo
Liners
Bulk
Carriers
Tramp Tankers
No. of Vessels 121 41 612 198 461 510
No. of Seamen 18,113 1,038 29,610 7,866 8,737 9,486
Deck 3,685 393 11,872 3,018 4,302 5,947
Engine 2,729 298 10,393 2,499 2,548 5,567
Catering* 1,699 347 7,345 2,349 1,887 7,972
4*
SOURCE: Census of Seamen
* Including General Purpose ratings
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X CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION OF SEAMEN BY DEPARTMENT AND
TABLE 5.4
TRADE OF VESSEL 1951-1971
Department
Passenger
Liner
All Dry
Cargo
Vessels Tankers Total
Deck -64 -54 -35 -56
Engine -68 -49 -20 -48
Catering -52 -26 +55* -28
Total -58 -50 -1 -44
SOURCE: Census of Seamen.
NOTE:
a. Including General Purpose Ratings.
the similar overall experience. While the engine room is the most severely 
affected in passenger liners followed by the deck department, the latter 
is the department which has contracted most in all dry cargo vessels. The 
tankers have shown the smallest fall in all departments and, indeed, in 
the case of the catering ratings there appears to be a very significant 
rise. These figures must, however, be treated with circumspection since 
in the census figures the category of the catering department includes 
those ratings who have been designated general purpose ratings snd under­
take general duties across departments, therefore detracting unrealistically 
from the numbers included in the other departments and falsely swelling 
the catering figures. The total change in percentage employed in tankers t
does, however, give a fairly accurate reflection of the trends in employment 
in that sector compared with the other two discussed.
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This trend appears to have continued throughout the 1970s. This 
view is supported by the 'Jobs at Sea' figures for the period 1972-77 
which show that employment in passenger liners has continued to fall at
a faster pace than that in all dry cargo while tankers have only lost a
13
small percentage of jobs, mainly those for ratings.
The tanker sector has, therefore, become increasingly important 
as an employer whereas dry cargo has developed a greater degree of 
specialization creating more variety of demand for labour in that sector.
The growth of new methods of transporting dry cargo was very rapid and 
since in many respects they were breaking new ground the shipowners were 
able to take advantage of the latest technology. This, together with 
more intense competition throughout the industry, has tended to diversify 
the shipowners attitude to labour. Rather than pressure for unity over 
conditions, wages and qualifications, there is strong conmercial pressure 
for individual rather than collective approaches to these issues.
The diversity of the shipowners' attitudes, which may exist within 
the same shipping group, arises out of two main developments, firstly 
the increasing specialization of vessel type and secondly the desire to 
spread the risk of such specialization. For this reason there has been 
a movement away from commitment to one type of shipping activity and in 
some cases shipping companies have developed interests outside the 
immediate maritime sphere. In addition industrial companies for whom 
shipping is a small but vital part of their production pattern have, as 
a result of specialization, found it feasible to develop their own
if
shipping department,
A prime example are the large oil companies such as Shell and
B.P. In the case of Shell, shipping represented only 13 per cent of 
their total fixed assets in 1976 and for B.P, it was as low as 6 per cent
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(see Table 5.5). Nevertheless these companies do own a large amount of 
tonnage; for example, B.P. owned 78 vessels (7.6 M.D.W. tons) in 1976.
These companies may well operate their fleets In response to the wider 
demands of the oil industry rather than freight rate considerations.
Furthermore their attitude to industrial relations and collective 
bargaining may well be based on criteria other than those which directly 
affect or are relevant to shipping.
Table 5.5 also illustrates that this trend of shipping being 
merely a part of a much larger comnercial undertaking is also evident in 
companies which the layman would regard as the 'traditional' shipping 
companies. For example in 1976 P. & 0. had less than 60 per cent of their 
total fixed assets in shipping and the Ellerman Line group which had 99 
per cent of its assets in shipping in 1971 had only 52 per cent in 1976.
Cunard is an example of an instance where a large non-shipping company 
has become involved in shipping largely for fiscal reasons. The general 
trend of diversification of interest where shipping is not necessarily 
predominant has continued.
The wider range of interests does to some extent undermine any 
simplistic solution to industrial relations problems. In the particular 
area of collective bargaining the position is made even more complex by 
the extent to which demand for labour and more specifically cost 
structures differ in respect of both type and size of vessel operated.
Cost figures which can be compared across the industry are not accessible 
over a long period and most of the statistics available are based on 
evidence collected for the Rochdale Committee of Inquiry, The growth 
of vessel size, specialized building, and the cost of finance have 
resulted in increased capital costs over the period. This has resulted 
in capital costs snd deprecistion accounting for something in the region
rtr
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of 50 per cent of total costa. The acceleration in maritime technology 
has also influenced the economic life of tonnage. It was usual in the 
1950s to write-off a liner or tramp in about 25 years and a tanker in 
20 years. Today amortization is generally geared to 10 or 15 years, some 
companies having even lower estimates. This is a trend which serves to enlarge 
the capital cost element in a vessel's financial structure.
In such a heavily capitalized industry, labour costs are generally 
only a small proportion of total costs, and they appear to be contracting. 
Rochdale made some estimates of the magnitude of U.K. crew costs in 
different tonnage types, expressed as a proportion of total operating 
costs, which in this case include capital charges.
i) For tankers and bulk carriers they may vary from 
23 per cent at 15,000 deadweight tons to 6 per cent 
at 200,000 tons;
ii) for container ships they may vary from 12 per cent 
for a small ship to 6 per cent for a large one;
iii) for a typical cargo liner they may be around 12 
per cent;
iv) on small ships, which are more labour intensive, the 
proportions are generally much higher and may exceed 
40 per cent; and
v) passenger ships are also highly labour intensive, but 
the variations existing make it more difficult to 
quote any typical percentage.
In addition to trade and vessel size crew costs are, of course, 
related to manning ratios. Here agsin the experience has not been uniform 
because not all trades can benefit to the same extent from economies of 
scale. Table 5.6 illustrates how manning ratios have altered over the 
period and this is a continuing trend. The massive capital connitment to 
new large vessels is in part related to the lowering of crew costs as a 
proportion of total costs; the large bulk carriers and tinkers, with 
lower manning ratios per ton, radically reduce crew costs to less than 
10 per cent of total costs. It appears that this percentage is reduced
■
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TABLE 5.6
AVERAGE NUMBER OF SEAMEN FOR 1,000 G.R.T. 1951. 1961 and 1971
Size of Passenger Dry Cargo0 Tankers
Group Vessels
000 G.E.T. Container Bulk
Ships Carriers
1961 1971 1961 1971 1971 1961 1971
Under 5 17.2 18.5 10.9 7.4 - 10.9 10.8
5 Under 10 11.7 13.4 5.9 3.9 4.6 5.6 5.6
10 " 15 10.9) 4.9 ) 3.9>
) 13.4 ) 2.5 2.7 ) 3.7
15 " 20 13.0) - ) 3.0>
20 " 25 16.5) 2.2 ) 2.6)
25b " 30
)
16.6)
18.6 )
- )
1.5 )
2.1)
2.1
30 " 40 11.6 0.9 1.4 1.4
40 " 60 15.8 1.0 0.9
60 " 100 11.5 0.6 0.4
100+ - 0.4
All
Vessels 
In Category
15.6 16.1 9.0 2.3 2.1 3.8 1.6
All 1951 1951 1951
Vessels 
In Category
16.0 9.4 5.9
NOTES :
a. The Dry Cargo Category of 1951 and 1961 waa broken down into a number
of categoriea in 1971, the most Important have been aelected for compariaon.
b. 1961 all 25,000+.
N.B. Average all vessels in fleet.
1951 - 9.8 1961 - 7.0 1971 - 3.7
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further, by one-fifth or a quarter in vessels manned by U.K. resident 
officers and Asian ratings. Presumably these mixed crews also lower 
crew costs in dry cargo vessels. In the typical dry cargo liner, crew 
costs are approximately 10 per cent of all costs, a figure substantially 
lower in cellular container vessels, a reduction once again closely 
related to unit size. At the other end of the crew cost spectrum is 
coastal shipping and passenger liners. Here the ratio of manning per 
ton is unavoidably high, hence labour costs are in the region of 40 
per cent or higher in particular cases.
In an industry with such a large section of its costs dedicated 
to capital and depreciation payments, an analysis excluding these costs 
and concentrating only on operational costs and the crew complements 
of new vessels may be a more meaningful indicator of the relative 
importance of crew costs. The following estimates in Table 5.7 are for 
European based national flag vessels, of recent construction; to include 
older tonnage would require a considerably more complex calculation.
Crew costs are defined here as wages, insurance, pension, leave and 
stand-by pay, victualling and transport costs, for both officers and 
ratings.
The table confirms the general point that labour costs decline 
in relation to the growth in vessel size. It also shows the extent to 
which the effect differs between trades and type of vessel. In the 
cargo liner trade the cost of operating and maintaining expensive and 
complex machinery and cargo storage equipment, and the generally higher
*
speeds, are reflected in the high complement and proportionally higher 
crew costs. In tramp tonnage the need for cargo handling equipment and 
high maintenance costs make crew costs lsrge. The very low administrative 
costs compared with liner tonnage give crew costs the appearance of being
TABLE 5.7
CREW COST AS PROPORTION OF OPERATING COST 
IN RECENTLY BUILT VESSELS; END 1971
Type« Tonnage Ranges Complement Cost of complement 
as a Z of operating 
and maintenance 
cost
I. Regular Trades
Cargo Liner 9,000 to 10,000 40 45Z
II M 15,000 to 17,000 43 47%
Reefer 9,000 to 10,000 43 33%
•I 15,000 to 17,000 47 33%
Container Ship 9,000 to 10,000 37 38.5%
•• tl 15,000 to 17,000 37 35%
•• II 30,000 to 33,000 40 24%
II. Tramps and Bulk 
Carriers
General Tramp 15,000 to 17,000 33 55%
Bulk Carriers 22,000 to 25,000 33 47%
•• ft 38,000 - 33 35%
•t ft 75,000 to 80,000 42 31%
III. Tankers and
Combined Carriers
Tanker or O.B.O. 110,000 to 120,000 45 28%
It II II 200,000 to 215,000 45 19%
Tankers 225,000 to 250,000 39 17%
SOURCE: Westinform Shipping Report No. 299 July 1973. 'Manning the 
Merchant Fleet of World'.
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disproportionately large. In bulk carriers and tankers the complement 
increases marginally with expanding unit size, while the manning ratio 
per ton falls steadily. Therefore crew costs as a percentage of 
operating costs fall steadily and, in the exceptionally large units, 
dramatically.
The specialization of capital is reflected in the need for 
increasingly specialized crews. In this respect the officer has been 
more directly affected than the rating since the carriage of dangerous 
cargoes in massive quantities requires officers with special skills to 
be responsible for them. More generally, there has been what may be 
regarded as a deterioration in working conditions. The development of 
container transport is perhaps one example of this with its regular 
runs and fast turn round which makes the opportunity of leisure in port 
much more limited and some tankers load and discharge without entering 
a conventional port. The extent to which this type of trade is regarded 
as disadvantageous in this respect is suggested by an advertisement for 
officers to join the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which states as an advantage 
of the job the fact that there are 'few fast turn rounds to mar your 
sightseeing'. The reduction in crew complement will, of course, increase 
the degree of social Isolation experienced by the seafarer.
The restructuring of the U.K. shipping industry has involved a 
drastic contraction of demand for labour. The brunt of the fall in demand 
was taken by ratings with the result that there are now more officers 
than ratings in the labour force. The increased variety of vessel type 
and trade has created specific demands with in many cases an emphasis 
on qualifications and experience. This, of course, implies a long term 
comnitnient to the industry by the work force. These factors, together 
with the widening of operations to 'non-traditional' owners, would
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suggest the need for individual approaches to particular manpower 
problems. Such an approach is contrary to the principles on which the 
N.M.B. is based; uniformity of action on the part of the employers and 
representation of the employees by grade of personnel. In addition it 
calls into question the extent to which the system of joint supply, 
based as it is on a degree of casualization, will provide the calibre of 
labour required.
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NOTES
1. See Census of Seamen, 1961.
2. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Shipping. Cmnd 4337
(HMSO, 1970), paras. 6W-6J9 ?Rochdale/.---
3. See Appendix III(i).
4. See Central Manpower Supply to the Merchant Navy (Intermediate 
Report), Sealife Programme, 1978, Section 3.
5. See Appendix IV,
6. See Appendix III(ii).
7. See op.cit., Sealife, for discussion of fall back capacity,
8. See Appendix Ill(iii),
9. N.B. For the purposes of this discussion non-European ratings 
may be taken as equivalent to non-domiciled ratings,
10. See Report of the Working Group on the Employment of Non-domiciled 
Seafarers. Department of Trade, (HMSO, 1978) paras.1:8 and passim.
11. Minutes of the N.M.B, 1965 and N.M.B. Year Book 1966.
12. N.U.S. Press Statement 1st July 1973, For a similar statement 
see The Seaman, Vol. 31 No, 9 (September 1973),
13. See Appendix IV.
14. Rochdale, op.cit., para. 823.
CHAPTER 6
PAY
The most obvious product of industrial relations and, in 
particular, collective bargaining is pay agreements. The negotiation 
of wage rates has particular significance in the U.K. shipping industry 
since the maintenance of a uniform wage for ratings was seen as, and 
for most of the period under consideration has remained, central to the 
philosophy of the N.M.B. A uniform wage was the method whereby the 
unity of shipowners was ensured^ and industrial peace encouraged. For 
many, pay is seen as the main product of the collective bargaining 
process. This may be particularly so in the shipping industry where 
the workforce is fragmented and where the Master assumes control over 
the running of the vessel and, therefore, the immediate working conditions 
over long periods of time. Furthermore, the failure of the collective 
bargaining machinery to fulfil the expectations of the employees in 
respect of pay is likely to lead to conflict. The measure of success 
for the individual is only partly the reward for his particular job; he 
will also be concerned with comparison between this and rates of other 
grades in the national industry, those employed in similar occupations 
ashore and his international competitors.
The 'success' of the N.M.B. is also important for the employer 
because of the relationship between wages and costs. While wages are 
not necessarily a large element in total cost they are vital since they 
are nationally determined whereas other costs are set internationally 
and labour costs may well be the factor in providing a shipowner with 
a competitive edge. The current movement by shipowners out of the U.K, 
flag into flags, or crews, of convenience now that the U.K. is a high 
wage country is proof of this.
\
-  1 0 6  -
All these factors make it essential to consider the extent to 
which pay has been influenced by or has influenced changes within the 
industry. The starting point of any examination of the industry's 
pay structure must be the experience of the U.K. officer and rating. 
However, any assessment of long term trends in seafarers' pay cannot be 
made in isolation with any validity. There must be comparison with 
trends in other industries and within the economy as a whole, since 
only trends specific to seafarers may be regarded as having direct links 
with that industry. In fact, in recent years the comparison with shore 
based workers has been regarded as increasingly important with the 
recognition that seafarers are not 'something apart'. For employers 
the rates paid will be seen in terms of costs, and these costs will be 
compared with those of their competitors who are not home based industries 
but foreign fleets. In this instance the Important comparison is an 
international one and one which will also be of concern to the employee.
It would be misleading to assume that the existence of a 
centrally negotiated uniform wage makes the study of the pay of U.K. 
seafarers less complex than that of other industries. For example, in
1976/77 there were 157 basic rates quoted in the National Agreement
2
for Engineering Officers and 69 for Ratings. The multiplicity of rates 
arises because they not only relate to a variety of grades of personnel 
but also to types of vessel and trade. In addition, these basic rates 
do not take account of the enormous range of special payments which 
exist, quite apart from leave and overtime, for such jobs as cleaning 
tubes, dumping ashes, and cargo handling. This complexity of pay scales 
presents great problems for making any satisfactory comparison both over 
time and with other industries. In the event the only satisfactory 
criteria would appear to be basic rates thereby avoiding the variability 
of special payments of all kinds and allowing for some comparison across
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industries. Furthermore, there is the problem of inflation when 
comparison is made over time.
The N.M.B. negotiations produce basic scales for all seafarers 
except Masters, While for ratings these scales are what is actually 
paid, for officers they are generally regarded as a minimum. Only a 
small minority of officers receive the N.M.B. rates; most shipping 
companies pay their own, higher, scale. The structure of these scales 
is closely related to that of the N.M.B. so that when an increase is 
negotiated in the Board it ia the practice for a company's rates to be 
increased by the same amount in terms of cash. The consolidated basic 
rate includes compensation for working at week-ends and varies according 
to the tonnage of vessels, type of trade and the qualification the 
officer possesses.
The consolidated basic rate applies in respect of a standard
working week but in practice these hours are generally exceeded and this
is compensated for by two alternative agreements. The Section 'A'
agreement, covering over 90 per cent of officers, includes continuity
of pay in company employment, covering such items as sick pay, payment
while on study leave, and occupational seniority pay for senior officers.
Section 'B' agreements cover the remainder of officers. These provide
direct compensatory pay or leave in lieu for senior officers; for other
officers overtime payments or, by mutual consent, extra leave in lieu
is received. Total leave entitlements under both agreements can be
liquidated, up to a certain proportion, into cash, with the mutual
consent of officers and shipowners. The amount of liquidation appears
3
to increase with the seniority of the officer.
In the case of ratings, the N.M.B. rates are, in general, those 
actually paid. Their basic wages are standard to conventionally manned 
vessels; where there is general purpose manning, there are special 
agreements which contain individual features relating to the company
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and the trade in which it is involved. These are factors which produce 
various wage levels enhancing the basic minima of the even
though these agreements are negotiated within the N.M.B. framework.
The other important additions to income for ratings are overtime 
and leave pay. The importance of overtime is illustrated by the comment 
that 'the union accepted that seamen were swayed into joining a vessel 
by the level of overtime offered. This was due to the low basic rate'.^ 
During the period under discussion, a rating's leave was based on a 
small annual allowance plus the number of Sundays spent at sea, which 
were translated into days leave. The system was then changed to one 
based on an annual leave allowance. With some minor exceptions the 
seaman's qualifications for leave is related to the amount of time 
actually spent on Articles. Payment of ratings for leave ia at the same 
rate as received while on Articles, supplemented by a food allowance. 
Should a crew member re-sign consecutive Articles his leave allowance 
is carried forward, payment for leave being made in a lump sum at the 
seafarers final signing off.
This type of 'lump sum' payment, which applies also to outstanding 
wages etc.,^ is one of the major differences between foreign-going 
seamen and shore-workers, although the actual rate of pay is calculated 
on a monthly basis. Seamen on running agreement (Home Trade) are 
generally paid on a weekly basis.
From these complex scales of pay and allowances it is necessary 
to select grades of personnel who may be regarded as 'typical' in order 
to achieve a viable basis for comparison both across time and between 
industries. The generally accepted 'typical' grade in the case of 
ratings, and the one usually used in international comparison, is that 
of a fully qualified Able Seaman (A.B.).
The 'typical' officer presents a more difficult problem as he ia 
not an accepted category in the same way as the A.B. To some extent 
the choice must be an arbitrary one and the N.M.B, basic scale for 
Second Navigation Officers with a certificate of rank in the largest 
category of foreign-going vessels has been selected. This scale would 
come within the middle range of officers' pay scales and would relate 
to men with a substantial degree of career connitment.
The pattern of the 'typical' officer and A.B's pay for the 
period under consideration, 1947-1980, is shown in Table 6.1, Two points 
emerge from the table. In the first place, negotiations appear until 
recently to have achieved a stability of scale with often two or three 
years between any substantial change; this is particularly noticeable 
in the early part of the period. From the N.M.B. minutes it would appear 
that the reason for this is that in one particular year the basic rate 
is agreed. The negotiations of the following two or three years are 
then concerned with the many 'additional' payments which go to make up 
earnings; the following year the basic rate would then again be the 
subject of negotiations. The trend towards annual negotiations has been 
a feature of all industries over the last two decades.
Secondly, the pay rates appear to have risen fairly steadily 
until 1965 when there is a rise of approximately 26 per cent for both 
grades. This was due to the restructuring of payments with the 
consolidation of many allowances into basic pay. Following this there 
was a period of stability which related in part to the consolidation and 
in part to the events of 1966;6 for both officers and ratings the 
1970s saw an acceleration of rate increases. This is, of course, due 
partly to Inflation and partly to a direct improvement in levels of pay 
increases.
TABLE 6,1
BASIC MONTHLY RATES OF PAY OF THE 'TYPICAL' OFFICER
AND A.B. 1947-1980
Typical Officer Typical A.B
f £
1947 34.00 24.00
48 34.00 24.00
49 34.00 24.00
1950 34.00 24.00
51 38.00 26.00
52 40.75 28.00
53 40.75 28.00
54 46.38 29.50
55 46.38 32.00
56 50.00 34.00
57 50.00 36.25
58 56.50 38.00
59 56.50 38.00
1960 62.50 40.50
61 62.50 43.00
62 65.15 44.50
63 68.38 44.50
64 71.88 47.00
65 90.50 59.38
66 90.50 59.38
67 90.50 59.38
68 90.50 61.94
69 103.00 61.94
1970 103.00 73.75
71 138.45 85.20
72 151.50 93,90
73 162.90 102.00
74 162.90 105.38
75 201.45 138.66a
76 262.35 147,33
77 312.64 147.33
78 343.90 177.66
79 404.08 196.81
1980 484.40 274.08
SOURCE: N.M.B. Yearbooks.
a. A.B'a changed in 1975 to weekly rate. Estimates obtained by 
multiplying by 52 and dividing by 12.
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The basic scale for officers is less useful than that for the 
ratings since as has been stated, most companies do not pay N.M.B. 
scales. The only calculation of the differences between Company and 
N.M.B. rates, not including any compensation for overtime, was published 
by the National Board of Prices and Incomes in 1967; this is reproduced 
in Table 6.2.
TABLE 6.2
COMPANY AND NATIONAL MARITIME BOARD MONTHLY PAY SCALES 
MAY, 1967
Company
National
Maritime (2) as
Rank 'Begin at' Board percentage
rate 'Begin at' of (3)
(1) (2)
rate
(3) (4)
Navigating Officers 
£ £ Per cent
1st Officer 138 115 120
2nd Officer 103 89 115
3rd Officer 82 70 117
4th Officer 67 61 110
Engineer Officers 
£ £
117
Per cent
Chief Engineer 200 157 127
2nd Engineer 131 114 115
3rd Engineer 96 82 117
4th Engineer 80 67 119
5th Engineer 72 62 116
Average all Officers
119
119
SOURCE: NBPI Inquiry.
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These figures cannot be compared directly with the 'typical' officer, 
as defined above, and it should be noted that 'begin at' rates are 
used, thus underestimating what most officers would be earning. Never­
theless, this comparison does provide at least some measure of the 
extent to which N.M.B. scales have to be modified to reflect basic rates 
actually paid. From the table it will be seen that the rates received 
by the majority of officers are between 10 per cent and 27 per cent above 
that designated by the N.M.B. and the gap becomes greater the higher 
the rank. In respect of the 'typical' officer, the difference is 
15 per cent. This is confirmed by a more recent ad hoc survey of 
companies advertisements (see Appendix V).
It is impossible to obtain any long run accurate assessment of 
officers' earnings as opposed to basic or company 'begin at' rates. 
However, in the early 1970s the General Council of British Shipping 
(GCBS) began to report on average earnings per calendar year and also 
to provide some basis of comparison with people ashore. The figures 
in Table 6.3 confirm the substantial increases shown in basic pay 
(Table 6.1).
The discrepancy between earnings and basic pay is, of course, 
explained in part by the fact that companies pay above N.M.B. rates 
for officers. In addition, the officers' earnings include compensation 
for the excessive hours worked at sea.
It may be seen, therefore, from this discussion of officers' 
pay that, despite the pressure on the industry, they do not appear to 
have suffered. In fact, in the crisis period of the 1970s they continued 
to gain substantial yearly increases and between 1973 and 1980 the 
average earnings of all officers rose by some 263 per cent and that 
of the 'typical' officer by 252 per cent. This movement must be seen 
against the relative stability of officers' Jobs and the opportunity 
which they have of alternative employment in foreign fleets.
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TABLE 6.3
AVERAGE EARNINGS FOR OFFICERS 1974-1980
Rank
Average Earnings per 
£
Calendar Year
1973 1974 1976 1978 1980
Master 8710 11401 15777
Chief Officer - 4810 6365 8657 11771
1 NO (a) 3580 - 6038 8275 11258
2 NO 2606 3607 4831 6722 9197
3 NO 2121 2845 3757 5351 7473
4 NO 1656 2896 3430 4929 -
Chief Engineer 4759 6168 8063 10663 14644
1 EO Cb) 3314 - 6699 9129 14388
2 EO 2448 4471 5945 8149 11256
3 EO 2036 3375 4575 6399 8838
4 EO 1868 2771 3826 5439 7556
All Officers 2761 3762 5430 7442 10030
SOURCE: Maritime Earnings Survey, British Shipping Federation and
G.C.B.S,
NOTES:
a. NO ■ Navigation Officer.
b. EO ■ Engineer Officer
While for ratings there is little divergence from the N.M.B. rates 
in respect of the basic rates actually paid, there is a divergence 
between these basic rates and actual earnings which is mainly due to the 
massive amount of overtime worked. Table 6.4 shows the average gross 
weekly earnings of foreign-going ABs since 1965, together with an analysis 
of overtime pay and hours worked. The gross weekly earnings reflect 
similar movements to that seen in basic pay but the increase in earnings 
is far more substantial than in basic pay. The greater increase in 
average earnings is related to the increase in leave and overtime pay 
and the amount of overtime hours worked.. For example, in 1965 leave and 
overtime payments constituted only 21,9 per cent of average earnings 
whereas in 1980 they accounted for 51.8 per cent.
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These figures of course only relate to foreign-going ABs and 
the experience is not uniform throughout all trades. For example, the 
First Pearson Report 1966 stated 'the average weekly working time for a 
seaman in a foreign-going ship is 66 hours and in the home trade ship 
is 73.6 hours'. This discrepancy was confirmed by a survey undertaken
g
by the N.M.B. in 1978, which showed that all ratings worked a weekly 
average of 32.02 hours overtime, with 61 per cent of all ratings working 
•t least 30 hours. Since the average given in Table 6.A shows a foreign- 
going AB working 24.9 hours overtime per week it would seem that the home 
trade ABs have a higher percentage of overtime. However, the fact that 
'all ratings' include catering ratings must also be taken into account.
To the extent that the increased earnings are directly related to
increased overtime, they may be seen as a reflection of increasing
pressure on the shipowner. This has resulted in a desire to have more
maintenance and repair work carried out at sea without the ship being
stopped. In addition, it is generally cheaper to have this work done by
seamen rather than shore workers, thus reducing cost. To some extent the
higher overtime worked may also be related to smaller crew size which has
resulted from technological change. On the other hand, the substantial
increase in earnings and the fact that the AB is paid in a lump sum at
the end of a voyage may explain the apparent lack of emphasis on basic
pay. This is particularly so if the view is taken that:
It (overtime) benefits the seaman because usually 
he would rather have additional earnings than leisure 
time at sea.9
The AB has therefore made substantial gains in earnings but at the 
price of long hours. These gains have also been schleved against a back­
ground of considerable loss of job opportunity with less chance of 
alternative employment in other fleets than officers.
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While all seafarers will be concerned with rates of remuneration 
within their industry, they will also be concerned with comparison with 
other industries. These comparisons will generally be with occupations 
requiring similar training, skill or status. Because of the nature of 
the industry, it is difficult to provide a basis for direct comparison.
In the case of officers, the three groups chosen are non-manual employees; 
two in occupations which may be regarded as having some similarity such 
as transport, and where formal qualifications are usually required, as in 
national and local government. The third group, that of 'non-manual, 
all industries and services', places the 'typical' officer against a 
wider background as this group would be one of which he would consider 
himself a part (see Table 6.5).
Two rates are shown for the 'typical' officers. The first is the 
N.M.B. rate and the one shown in brackets includes the 15 per cent 
difference between these rates and actual company 'Begin At' rates as 
calculated in the Survey of the National Board for Prices and Incomes.*®
This provides a more realistic view of pay rates. The table must be 
considered in two distinct parts since the figures for 1970 are based on 
the New Earnings Survey and are not comparable to the figures before that 
date.
An examination of the period 1947 to 1970 shows that the 'typical' 
officer,using both N.M.B. and 'company' criteria, was receiving a rate 
of pay below that of similar occupations. In the period 1955 to 1970, 
where direct comparison may be made, using the assumed 'company' figures, 
the basic psy of officers was increased by 122 per cent whereas his 
counterpart in local government increased his basic pay by 146 per cent.
In the period 1959 to 1970, his pay rose by 90 per cent in comparison 
with 126 per cent for transport managers, and that of all non-manual workers 
rose by 100 per cent. In real money terms the gap widens throughout the
*» I S id
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COMPARATIVE SALARIES OF THE 'TYPICAL' OFFICER3 AND SELECTED NON 
MANUAL GROUPS ZftEEKLX7 £
TABLE 6.5
• General All
'Typical' Transport Administrative Non Manual
Officer Manager Local Govt. Occupations Index
1947 7.84b
(9.01)
48 7.84
(9.01)
49 7.84
(9.01)
1950 7.84
(9.01)
51 8.76
(10.07)
52 9.26
(10.64)
53 10.70
(12.30)
54 10.70
(12.30)
1955 10.70
(12.30)
14.60
56 11.53
(13.25)
15.50
57 11.53
(13.25)
16.29
58 13.03
(14.98)
16.74
59 13.03
(14.98)
15.37 18.80 18.03
1960 14.42
(16.58)
17.71 18.87 19.10
61 14.42
(16.58)
17.92 19.96 20.04
62 15.04
(17.29)
19.0 21.42 21.13
63 15.78
(18.14)
21.9 22.71 22.25
64 16.60
(19.09)
22.75 23.39 23.53
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TABLE 6.5 (continued)
'Typical'
Officer
Transport
Manager
General
Administrative 
Local Govt.
All
Non Manual 
Occupations Index
1965 20.88
(24.01)
24.88 25.78 23.53
66 20.88
(24.01)
26.47 26.69 26.69
67 20.88
(24.01)
27.95 27.73 27.90
68 . 20.88
(24.01)
29.76 29.11 29.77
69 23.77
(27.33)
32.39 32.3 32.07
1970 23.77
(27.33)
34.8 36.0 36.12
1970 41.7*
NEW EARNINGS SURVEY 
32.6 31.4
71 42.8 35.4 - 34.4
72 47.3 39.2 40.9 38.5
73 47.9 45.8 44.1 42,8
74 53.4 50.9 61.7 48.5
1975 74.3 66.7 79.1 61.8
76 91.3 76.7 95.7 73.9
77 100.6 82.0 102.5 81.1
78 123.8 94.4 107.3 91.8
79 138.8 105.4 117.1 99.2
1980 165.3 136.3 154.6 127,7
SOURCES< N.M.B. Year Book.
British Labour Statistics - Historical Abstract 1886-1968.
British Labour Statistics Year-Books 1970.
New Earnings Survey 1970-1980,
All Department of Employment H.M.S.O.
NOTES!
a. From 1970 onwards a Ships Officer as defined in the New Earnings Survey.
b. Weekly rate estimated by multiplying monthly by 12 and dividing by 52.
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In the period after 1970 it is more difficult to make a clear 
comparison in respect of the 'typical' officer as the New Earnings Survey 
implemented at that time, does not provide sufficient specific information. 
The ship's officers earnings are based on a 1 per cent sample of a wide 
range of personnel, including the shore staff of shipping companies, pilots, 
cadets and apprentices, and this distorts earnings, making them somewhat 
unrelated to the 'typical' officer. Furthermore, the figures include a 
large number of allowances as well as overtime on top of the basic rates.
The only way of assessing the relationship of these figures to the earnings 
of the 'typical' officers is to compare them with the figures available 
in the Maritime Earnings Survey undertaken by the G.C.B.S. (Table 6.3).
On this basis the New Earnings Survey would appear to underestimate the 
'typical' officer's earnings by some £500 per year. They do, however, 
suggest that the officer maintained an improved position throughout the 
1970s.
The same problems of providing a basis for comparison exist in the 
case of the ratings. Perhaps the most obvious comparison, not least for 
the rating himself, is with the dockers since it is not only an occupation 
which an AB might well enter on leaving the sea, but one with which he 
could well have close kinship and community ties. While government figures 
are available in respect of the basic rates for dock labourers, they give 
little or no indication of rates actually paid and even less of earnings.
As has been pointed out in studies of dock labour, basic rates play a 
very small part in determining earnings.^ This discrepancy is illustrated 
by comparing the quoted basic rate and the fall back guarantee; for 
example, in 1967-1968 tha former was £11.08 while the latter was between 
£16 and £17. Furthermore, the average earnings of a London docker was 
£23.75 in 1967 and £42 by 1971 with some dockers earning up to £46 
whereas the basic pay was £20. This rendered any comparison meaningless.
- 120 -
The most directly comparable shore-based occupation in terms of 
working conditions, would seem to be that of long distance lorry driving 
since this involves absence from home and an atypical life style. In 
view of the relatively low basic rate of the AB it is useful to make a 
comparison with agricultural workers, the group most often cited in 
negotiations as representative of the low paid. Even when this decision 
is made problems still remain since they do not provide a basis of 
nationally negotiated rates. In the case of the AB the rates are not 
only nationally negotiated but they are those which are actually paid.
The rates for those in road haulage are not negotiated on an industry 
basis but rather on a regional basis with groups of employers. It is 
true that the rates for the agricultural worker are fixed by a National 
Board, but they only provide for a minimum wage. It has been suggested 
that the rationale for the Board is to ensure that a minimum is paid 
rather than providing a minimum of which higher rates are based. Further, 
the provision of accommodation, and payments in kind, distorts this 
analysis.
If the criteria are merely the basic rates shown in Table 6.6, 
the AB remains ahead of the two other groups throughout the whole period. 
Rather surprisingly, in view of their reputation as a group of low paid 
workers, the agricultural labourer maintains his position vis a vis the 
ratings, whereas the lorry driver appears to fall farther behind. How­
ever, the validity of this conclusion must be questioned when consideration 
is given to regional differences, overtime and other payments, both in 
money and kind. What the table highlights most clearly is the difficulty 
of providing an adequate basis for valid comparison, especially over time.
If the analysis is more broadly based to consider manual workers in 
all industries and services, the picture is considerably modified. The 
indices of basic rates earned by ABs and other manual workers, which uses
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BASIC WEEKLY RATES OF WAGES A.Bs AND OTHER SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
AND INDUSTRIAL INDEX ¿WEEK.LY~!7
TABLE 6.6
Year
AB's*
Foreign-
Going
Road 
Haulage 
Driver 
(Grade 1)
Agricultural 
Labourer 
/Wage Boar<l7
A.B's Index 
Æ972 - ioq7
All Industries*5 
And Services Index 
Æ972 - 1007
1947 5.53 4.48 4.00 27.52 25.7
48 5.53 4.80 4.50 27.52 27.2
49 5.53 4.80 4.70 27.52 27.9
1950 5.53 4.95 4.70 27.52 28.4
51 6.00 5.30 4.70 29.86 30.8
52 6.46 5.65 5.40 32.15 33.4
53 6.46 5.90 5.65 32.15 34.9
54 6.69 6.25 6.00 33.30 36.4
1955 7.38 6.40 6.55 36.73 38.9
56 7.84 6.90 6.75 39.02 42.0
57 8.36 7.35 7.05 41.61 44.1
58 8.76 7.90 7.05 43.60 45.7
59 8.76 8.15 7.08 43.60 46.9
1960 9.34 8.40 8.00 46.49 48.1
61 9.51 8.90 8.45 47.33 50.1
62 9.84 9.04 8.75 48.97 51.9
63 9.84 9.26 9.15 48.97 53.8
64 10.38 9.62 9.50 51.66 56.4
1965 12.33 10.01 10.10 61.37 58.8
66 12.33 10.61 10.50 61.33 61.5
67 12.33 10.93 10.80 61.33 63.9
68 12.89 10.93 11.55 64.16 68.1
69 12.89 10.62 12.40 64.16 71.7
1970 15.69 11.12 13.15 78.09 78.8
71 18.06 16.20 14.80 89.89 89.0
72 20.09 16.50 16.20 100.00 101.3
73 21.98 18.00 19.50 109.40 115.2
74 25.44 19.72 21.80 126.63 138.0
1975 32.00 21.97 28.50 159.28 178.7
76 34.00 21.97 30.50 169.23 213.2
77 34.00 21.97 36.50 169.23 227.3
78 41.72 - 43.00 207.66 259.3
79 45.65 - 48.50 227.22 298.1
1980 63.25 50.00 314.83 351.8
SOURCES] N.M.B. Year’« Book.
British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract 1887-1968. 
British Labour Statistics 1970.
New Earning Survey 1970-80.
All Department of Employment H.M.S.O.
NOTES !
a. AB's Basic Consolidated Rate.
b. Basic Weekly Wage Rates - Manual Workers.
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1972 as the base year, show that, while initially the AB was in a better 
position, this position was lost in 1970. It was not regained until 
1965 and 1966 with the consolidation of basic rates but this gain was 
only temporary. Since 1973 the position of the AB has, on this comparison, 
been declining. Moreover, one important point has to be made which 
modifies any conclusion drawn from a consideration of basic pay alone and 
that is the question of hours. The ratings worked a basic week of 56 
hours until the early 1960s and did not achieve a AO hour week until 
1967.
The most realistic comparison for seafarers' wages is the inter­
national one and one very relevant to the seafarer and how he sees himself. 
Unfortunately, there are no published figures which would permit of a 
comparison for officers. However, internationally their rates are likely 
to bear the same relation to their fellow foreign officers as the ABs 
to their foreign counterparts. A limited international comparison of the 
position of the 'typical' AB is possible but again there are a number of 
qualifications which restrict the conclusions that may be drawn. For 
example, there are the problems of fluctuations in exchange rates, the 
difference in the standard of living in the individual countries and 
finally, the way in which the various basic rates are defined.
From Table 6,7 it may be seen that when ABs' rates in the U.K. 
are compared with those in other major maritime nations (Greece being 
representative of flags of convenience until 1970), they have declined 
throughout the period. By 1968 it is the lowest rate, in spite of the 
fact that consolidation had taken place in 1965; this was the point 
when their position began to improve nationally. For the remainder of 
the period only two fleets pay lower basic rates, Japan in 1970 and 1972, 
and Greece in 1970, 1972, 1976, 1977 and 1980. The figures for Japan 
must be treated with caution as their actual rates of pay are made up of
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TABLE 6.7
A COMPARATIVE INDEX OF A.B's BASIC MONTHLY RATES 
1951 - I960
Country 1951 1958 1960 1968 1970 1972 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
U.K. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 22 87 - 104 76 78 - 134 179 148 147 122
Norway 77 119 103 141 184 135 157 131 272 230 225 167
Greece 116 62 95 106 91 81 106 88 98 106 106 77
Germany (W)' 74 83 77 118 105 119 128 - - - - •
Italy 80 132 - 142 - - 101 - - - - -
Netherlands 90 104 93 146 142 127 151 - - - - -
U.S.A. 369 379 334 328 297 232 - 180 272 240 255 180
Liberia 180 161 155 119
SOURCE» I . L.O I.L.O I.T.F I.L.O I.T.F I.T.F I.T.F I.L.O Lloyds Lloyds Lloyds Lloyds
Lloyd* - Lloyds Shipping Economist.
For details see Appendix VI.
large special payments which make them almost totally unrelated to basic 
rates as paid in the U.K. It is interesting to note that Liberia, generally 
regarded as the epitome of the flag of convenience fleets, appsrently has 
rates well above those of Greece and the U.K. and until 1980, Japan. If the 
U.S. is ignored, the U.K. had at the beginning of the period a wage rate 
considerably higher than its main competitors, whereas by the late 1970s 
it was below all major maritime nations. The point should be made, however, 
that by this time the traditional manning patterns had changed radically.
The low costs crews now would be nationals from Taiwan, Korea and the 
Phillipines.
This relative loss of the position of the U.K. AB has been a gain 
on the employer's side of the collective bargaining. He is, of course, 
concerned with the relationship of his costs to those of his international 
competitors, particularly in relation to manning costs, not least because 
this is one of the few areas of total costs over which he has a direct 
influence, although he may be restricted by legislation as to the nationality
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Crew coats ... are generally dictated by the nationality 
of the crew employed which in turn is usually a function 
of the flag of operation, Hence, ceteris parabus, the 
competitiveness of any one flag is determined by the 
level of crew costs associated with that flag.14
Shipowners are interested in national comparisons of reward in so 
far as they may provide the basis of a union's claim or effect recruitment 
and retention of labour, particularly in a full employment situation,
Nevertheless the owners most important consideration will be his comparative 
position vis-a-vis his foreign competitors and since price (freight) rates 
ere set internationally, an international comparison of manning costs is 
especially relevant. It must be pointed out that manning costs included 
a great deal more than the direct costs of basic rates; overtime etc.
They will also include social insursnce contributions, subsistence allowances, 
training costs, victualling, crew travel and welfare costs. Table 6.8 
gives some estimates of international manning costs from a number of 
sources, which apart from 1975, which refers to short sea trades only, 
are more or less comparable. i
In view of the wide range of items which may be included in manning 
costs, as discussed above, the comparison is limited since the definition 
of manning costs is not constant across all the sources. Neither do the 
figures give any indication of difference between trade vessel sires snd 
ratio of manning to tonnage. The table illustrates the general improve­
ment in U.K.'s relative position from the ship operators point of view, 
with the exception of Italy and Japan, until the late 1970s. For example, 
in a report entitled British Flag: An Outline of its Scope and Advantages, 
s league table was published listing various maritime countries in order ^
of their level of labour costs at July 1977, beginning with the highest:
U.S., France, Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, Norway,
Belgium, Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Spain, Portuguese,
United Kingdom (European Ratings), United Kingdom 
(Hong Kong Ratings), Hong Kong, Philippines, Greece,
China, South Korea and Taiwan.
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TABLE 6.8
SOME ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE MANNING COSTS
Country 1949 1953 1960 1963/4 1971 1975 1978
U.K. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Italy 85 120 - 80 84 - 130
Netherlands 122 117 100/108 - - - -
Denmark 140 124 120/130 - - - 190
Norway 98 111 104/111 97 - - 173
Germany - - - 95 131 126 182
Greece 130 - - l59(a) - - 65
Japan - 97 - 85 - - 160
U.S.A. 288 456 - 398 - - 360
Israel - - - - 114 - -
Sweden - - - - - 132 -
Finland - - - - - 107 -
Cl) (2) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SOURCES: (1) Sturmey G.S. British Shipping and World Competition p.314
(2) House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries: Hearing 
on Maritime Administration and Federal Maritime Board; 
U.S.A. 1955 p.21.
(3) O'Loughlin C. The Economics of Sea Transport p.108.
(a) On the face of it this figure would appear somewhat 
suspect.
(4) Cohen D. 'A Comparative Study of Seamen's Wages'
Journal of Israel Shipping Research Institute, Vol. 3 
No. 2. Aug. 1973.
(5) Ehrnrooth R.G. 'Finnish Shipping Today and Tomorrow'
Unitas Economic Review Finland 2 1976 Vol, 48.
(6) Crew Costs: The Shipowners Dilemma? Galbraiths Shipping 
Advisory Services Ltd. (Dec.) 1979. (Based on comparisons 
on bulk carriers or tankers 32 man crew.)
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However, since 1978 the position of the U.K. rating has altered 
as shown in the final column of Table 6.7, In the last three years U.K. 
crew pay has gone up by almost 55 per cent, Norwegian by 33 per cent and 
the Japanese by 15 per cent. One major element in the high percentage 
increase for the U.K. has been inflation as her inflation rate continues 
to exceed world levels. On this evidence it would appear that negotiating 
through the N.M.B. has kept the U.K. owner in a competitive position in 
regard to manning costs. This conclusion is confirmed by the AB's 
international comparative table above.
The initial conclusion to be drawn from this limited examination of 
wages is that the structure of payments for all personnel is extremely 
complex. This must complicate any negotiations and makes comparative 
analysis very difficult. Even if the structure had been simplified, 
comparison would not necessarily be facilitated since the work environment 
differs greatly from that experienced by shore-based employees.
It cannot be argued, however, that this precludes the necessity to 
find some basis for comparison. Whilst the seafarer may work in a different 
environment, he and his family live in the same society as shore-based 
employers. Finally, most wage claims are related to some comparative 
criteria and on all these grounds, therefore, the search for valid 
comparisons cannot be abandoned.
The general conclusion on the date considered in this chapter, is 
that from the national point of view both officers and ratings have 
improved their relative position since the mid-1960s. Internationally, 
their position has deteriorated; until the 1960s they were comparable with 
other maritime nations but since then their position has been considerably 
eroded. This movement has, of course, benefited the employers whose 
main concern is with International manning costs, since manning costs in 
U.K. registered vessels generally have experienced a relative decline 
over the last two decades. Thus, if wages are used as the criteria of
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success, it would sppear that the N.M.B. has served the shipping industry 
well with particular benefit to the employers because they operate in an 
international market.
It is extremely difficult to support any argument for a direct 
relationship between levels of pay or patterns of wage negotiations and 
technological change, not least because of the problem of isolating the 
dependent variables. Just becsuse two events occur in close proximity 
does not mean they are necessarily linked as cause and effect. For example, 
while it is true that the improvements in pay of the late 1960s and in the 
1970s happened at the same time as the new technology was being taken up 
by the British fleet, this is by no means the only factor which must be 
considered. At this time the industry as a whole was going through a 
period of reassessment following the overt conflict of 1966, and, while 
this did not have a direct relationship with either pay or specific 
technological change, it has to be seen in the total context of events 
affecting the industry. There may, however, be a case for seeing the 
improved rates as a recognition that the industry required a more experienced 
labour force with a high degree of career conrnitment*5 which does 
undoubtedly have a correlation with high technology.
1 2 «  -
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HMSO, 1967. Para. 7.
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5. See Chapter 8 below for discussion of 1966 strike.
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paras. 9 and 10.
10. See M. Mellish, The Docks after Devlin, London: Heinemann, 1972, 
chapter 5; and U.F. Wilson, Dockers: The Impact of Industrial 
Change, London: Fontana/Collins, 1972, chapter 12 and Appendix 1.
11. ibid.
12. II.A. Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great 
Britain, Oxford: Blackwell, 19)4, page 39.
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Shipowner's Dilemma, 1079, page 1.
14. Cnlbraith's Shipping Advisory Service Limited, Special Report, 
September 1977, Section 2 para. (iil). 15
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CHAPTER 7
THE IMPACT OF CHANGE:
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RATINGS
The extent to which the expectations and demands of the employer 
and employee are successfully met by the process of collective bargaining 
is an extremely important element in industrial relations, particularly 
in respect of costs and rewards. Industrial relations however, encompasses 
a great deal of problem solving which never reaches the formal collective 
bargaining machinery, and may indeed do so only when industrial action of 
some kind is imminent. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the wider 
spectrum of industrial relations than the functioning of the N.M.B. in 
order to assess the extent of the impact of change within the shipping 
industry on its industrial relations.
The most obvious criterion to consider is the official strike since 
this is a measure of the failure of the whole problem-resolving structure. 
In this respect the N.M.B. has a reputation for achieving harmony within 
the industry,since the first official strike did not take place until 
1966. Forty-five years of peace is certainly an achievement in an industry 
which had, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, based its 
industrial relations on conflict.
The 'degree of harmony' in the U.K. industry is even more remarkable
in view of the fact that the maritime industry is regarded internationally
as having a high propensity to strike.* Kerr and Segal,in their study
of the strike proneness of industries in eleven countries, put forward an
explanation of the high propensity of seafarers to strike which applies
to other industrial groups such as miners and dockers.
The miners, the sailors, the longshoremen, loggers and, to 
a much lesser extent, the textile workers form isolated 
masses, almost a 'race apart', They live in their own
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separate communities, the coal patch, the ship, the 
waterfront district, the logging camp, the textile town.
These communities have their own codes, myths, heroes and 
social standards. There are few neutrals in them to 
mediate the conflicts and dilute the mass. All people 
have grievances, but what is important is that all the 
members of each of these groups have the same grievances: 
industrial hazards or severe depression, unemployment or 
bad living conditions (which seem additionally evil because 
they are supplied by the employer), or low wages or inter­
mittent work. And here is a case where the totality of 
comnon grievances, after they have been verbally shared, may 
be greater than the sum of the individual parts.2
The U.K. seamen are no exception to this analysis and in a period of rapid
change the 'totality of common grievances' might be expected to have been
intensified. Other variables, therefore, have to be considered to explain
why the U.K. is an exception to the general conclusion. The most important
variable may be of course the seafarers’ legal position in respect of
3
industrial action.
A number of factors may have contributed to the absence of official
strikes and counterbalanced the stress of Industrial change and the problems
it is likely to represent. First it is perhaps significant that by the
beginning of the period under discussion the institutions of the industrial
relations system were firmly established. Prior to this it is debatable as
to what extent there was a realistic potential for conflict following
the formation of the N.M.B. In the early years the participants were
concerned with consolidating their new position and isolating any militant 
£
rivals. In the 1930s, of course, the economic situation was hardly 
auspicious for successful strikes. This type of long term evolution of 
cooperation ia seen by Walton and McKersleJ as an important factor in 
problem solving. Furthermore, there is apt to be a long period for 
feeling out one another on the dimensions of trust, respect, etc. Walton 
and McKersie suggest that the effectiveness of (a) negotiations in general 
and (b) non-distributive bargaining in particular will be positively
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related to the length of time the parties and the chief negotiators have 
been dealing with each other.®
In order to make an attempt to test this the records of the N.M.B. 
were examined to ascertain the length of service of negotiators on the 
employers and employees side of both the Sailors and Firemen's and 
Navigating Officers Panels of the National Maritime Board. Table 7.1 
shows the numbers of years of experience of all those involved in 
negotiations in the particular years selected on a five year basis. 1947 
was used rather than 1945 as this was the year in which the Established 
Service Scheme was implemented. The main points which emerge and which 
would appear to support the already available evidence are:
1. There is a high degree of stability of representation in all groups.
2. Since the selection is such that the length of service is measured 
in five year cycles (seven and three in respect of the 1940s)
the figures would suggest that in any one year the percentage of 
new-comera would, in all probability, be below 50 per cent. The 
longest servers were the most senior officials although the tables 
do not specify individual membership.
3. The employers not only appear to have been the more stable group, 
in terms of years of service, but in the main they had more 
negotiators available to act in any one year. The reason for this 
may well be the fact that they were representing a more diverse 
group of interests than the employees'organizations.
4. It should be noted that throughout the period the officers' 
organizations were Involved in amalgamations of one form or another 
and yet this apparently had no effect on the stability of their 
representation.
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A further objective of the study was to identify the areas of 
discussion covered by the National Maritime Board Panels and, if possible, 
to detect any reflection of the changes the industry was undergoing during 
the period. The source for the following table (Table 7.2) is the 
N.M.B. Minutes for the years 1947, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970.
1947 was selected as the first year since it must be regarded as the first 
'normal' year after the War. The categories shown cover all the major 
areas of discussion, where panels met jointly, indicated by brackets ( ) 
under the number of meetings, the item is entered under each appropriate 
panel. The category 'General' covers either very specific issues, i.e. 
one incident on a single vessel or such non-contentious issues as war 
memorials.
In the selected years the Full Board only met once, at the 
beginning of 1947, to discuss the Established Service Scheme; the Masters 
Panel did not meet until after 1964.7 The N.M.B. does not have a formal 
timetable for convening meetings, but meets as and when it is felt 
necessary. For example, in 1955 the Navigating and Engineers Officers 
Panel met on three occasions whilst the Sailors and Firemen's and 
Catering Panel met six times, whereas in 1965 both Panels met only twice.
These Panel meetings are not, of course, the only meetings held since 
some matters are referred to sub-committees; these are usually either to 
deal with specific single issues or to undertake groundwork before a final 
decision is given by the respective Panel. All areas of concern are, 
therefore, properly reflected in the following table in their frequency, /
if not their depth of discussion.
It is perhaps surprising to find that strikes are only discussed 
once, in 1947, although the selected years do in fact cover periods during
g
which the Industry was involved in considerable unofficial unrest.
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Furthermore, in an industry where discipline is a bone of 
contention, it was only discussed four times in the sample.
On the other hand there appears to have been a preoccupation with 
special allowances, to such an extent that it was commented on in the 
report of the Prices and Incomes Board where it was stated that 'They 
seem to us to show a greater zeal for securing a differential payment 
for every minor factor affecting an officers conditions of work than
for securing a pay progression generally in keeping with progress in an 
9
officers career'. Although this reference was specifically to officers, 
it holds true for all grades.
What does emerge is the similarity of the subject matter of 
discussion to what would be expected from any collective bargaining 
machinery. Furthermore, there is no indication in this sample of any 
shift of emphasis, or that the pressures under which the industry was 
operating produced new areas for negotiation. As a matter of interest 
Table 7.3 below, shows a similar analysis made of 1921 and this gives 
some indication of the stability of the range of topics over time.
The study of the N.M.B. minutes, therefore, gives little indication 
of the changes the industry has undergone and would appear to support the 
findings of Walton and McKersie. From this the conclusion could be 
drawn that the chsges had not placed any strain on the collective 
bargaining structure and the participant organizations. A conclusion 
given credence by the lack of official strikes until 1966, What must be 
questioned is the assumption that the apparently unaltered functioning 
of the N.M.B. and the absence of official strikes are sufficient criteria 
on which to judge the effects of change. This, however, implies a 
limited view of industrial relations. The first to experience the impact 
of change will be the individual and his representative organization and
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TABLE 7.3
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CAUSES DEALT WITH DURING YEAR 
ENDED 31 DECEMBER, 1 9 2 1
Subject
National
Maritime
Board
Masters'
Panel
Navigating 
Officers' 
Panel
Engineer 
Officera' 
Panel
Sailors'
and
Firemen's
Panel
Catering
Department
Panel
Rates of Pay 3 7 11 26 20 3
Overtime 12 - 8 17 84 12
Annual Leave - 1 4 19 - -
Accommodation - - 2 - - 2
Bed and Bedding - - 1 1 3 -
Heavy Ashes 1 - - - 14 -
Tube Money 1 - - - 4 -
Railway Fares - - 1 1 5 1
Manning 1 - 1 - 13 -
Port Pay off Articles - - - - 7 -
Shorthand Money 1 - - - 6 -
Bonuses - - - - 3 -
Runs 2 - - - 9 -
Representation 1 - - 1 1 1
Subsistence Allowance - - - - 1 1
Medical Examination - - - - 3 -
Tobacco Prices - - - - 1 1
Registration of Seamen 1 - - - 1 -
Desertions, U.S.A. - 1 - - - -
Pilotage - 2 - - - -
Joint Supply System - - - - 2 -
Publications 1 - - - 1
General - 1 2 5 16 6
24 12 30 70 193 28
357
SOURCE: Report of the Working of the National Maritime Board 1920.
N.B, Tube money, port pay off article!, ahorthand money, bonuaea, runa 
and aubaiatence allowances would appear as special payments in 
Table 7.2.
r
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it is at this level that manifestations of stress in industrial relation­
ships will first occur. Only if the problems which arise cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved will they be reflected significantly in the 
collective bargaining machinery. In this respect unofficial agitation 
is as important to the analysis as official action, for the former 
indicates not only dissatisfaction with collective bargaining but also 
is an explicit statement of dissatisfaction with the particular 
representative organization. It must be remembered that in the maritime 
industry official strike action is severely inhibited legally, and 
seafarers do not share the same freedom as most other workers in this 
respect. The seafarer tends to express his discontent in what is perhaps 
regarded as 'traditional' behaviour, that is, excessive drinking and 
carousing. In addition to this, the high turnover of labour undoubtedly 
highlights discontent which the individual solves simply by leaving the 
industry.*®
The lack of formal reference to active discontent by the N.M.B. 
ignores an important aspect of maritime industrial relations between 
1946 and 1966 since during that period there were a number of unofficial 
strikes among groups of ratings. Furthermore, the N.U.S. faced 
considerable criticism from its members and extensive pressure for reform. 
The N.M.B. may well have avoided discussion of these issues because they 
would have been regarded as the private concern of the N.U.S. rather 
than the collective responsibility of the N.M.B.
Dissatisfaction among the ratings became evident immediately after 
the Second World War. In part this was due to the changed social and 
economic climate; there was a desire not to return to pre-war conditions 
and a greater individual expectation particularly in view of the 
commitment to full employment. There continued to be underlying discontent
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related to developments in industrial relations practice ashore, such 
as plant bargaining, and, more directly in the later part of the 
period, with the contraction in job opportunities.
Immediately following the end of the war the industry was 
concerned with restructuring the system of joint supply of labour to 
meet peacetime needs and to replace the Merchant Navy Reserve Pool.
The Established Service Scheme was instituted on 1st April 1947, The 
Scheme aimed at preventing, to some degree, a return of the pre-war 
casual employment by enabling seafarers to look to the Merchant Marine 
to offer them a stable and attractive career, greater regularity of 
employment and income, and give shipping companies efficient, 
reliable personnel to man and maintain their ships at sea and in port.^
The Scheme designated two categories of registered seamen:
'unestablished' - those who would remain essentially casual workers and
the 'established' seaman, who in return for accepting a two year,
renewable either 'Company' or 'General Service' contract, was given
preference of employment, and paid in addition to unemployment benefit,
while awaiting employment between ships. In this way the employers'
flexibility to respond to changes in demand was preserved. The N.M.B.
had overall control of the Scheme, but the day to day administration
was left to the Shipping Federation, known in this instance as the
'Administration', The Scheme superimposed on the Merchant Shipping Act
a new disciplinary procedure for all registered seamen. Any act of
misconduct, should the Master so desire, could bring a seaman before
a disciplinary committee in the larger ports. These consist of three
representatives, one from the Administration, one shipowner, and one
from the seaman's union or association. The Conmittee's ultimate
12
sanction is denial of further employment in the industry.
I A
-  H O  -
The introduction of the E.S. Scheme was part of a larger package, 
including a restructuring of the wage payment system for ratings. As 
usual, taking the Able Seaman's (A.B.) rate, in this particular case 
the most contentious, the basic monthly rate was £ H  plus a war risk 
payment of £10, the latter ceasing with the ending of the Merchant Navy 
Pool. The N.M.B. negotiations produced a basic rate of £20 per month, 
and introduced a new system of 'efficient service pay' of £1 a month, 
for each year in the industry after the first four, to a maximum of 
£2A. This was described as an incentive to seamen to remain in the 
industry and was later to become a factor in the unrest. A clause was 
included in the new agreement ensuring no loss of pay to any seaman
re-entering the industry who had served during the last 8 years. The
13
last date for registering to avoid such a loss was 1 October. Many 
claims were made that with the earlier ending of the Essential Work 
Order, numerous seamen had temporarily left the industry; quite normal 
practice under casual labour conditions. On returning they found their 
wage rates unrelated to their experience or skill. This was an important
element in the dissatisfaction with the new agreement which resulted in
H
a large indoor meeting being held in Liverpool on 15 October 1947,
At this meeting a committee was elected, later entitled the 
'Merseyside Seamen's Rank and File Committee'. There was also a 
unanimous call for a strike beginning on 25 October and a table of demands 
was drawn up in the form of a Seamen's Charter, Most of this was in 
direct opposition to the E.S. Scheme, with its employers' control, 
preference of employment, and the new efficiency payment. The Charter 
basically set out four demands: a unified 'pool' system for all seamen, 
i.e. no 'contract' group; 80 per cent of wages whilst waiting for a 
ship; maximum basic rate for all seamen according to their rating; a 
system of rating hiring to be based on the principle of 'first ashore,
first afloat'. All this was to be constructed around a union operated
hiring hall, on the U.S.A. or New Zealand model. There was also a
demand to suspend the rating training scheme, as they suspected an
oversupply of seamen, and a call for some form of ship shop steward,
or delegate. The designers of the Charter further questioned the need
for the new disciplinary procedures and complained of its undemocratic
nature.^ The committees consisted of two shipowners representatives,
and only one union official. An imbalance compounded in the case of
disagreement by the fact that reference should be made to the Administration
as the final arbiter. Finally, the N.U.S. was castigated for failing
to present their interests with sufficient vigour. Representatives of
the 'Rank and File Committee' were despatched to other major ports, the
result being only minor sporadic stoppages in Manchester, Hull, Glasgow
and latterly London and Southampton. The dispute was thus almost
totally concentrated in Liverpool. The stoppage of two large Canadian
Pacific liners, the Empress of Canada and the troopship,Empress of
Scotland, gave the dispute impetus. As did press reports of pickets
lying on the railway lines to prevent a train carrying some fifty
'loyal' N.U.S. members past the pickets into the dock system.^
By 29 October 18 ships were held up in Birkenhead and Liverpool^
although later the Mersey District Secretary of the N.U.S. was to claim
the strike committee 'only succeeded in persuading 483 men to come out
on strike in Liverpool. That, my friends, is the number of men that
18
were required to come from other ports to man our ships fully'.
Within a week much of the Initial enthusiasm had waned and it appeared 
that the strike would quietly fade away. Momentum was regained when 
two of the strike leaders persuaded over 200 of the Queen Mary's crew 
in Southampton to join the dispute. The N.U.S. had remained aloof.
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apart from either claiming the strike was over, or condemning it. The 
N.U.S. National Organiser, for example, claimed that the Liverpool 
seamen had 'been used as tools in the furtherance of a communistic 
attempt to hold British shipping to ransom and thus impair the nation's 
efforts to overcome its economic difficulties'. Union officials were 
apprehensive about the possibility of the wide press coverage given 
to the Queen Mary’s failure to sail regenerating the dispute. So the 
N.U.S. Acting General Secretary, Thomas Yates, went down to Southampton 
to meet the strike leaders on the quay. After some discussion it was 
agreed to begin negotiations on the strikers' demands.20 Similar 
meetings were held in Liverpool, particular emphasis being placed on 
the revision of the E.S. Scheme. The following day, 6 November, the 
strike ended with a victory parade in Liverpool of, it is claimed, 
some 7,000 strikers. The Rank and File Committee claimed that 'when 
the Queen Mary's crew walked ashore and set off the biggest firework in , 
N.U.S. history, Mr. Tom Yates ¿was forced? ....  into accepting
Merseyside Seamen's Rank and File Committee's proposals to end the 
21
strike'. Although the strike was over, pressure remained on the 
N.U.S. In order to prevent further stoppages, Tom Yates called a 
special meeting at N.U.S. headquarters where the ordinary members 
pressed agsin for modifications to the Established Service Scheme.
Whilst this was appsrently conceded at the time, no modifications were 
in fact made.
Three unofficial organisations emerged during the strike of
which the Merseyside Seamen's Rank and File Committee was the most
important. They saw their future policy as
First, that we must continue the fight in the most 
vigorous manner possible by keeping our Union books 
clear, in order that we may raise our voices inside 
the N.U.S.
That we must fight to get Rank and File leaders from 
all Ports on the Executive Council of the N.U.S.
That Rank and File Committees must be set up on all 
ships in order that the solidarity and determination 
displayed in the last two months is maintained.22
Whilst the strike was apparently unsuccessful, its unofficial nature
represented a threat to the union although they attempted to minimize
its importance. They were not prepared to recognize the possibility
that it might have any widespread support among the membership and saw
unofficial action as being organized by 'a very efficient Communist 
23
minority'. There is no doubt that this was to some extent true but 
it is difficult to know whether the Communist influence was internal or 
external to the Rank and File Committee. The lasting effect of this 
was that the union became one of the leading British anti-Communist 
Trade Unions. Their sensitivity to and fear of any Communist influence 
meant that future questions of official policy were inmediately stamped 
as Communist. In this respect it is interesting to note that unofficial 
stoppages were discussed in the General Secretary's Report under
Communist Infiltration when it was stated that 'Ringleaders in such
24
stoppages would be dealt with severely*.
The one issue in the Seamen's Charter of 1947 which remained 
alive was that of shipboard representatives. This in fact was an issue 
that pre-dated the strike and was perhaps part of the general concern 
in British industry in the post-war period, with shop stewards. At the 
1945 Annual General Meeting, resolutions were put forward concerning 
the appointment of ships delegates or committees but they met with little 
success. They were seen as 'nothing but an attempt to undermine the work 
of the union' 'misleading the rest of the members of the crew' 
whilst one of the Assistant General Secretaries (later to become the 
General Secretary) stated 'an unofficial coimnittee could do a good job
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but the moment It become* an official committee, it is dangerous'.27
The matter was remitted to the Executive Committee. At the following
AGM, the matter was raised again but the meeting was informed that it was
28
to be discussed at the next Executive Committee meeting.
In the context of the 1947 stoppage, the discussion of shipboard 
representatives at the 1948 Annual General Meeting is particularly 
relevant. When the matter came up for discussion, three main arguments 
were put forward by the officials as to the advisability and feasibility 
of ships delegates. Firstly, they were unnecessary in view of the 
presence of experienced officials outside the U.K, in places such as 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Malta and New York; secondly, as there are 3000 
vessels in the fleet, such a scheme would necessitate approximately 
nine thousand delegates; and finally 'Power was likely to get into the 
hands of the wrong people'. The resolution on this occasion was 
defeated by 71 to 12. This question of power was perhaps the one that 
concerned the union most and the issue was raised again in 1949^° and 
in 1951 when it is significant that the General Secretary, replying to
a comment concerning the success of shop stewards in shore-based
31
industry, said 'You can control shop stewards ashore'.
The question does not emerge again for serious consideration 
until the unofficial strike of 1955 when it was included as one of the 
demands of the strikers. It is difficult to find any one particular 
cause of the 'unrest' among ratings in that year but the main stoppage 
was the last of several smaller incidents and its length and the 
response it engendered does suggest some wider underlying discontent.
There is no doubt this was related in part to the manning of»and hours of 
work in»passenger liners which were coming under commercial pressure 
in the North Atlantic. Furthermore, individual seafarers were increasingly
- 145 -
prepared to attempt to settle issues at plant level rather than refer 
back to the union. In March, for example, the crew of the Queen of 
Bermuda engaged permanently in the passenger trade between New York 
and Hamilton, Bermuda, held an on-board meeting. During this a committee 
of six was elected to begin negotiations with the owners for a United 
States coast cost-of-living allowance. On approaching the Master, the 
six were dismissed as agitators, three were later reinstated, With the 
ship's arrival in New York, 210 of the crew walked ashore in protest 
at the dismissal of their three colleagues. All were promptly dismissed 
by the New York director of the company, the vessel sailing without 
passengers. The director told the press that 'There is no reason for
negotiation with the men, we will have no mob rule. They are finished.
32
This is not a strike. They deserted the ship. They are unemployed'. 
Discussions followed with Consular officials and the New York delegate 
of the N.U.S. The Company, after some delay, agreed to reinstate a 
majority of the men. A minority, some 70, elected to return to the U.K. 
The three committee men were not reinstated and no cost-of-living 
allowance was conceded.
There was also an incident on board the Cunard liner 'Georgia' 
engaged in the emigrant trade from Liverpool to Australia. On 14 May, 
about 100 of the catering crew walked ashore in protest at undermanning 
in the dining rooms. The men were particularly incensed by a notice 
posted on board asking passengers to volunteer an waiters during the 
voysge. Cunard did not press the issue, signed on additional staff and 
the vessel sailed after half a day's delay. A similar incident of 
undermanning occurred on board the 'Asconia' on 31 May, which was to 
provide the Initial impetus to an unofficial dispute lasting four weeks, 
causing the loss of some 25,000 working days, although it is officislly
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estimated that only some 1,700 seamen were involved.33
Some 180 of the Asconia's crew, mainly from the catering depart“ 
ment, walked ashore three hours before the vessel was due to sail for 
Montreal and Quebec. They complained of undermanning and demanded a 
revision of working hours, which were 70 per week before overtime.
Further Pierhead meetings were called for 6.45 a.m, the following morning 
and at 10 a.m. in Huskison Dock, The latter was attended by some 200 
or more seamen from four other liners docked in Liverpool. At a meeting 
held the same evening, a seven man conmittee, including representatives 
from all the ships involved, was elected. An N.U.S. official who 
appealed to the men to return to their ship and allow the normal 
negotiation of their grievance to take place received a less than 
sympathetic hearing. By 3 June, the strikers had agreed on a six point 
charter including a reduction in working hours to 44, regular meal 
hours, overtime for weekend watches, better living conditions, ships to 
be inspected regularly by union officials, recognized ship's delegates 
and the institution of proper safeguards against alleged inexperienced 
men being shipped at low wages. The shipping companies involved declined 
an invitation to negotiate with anyone other than N.U.S. officials, and 
proceeded to recruit alternative crews. Ship's officers and shipping 
companies'shore secretarial and clerical staff served passengers on 
board detained vessels. Meanwhile, dock gate pickets had been organized 
in Liverpool, and the dispute had spread to Southampton. The strike was 
gradually growing with each passenger vessel's arrival; by 6 June five 
large liners were strike-bound. At some strike meetings, the regular 
vote of no confidence in the N.U.S. was supplanted by an idea of setting 
up a breakaway 'British Seamen's Union' but nothing came of this. In 
Southampton, the local strike leader described the claims as a pot
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which haa been boiling for the last decade. This time it has boiled 
over. We have to bring about a new era of British shipping'.3*
The N.U.S. General Secretary, Thomas Yates, flew back from the 
U.S. to deal with the dispute. On 8 June, he went on board the 'Queen 
Elizabeth' and persuaded the crew not to join the strike. Later he 
described himself as 'the happiest person in Southampton'. 'I know
the Queen Elizabeth will crack this thing wide open. I think we have
35
broken the strike in Britain'. He dismissed the idea of a breakaway
union, pointing out that the strikers had broken their agreement and
'Before any of the men can ever be considered for re-engagement, they
36
will have to come to the Union'.
Despite the General Secretary's forecast, the strike continued 
seemingly unhampered, until its third week when it began to lose 
momentum and the sailing of the previously strike-bound ships was 
becoming more frequent. The strike leaders, in an attempt to inject 
renewed vigour into the dispute, concentrated all their efforts on 
stopping the 'Queen Mary'. Shortly before the ship docked, a meeting 
had been held and representation made to the Master, with claims similar 
to those of the strikers and stating their intention not to walk ashore 
if these were put to the ship's owners, Cunard. Thus Cunard were 
presented with an opportunity to considerably ease the delicate situation. 
Instead they rejected the representations out of hand on the ground 
that the N.M.B. dealt with such matters and the crew should make their 
grievance known to their representatives on the N.M.B., the N.U.S.
As the board meeting had passed s vote of no confidence in the N.U.S. 
the outcome was obvious.
Just prior to sailing 500 of the Queen Mary's crew of 1,300 
walked shore. The strikers' elation at their Southampton success was
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short-lived, because an unexpected and ultimately fatal blow to their 
cause fell in Liverpool. The crews of the first strike-bound vessel 
received warning to be prepared for call-up for military service under 
the National Service Act, They were no longer Merchant Seamen and, 
therefore, no longer exempt. Since the majority of strikers were in the 
catering department, a department in liners where young men under '¿b 
years of age predominated, they were eligible for military service. Despite 
the cries of intimidation, many seamen were conscripted. The Minister of 
Labour, inawering questions in the House of Commons, stated this was 
normal practice, automatic once they had been notified by the Merchant 
Marine Establishment. No official reply was given to the persistent 
assertions that this process usually took three months, but in these 
cases it had been achieved in some weeks. In the long term, what is 
perhaps most unfortunate about the whole disquieting incident, is the 
N.U.S. attitude. As members of the Merchant Marine Establishment they 
could have made strong representations, hindering and possibly stopping 
their members being conscripted. This they failed to do. At a press 
conference, the General Secretary appeared positively relieved at having 
the embarrassing problem of a large section of his membership, who were 
publicly demonstrating their dissatisfaction, removed by this means, and 
its disciplinary influence on the remainder.
The fourth week of the dispute saw over half the Canadian Pacific
and half the larger Cunard fleet strike-bound. Attempts to sail the
Queen Mary by bringing 100 'loyal' men from other ports failed because
it caused another 400 of her crew to walk ashore. Cunard in reply took a
summons out against 49 of the Queen Mary's crew, under the Merchant
37
Shipping Act for 'wilful disobedience to a lawful command'. In addition, 
interim injunctions against five leaders of the strike were granted; they
r
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were also to be sued for damages, thus worsening relations between the 
strikers and their employers and union. In Southampton, the strikers' 
failure to stop the Queen Elizabeth sailing marked the eventual collapse 
of the strike. While at Liverpool the conscription and threatened 
conscription of strikers was draining their reserve. On Saturday 
25 June, a meeting attended by 400 strikers voted to return to work,
but the dispute appears in both ports to have dragged on weakly for a
, , 38
few more days.
There were, over the next few years, a number of minor incidents
but the next major unofficial dispute did not occur until the summer of
1960. Again its beginning was haphazard, the spontaneous walk-off of
a liner's crew over a minor incident. The speed at which it swelled
into a major confrontation, not only with the employers, but also
seriously challenging the union leadership, is some indication of the
underlying dissent within the industry. The dispute was in two distinct
stages, separated by three uneasy weeks, the first from 6 to 20 July
and the second from 10 August to 26 September, It involved, according
to the Ministry of Labour Gazette, 5,000 men in the first period and
4,000 in the second, with an estimated loss of 124,000 working days;
39
it has been suggested that this is a considerable under-estimation.
The strike began on the Cunard liner 'Corinthia' in Liverpool.
On her previous voyage, four stewards had been disciplined for playing 
guitars to a group of colleagues in the early hours of the morning, 
some passengers complained. The four were dismissed on the ship's 
arrival in Liverpool. The vessel's evening departure was delayed due to 
high winds. At this time 200 of the crew, mostly from the catering 
department, walked ashore in protest against the dismissal of their 
four colleagues. It was decided to hold a quay-side meeting at 8 a.m.
the following day, some stewards remaining behind to feed the child 
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passengers. At this meeting the Master's decision to reinstate the 
four men was announced by the District Secretary of the N.U.S. His 
presence was perhaps the reason for the discussion broadening to take 
in the forthcoming N.M.B, negotiations. The perennial question of a 
44-hour week was raised, but this the official refused to discuss.41 
The now familiar pattern occurred, the men walking on board the ship 
to collect their belongings. The expectation that after a 'cooling off' 
period of a few hours, they would return, was not on this occasion 
fulfilled. Instead another meeting was convened, attended by some of 
the crews of other passenger liners lying in Liverpool; it was unanimously 
decided to remain on strike, a committee being elected.
While throughout the dispute much of the activity was to be
concentrated on Liverpool, within a few days it had spread to other ports.
Within a week the press were conservatively estimating some 2,700 ratings
from all departments were involved, and 45 vessels strike-bound, covering
42
everything from small coasters to large passenger liners. The 
extension of the dispute necessitated a reorganization of the committee, 
representatives being elected from ell the ports involved, The committee 
provided the basis of the influential 'National Seamen's Reform Movement' 
which was soon to emerge.
Faced with the agitation by its members, the N.U.S. Finance and 
General Purposes Conmittee 'instructed all members of the union to carry 
out their contracts'.43 The employers' organizations took a similar 
line. The Shipping Federation and the Liverpool Port Employers 
Association wrote a letter to each striker, stating that they had broken 
their contract and bringing to their notice the legal implications of 
their actions. Cunard took matters a stage further, being granted
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injunctions against two strike leaders, restraining them from,
inciting or persuading and conspiring with one another 
and with others, and from doing any act or taking any 
step to incite or persuade seamen in the employ of the 
Cunard Shipping Company Limited to break their contracts 
of employment with them and/or to commit breaches of the 
Merchant Shipping Act (1894) whereby ships cannot proceed 
to sea or otherwise fulfil the contract of the company.
Under such pressure, the feelings which had caused the inital eruption
and ensuing spread of the dispute began to be formulated into a
programme. General to this was dissatisfaction with the past performance
of the N.U.S. and a belief that it operated in such a way as to frustrate
the legitimate aims of the large mass of its members. Its structural
reorganization was to be spearheaded by the introduction of ship shop
stewards or delegates, and the election of all officials who were to
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return to sea after two years. Some strikers believed the N.M.B.
negotiations which were about to begin gave the N.U.S. officials their
last opportunity to vindicate themselves, at its simplest by securing
an agreement on a 44 hour week and £4 increase (ABs). The main aim of
bringing pressure to bear on the forthcoming negotiations was by mid-
June being recognized by all the speakers at the daily strike meetings.
Having achieved this in common with other unofficial disputes the
problem was how to return to work without appearing to concede. The
problem was solved by the N.U.S. unexpectedly agreeing to meet the strike
committee and to negotiate. After this, all that remained was for the
committees to convince the strikers of the acceptability of the return
to work. If the Liverpool men could be convinced, the other ports would
follow their lead. After some confused meetings it was finally agreed
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in Liverpool to return to work on 20 July and await the outcome of the 
N.M.B. negotiations. Other ports followed,
The dispute differed fundamentally from its predecessors in that 
it left an active and effective organization, the National Seamen's 
Reform Movement (N.S.R.M.), with members drawn from all the major ports.
A policy statement, attached to its membership forms, stated that 'This 
organisation is a voluntary association of seamen whose declared aims are 
to organise and unite all British seamen. To bring about constitutional 
reforms into the N.U.S. by legal and constitutional means, to elect all 
national, district and branch officials and the insnediate introduction 
of ships delegates and the recognition of those already existing'.47 
On 2 August 1960 it published 'An important message to the Merchant 
Seamen of Great Britain'. In addition to the previous claims, they 
wanted improved wage and overtime rates, and a shortening of working 
hours. These demands were eventually identical to those presented by the 
N.U.S. to the N.M.B. Where the difference lay was that the N.S.R.M. 
would accept nothing less whereas the N.U.S. in the actual negotiating 
situation was almost certain to accept some form of compromise. The 
recently knighted General Secretary of the N.U.S., Sir Thomas Yates,
CBE, had rather prejudiced the negotiations in his closing speech at the 
union A.G.M. in May where he stated that 'if we are able to get adopted 
all the resolutions you have passed this week it would increase operating 
costs by at least 50 per cent. It would be foolish to say you will get 
a 44 hour week, a wage increase of £4 a month and a pension scheme all 
in one bit'.48 Thus placing the N.U.S. negotiators at a disadvantage, 
although the dispute and the highly charged situation may have stiffened 
their resolve for on 28 July they rejected the employers' offer as 
inadequate. The negotiations resumed on 9 August, producing an agree­
ment which by previous standards was a remarkable one, At its simplest 
it gave a 5) day week and a fifty shilling a month Increase,
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The agreement failed, almost by definition, to satisfy the
N.S.R.M, It called the men out on 10 August and the second stage of
the dispute began. The response to the call took even the most fervent
advocates by surprise, although it failed in its central aim, which was
to have a short sharp stoppage of all U.K. shipping in port. It was to
prove irrefutably the seaman's dissatisfaction with his employers and
union. The majority of ports were affected, many seriously. Areas
previously not involved came out, like the south coast ports, who
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participated during the first few days of the dispute. It was fairly
soon concentrated in the North, particularly Liverpool, and the North
East ports between the Tyne and Wear.
The employers who, as the Daily Telegraph pointed out, had
'weapons in their armoury which other employers lost half a century 
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ago' began to use them. The Master of the 'Castilian', a Liverpool 
vessel lying in London, charged the members of the crew under Section 
255 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, with three offences; wilfully 
disobeying the lawful command, wilful disobedience and combining to­
gether to impede the progress of the voyage. All pleaded 'not guilty', 
claiming they were engaged in an industrial dispute called by the 
N.S.R.M. The 8 crew members over 21 years of age were sentenced to 
1 month's imprisonment, the remainder forfeited six days' pay. The 
Council for Civil Liberties, after expressing its 'shock' over the case, 
noted that the prosecution was represented by a Queen's Counsel but the 
seamen were unrepresented. Cunard once again secured interim injunctions 
against the four strike leaders for 'inciting and persuading'. A week 
later the Chairman of the Strike Committee, Mr. Neary, was imprisoned for 
contempt of Court, in that he failed to stop his strike activities. In 
addition, two seamen from the Cunard liner 'Sylvania' were sentenced to
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one month for disobeying a lawful command. The sentence was later
quashed, although such convictions and sentences continued throughout
the strike. The effect of these legal actions was, it appears, to
stiffen the strikers' resolve. As The Times put it, 'The men are
angered not intimidated by the threat of gaol and by the thought of
seamen incarcerated as a result of their part in the strike'.51
Certainly, the General Secretary considered the arrest of the Chairman
of the Strike Committee of prime importance. 'This strike had run its
course after the first fourteen days and would have ended, but for
Mr. Neary going to prison for Contempt of Court. This aroused public
52
opinion and a certain amount of sympathy'.
These convictions brought support for the strikers from numerous
quarters. The reaction was greatest in Liverpool. There, on 16 August,
much of the port was brought to a standstill by a token strike of
dockers, and the crews of certain river craft, in support of those 
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imprisoned. Two weeks later a large demonstration was organized by 
the Trades Council, Labour Party and a number of trade unions, to protest 
against the imprisonment. These activities were presumably of minor 
significance to the employers,but their source and the amount of adverse 
publicity must have embarrassed the N.U.S. as much aa it helped sustain 
their dissenting members. The employers' legal activity secured an even 
higher place on the strikers' lists of demands for the repeal of the 
Merchant Shipping Act. When two Liverpool MPs enquired about this the 
Minister of Labour, in reply, reconmended the men return to work to speed 
up the joint examination of the Act.
The Shipping Federation and the Employers Association of the Port 
of Liverpool, who had previously contented themselves with rather mild 
statements, published on 25 August a statement couched in much stronger 
terms. This reiterated the main points of the N.M.B. agreement and after
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castigating the strikers' '8' or 'll' point programme, dealt with their 
four main points in detail. The suggestion of an American style 
union controlled hiring hall was dismissed on the grounds of the success 
of the Established Service Scheme, In general, they upheld the Merchant 
Shipping Act (1894) while being quite willing to discuss it with the 
N.U.S. 'But the maintenance of discipline on board ship and the 
honouring of contracts voluntarily entered into is as much in the interest 
of the seamen as the owners'.^ The demand for ship shop stewards was 
denied because it was 'designed to undermine the authority of the Master 
and to ferment discontent among the crew'.^
Finally, the 'no victimization' demand was considered and it was 
>. minted out that 'The unofficial strike has already victimized the loyal 
seamen, the shipping companies, the public and the national economy. 
Individual shipping services have been and still are dislocated and there 
can be no guarantee that all strikers will get back into the Merchant 
Navy in the same or similar capacity as previously. Some,by their conduct 
in the strike, have proved themselves quite unworthy members of the 
Merchant Navy and it is unlikely that they could be re-admitted to it'.
A minority was soon to be affected for all the strike leaders were 
dismissed from the Merchant Marine Establishment; on rejection of their 
appeals they were asked to surrender their seamen's identity cards.
With the emnity existing between the leaders of the strike and 
the N.U.S. officials, it is hsrdly surprising that the union did little 
to hinder their expulsion from the industry. From the outset of the 
second stage of the dispute, the verbal attack of the strikers on the 
N.U.S. bureaucracy, and its attack on the striking members and in 
particular the N.S.R.M., were among the most vituperative in recent 
trade union history, and they became increasingly more vitriolic.
Sir Thomas Yates began with what might be termed the classic attack on
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the Reform Movement, 'They do not represent anybody but themselves.
We believe they are Communist dominated'.57 Perhaps unique in strikes
of that period the majority of the press dismissed the claim of 
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Communist influence. The second day of the strike, he told the press 
'I have issued instructions today to my members not to be misled by 
outsiders. The strikers are flying in the face of union decisions'.59
The N.U.S. were in somewhat of a delicate position, particularly 
in the initial stages of the dispute. On the one hand it did not wish 
to be accused of shirking its responsibility to the N.M.B. and its 
members, in particular the Shipping Federation. Neither, on the other 
hand, could it take any specific action against the strikers, as that 
could cause a further deterioration in the situation by alienating 
sections of the loyal membership. Hence it limited its activity to 
statements urging the men to observe their contracts and return to work, 
and such things as flying out Assistant Secretaries to explain the new 
agreement to the crew of the Queen Elisabeth, thus successfully averting 
her involvement in the dispute. The N.S.R.M. and its leadership it 
refused to acknowledge in any way, and persisted in its accusations as 
to its political motivations. 'Leaders of the unofficial strike of 
seamen have attacked the National Union of Seamen and its chief officers 
as a union has rarely been attacked by its members'.^0 All the press 
were to point out to Sir Thomas Yates that to drive around in the latest 
model Bentley, as was his habit, was hardly the way to impress his 
membership, dissenting or otherwise. Whilst at virtually all the regular 
strike meetings caustic comments were made about 'Brother* Yetes' 
ability to combine his activities as their General Secretary with those 
of the proprietorship of the Club Miremba in Dover, and of the source 
of funds enabling his son to own and run a hire car firm in the same
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port. Accusations of nepotism were not confined to Sir Thomas, whose 
son was a Branch Secretary; other senior officers were also included.
In this atmosphere of acrimony it is not surprising that 
Sir Thomas instructed all his officials to have no communication or 
negotiations with the N.S.R.M. An instruction of some moment, denying 
to the unofficial leaders the method used in the first stage of the 
dispute, that of negotiating with the N.U.S., coming to some form of 
agreement on which there could be a return to work without loss of 
face. The denial of this avenue placed the N.S.R.M. leaders in a cleft 
stick. For by the middle of August the basic point, that of illustrating 
the extent of discontent within the industry, was made. The problem 
was where now to lead the supporters who were largely concentrated by 
this time on Liverpool and on the North East coast. These strikers, 
though dedicated, were alive to the scent of a 'sell out', but on the 
suspicion of the exercise becoming pointless would melt away like snow. 
The employers' legal activity with the Merchant Shipping Act had, of 
course, given the dispute leaders considerable ammunition but this was 
soon largely spent. The N.S.R.M. had as early as 18 August 'thrashed 
out' a set of proposals as a basis for a return to work. These included 
the suggestion of a TUC inquiry into the N.U.S., and were obviously 
totally unacceptable to the Union. It was at about this time speculation 
began concerning some form of mediation between the N.S.R.M. and the 
N.U.S. This combined with the realisation that N.U.S. officials were 
refusing to allow branch meetings was to be the basic ingredients of 
the last four weeks of the dispute.
The situation had become grave by early September, the strikers 
having, it appears, reached an impasse. Manchester strikers requested 
Gateskill, leader of the Labour Party, to intervene, but nothing came 
of this. A few days later the N.S.R.M. convened an emergency meeting
of delegates from all ports effected by the strike, to discuss the 
offer to act as mediators by the Liverpool Trades Council leaders, 
who were its President Alderman S. Mahon MP, Vice-President Councillor 
E. Heffer and Mr. S. Fraser, Secretary of the Trades Council and Labour 
Party. Their offer was accepted and the three had a number of 
preliminary meetings with James Scott, Assistant General Secretary and 
Treasurer of the N.U.S. Arrangements were then made for the mediators 
to meet Sir Thomas Yates in the Isle of Man, where he was attending the 
TUC. After a long meeting they emerged with a two point agreements
1. that seamen on strike were to be invited immediately to attend 
a meeting addressed by Mr. Scott,
2. this would be followed by weekly branch meetings with a 
national officer present to go into a number of longstanding 
grievances.
This appeared to be grounds for a speedy return to work until
Sir Thomas Yates flatly denied the second point, stating that there would
be no meeting before a return to work.
The agreement for Mr. Scott to address the strikers on 9 September 
stood. The Daily Telegraph remarked, 'Why did not Sir Tom Yates, take 
the opportunity to go to Liverpool himself? He has been accused of 
sailing exclusively on land, in fast and expensive cars, and of leading 
a union executive recruited from those who have cushy coastal jobs and 
are therefore quite out of touch with the bulk of union members who 
sail the high seas and find their grievances thereon. Since this strike 
has been primarily against unrepresentative union leadership it is, to 
say the least of it, odd that Sir Thomas will not be at Liverpool 
today'. At this packed indoor meeting, many seamen were unable to
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get in; it became swiftly obvious that the central bone of contention
was to be the refusal to allow branch meetings, It was a point
reiterated by every speaker from the floor, many pointing out that with
the ending of the strike the men would be dispersed before the meetings
took place. With Mr, Scott's adamant refusal to allow branch meetings,
the meeting began to disintegrate; only the efforts of the Chairman,
Mr. Heffer, kept it together. Eventually, after two hours, Mr. Scott
capitulated,agreeing to the following:
branch meetings before the strike ended; 98Z to 99Z of 
seamen being re-engaged; that in future the N.U.S. 
would have a more militant policy and that its 
constitution was not sacrosanct.
Conditions seemed, once again, set for a return to work when, 
inexplicably, Sir Thomas, two days later, countermanded Mr. Scott's 
promise of branch meetings before a return to work. The rule regarding 
this meeting was now being widely quoted; 'Rule 32(3), A special
meeting of members in a branch may be held on a requisition signed by
6A
not less than 30 financial members'. Union officials claimed the 
word 'may' left the decision to them and they saw no justification for 
a meeting. Strikers in some ports began to use writs against local 
officials for disobeying union rules, and there appeared to be every 
prospect of the N.U.S. having to defend its decision in the High Court.
This was an element in the pressure under which Sir Thomas was now 
finding himself. The press was totslly hostile, and of more importance 
the Shipping Federation, it has been suggested, were becoming restive 
and looking for a settlement. Such pressure may explain the unexpected 
arrival in Liverpool on 15 September of Mr. Scott and the N.U.S.
National Organizer, and the immediate long meeting with N.S.R.M. leaders. 
Two days later, Sir Thomas agreed not only to meet the Liverpool Trades 
Council mediators again, but also two representatives of the men on strike,
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making it clear that this afforded no recognition of the N.S.R.M. At 
this meeting, the N.U.S, leaders proposed no victimization, a 99 per 
cent re-engagement, wages due would be paid and there would be a 
policy of amending the 1894 Act. Host important, immediately the men 
agreed to return to work, branch meetings would be held; the first 
meeting would take place before work commenced. The meetings of strikers 
were far from unanimous in their desire to accept these terms. Many 
were angry, feeling that the question of branch meetings had side­
tracked them from the main issue. After a number of indecisive meetings, 
the strike ended in Liverpool on 26 September, two days after an N.U.S. 
branch meeting; other ports followed Liverpool's lead. Both stages of 
the dispute had a total duration of somewhere in excess of nine weeks.
As a footnote to the tremendous controversy over the branch
meetings, the first Executive Council meeting to consider the resolutions
from those branch meetings was on 27 and 28 October. A number of
resolutions calling for the resignation of the Executive Council, the
General Secretary or national and local officers, failed to find a mover
or seconder and consequently fell. The General Secretary commented that
'it was small wonder that branches had refused to allow union premises
to be used to hold branch meetings to pass ridiculous resolutions'.^
A composite resultion from twenty branches was put forward to 'request
the Executive Council to consider the appointing of ships' delegates'. ®
The General Secretary said he was opposed to ships' delegates 'Unless
the Union could control and have some say in the election of those who
would represent the Executive Council on board ship'.^ The resolution
was unanimously defeated. Finally, there was a resolution from Dover,
'wishing to place on record our complete confidence in the General
Secretary and the negotiating body of the Union responsible for our new 
- 68
agreement'. This was unanimously adopted.
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To sum up these three unofficial and unconstitutional disputes, 
spread as they were over nearly a decade and a half; they exhibit a 
number of surprisingly similar facets. There was a notable failure to 
achieve any success, each extensively repeated the previous dispute's 
demands. An exception perhaps being in the first stage of the 1960 
strike when the N.H.B. negotiations were unquestionably influenced.
The Government's willingness to use its influence, particularly in 1955, 
in suppressing the dispute with regular, never fulfilled, promises to 
seriously reorganize the Merchant Shipping Acts. Attempts by individual 
shipowners to solve the immediate industrial relations problem used 
the crudest of methods; mass dismissal and the law. The Shipping 
Federation, apart from ensuring that strike leaders were no longer 
employed in the industry, and making the occasional press statements, 
depended almost wholly on their fellow members of the N.M.B., the 
N.U.S., to control and discipline its wayward members.
Finally, this agitation indicates that at this time the impact 
of change was being experienced by individual, or small groups of, 
ratings rather than being anticipated by the N.U.S. A situation perhaps 
more likely in shipping than other industries since the employees' 
organizations and officials are somewhat divorced from everyday sea 
experience, that is the point of change. In the wider context the 
seafarer must have been increasingly aware of developments in shore- 
based industrial relations, such ns the growth of plant level problem­
solving, in which he had no part. As a result the N.U.S. was under 
increasing pressure from below for the union to recognize and react to 
changing circumstances. It appears that the N.U.S. was unprepared to 
respond and seemed to accept as a fact of life that a large section of 
its membership had no confidence in its union. The union's professional
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officials,rather than making any sustained attempt to remedy the 
situation,merely rationalized it by accusing small politically 
motivated groups of fermenting discontent within the rank and
file.
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CHAPTER 8
THE NATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT AND THE 
OFFICIAL STRIKE
The N.U.S. officials were not able to continue to dismiss the 
criticism of their membership as insignificant and politically motivated. The 
National Ketorm Movement gained permanent rank and file support which enabled 
its members to be elected to the Union National Executive Council in the 
early I960*. Their influence and the more militant attitude of the 
membership was manifest in the N.U.S.'s more 'positive' attitude to 
N.M.B. negotiations, together with explicit recognition of the extent to 
which seafarers were not gaining the proper rewards from the increased 
productivity brought about by technological change. In addition the union 
became committed to achieving some form of plant level organization. With 
these radical changes in policy and an executive more representative of 
the seagoing members it could be argued that without modifications of 
attitude on the part of the employers some form of official industrial 
action was inevitable. The increasing pace of change and the contraction 
of job opportunities for ratings made this outcome more likely. While the 
intensity of the official strike in 1966 must be directly related to 
government policy and attitudes this does not deny that the potential had 
existed for a number of years.
Following the 1960 dispute many of the leading figures in the 
National Seamen's Reform Movement became active members of the Union's 
National Executive.1 In the same year, Sir Thomas Yates, General Secretary 
since 1947, retired, making way for the newly elected James Scott. Scott, 
while having no truck with members of the Reform Movement, was acutely 
conscious of their influence with the union membership, He was faced with 
three main problems: the increasing rank and file response to organized
militancy in the form of the N.S.R.M., the need in the light of this 
for a more responsive and efficient union organization, and finally, 
the need for the N.U.S. to take some initiative to combat the implications 
for the ratings of technology change and competition. His recognition 
of the importance of these issues was reflected in his early speeches.
He said, for example, addressing a meeting in South Shields,'my task 
on taking over the responsibility for leadership was to unify the 
membership, build up a strong organization and set about removing the
2
fundamental causes of the grievance felt so strongly by our seafarers'.
On the wider issue of changes within the industry, he pointed out that 
'We also know from our own experience that new ships are continually 
coming into operation which are bigger, faster and more efficient than 
the ships they replace. They carry far more cargo per year and they
carry less crews. We think that seafarers ought to share in the rewards
3
of this increased productivity'. One of his first actions as General 
Secretary was to take the unprecedented step of re-opening the N.M.B. 
negotiations within six months of the previous settlement. No doubt, 
this was at least in part an attempt to pre-empt further unofficial 
agitation, although he claimed they were 'not in any way influenced by 
the actions and opinions of the dissenting group on our flank known as
L
the "Seamens Reform Movement"'. In respect of the particular question 
of shipboard representation, his attitude appears to have been similar to 
that of the previous General Secretary since he saw them as providing the
potential for undermining the official organization of the union,5 
His death in 1962 after only n year in office provided a new 
impetus for the views of the N.S.R.M. for it was followed by a unique 
election. It included an ordinary member, as distinct from a union 
official, as a candidate, Mr. James Slater, who was a leading member
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of the Reform Movement, and he took as the central issue of his 
campaign, the question of shipboard representation; a stand which 
induced the other candidates to seek a more popular platform. The 
leading contender among the three union officials was William Hogarth, 
in the interim, acting General Secretary, During the election period, 
the question of shipboard representation, a proposal only defeated in 
the AGM six months previously, was brought before the Executive by 
Hogarth for serious review. The union elects its General Secretary by 
postal ballot taking,by rule, six months to complete, in this case,
March to September 1962. At that time, the N.U.S. was the only 
remaining British trade union with a gerontocratic voting system. This 
gave members of one year's standing one vote, over five years', two 
votes, over 10 years three votes, and members with fifteen years plus, 
including retired members, were entitled to four votes. True to 
expectations, William Hogarth was duly elected with 30,897 votes, a 
clear majority over his rival James Slater with 9,855 votes. Taking 
into account the voting system it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
many of the younger, presumably more radical members, possessing only 
a single vote gave it to Slater. Therefore, despite the severe setback 
suffered by the Reform Movement, who were also in financial difficulties, 
the pressure on the union hierarchy was greater than the election 
results would suggest.
The modified attitude of some leading union officials found a 
response in the Autumn AGM (1962) where no less than nine resolutions 
were submitted in favour of shipboard representation. Contrary to 
previous experience, the resolution was carried by 67 votes to 31. The 
union officials had presumably anticipated the decision for during the 
debate the General Secretary commented:
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We might have to come back to next year’s Annual General 
Meeting to decide what action we take if we do not get 
what we want. We will meet opposition, we know that 
already, when we have discussed this with officers and 
representative of the owners and the Maritime Board.6
By the end of the year the General Secretary's view had changed to one
of mild optimism.
I anticipate it will be at least six months before the 
first ship's representatives can be elected under the 
union scheme.'
Events were to support his original pessimism, since from the N.M.B.
Meeting of January 1963 came clear indications that neither the officers’
organizations nor the employers were convinced of the value of such
representation. Mr. Hogarth wrote,
We are all disappointed at the shipowner's dislike of our 
scheme to introduce union representation. But it was not 
unexpected! At the same time we can congratulate ourselves 
that our arguments have had sufficient force to persuade 
those Victorian-era ship bosses that the subject is one 
worthy of further examination.6
The owners did concede the need to investigate human relations 
within the industry: so a joint working party, including representatives 
of employers, officers' associations and the N.U.S., was set up. Its 
brief was to examine the whole question of officer-ratings relation­
ships and discipline, and to formulate some scheme to deal with complaints. 
The outcome was the announcement of such a procedure in July 1963. It 
set out the rights of individual seamen to make complaints through their 
departmental head up to the ship's master; if still dissatisfied , to 
the union end employers ashore, and finally to the N.M.B. A feature of 
the procedure and a comment on the nature of relationships within the 
industry, was the inclusion by the Committee of the following clause:
It must be clearly understood that no-one making a complaint 
in good faith in accordance with the foregoing procedure 
will be penalised in any way for making the complaint.$
The introduction of the procedure was regarded as suspect by many union
members who saw it as a substitute for, or a means of retarding the
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introduction of, shipboard representatives; a suspicion confirmed by 
national press comment, necessitating a strong formal denial from the 
union. The membership's grave concern was highlighted by a number of 
strongly worded resolutions to the ACM of 1963 and 1964, where ship­
board representation was equated with union unity and 'giving the 
union back to the membership'. The union's negotiators, thus fortified, 
continued to press the N.M.B. for some form of shipboard representation.
Eventually in May 1965 there was something of a breakthrough, the 
N.M.B. agreed to recognize the union scheme.
A pilot scheme was inaugurated on board a passenger liner, the 
'Empress of England' out of Liverpool. The venture succeeded in
r
persuading the officers' associations and shipowners to agree to a 
gradual adoption of the scheme. The union had earlier begun training 
courses specifically for such representatives. The necessary qualifica­
tions for the post were lengthy and stringent, while as their title 
'Liaison representatives' suggests their role is in no way analogous 
to that of a shop steward. They have no rights to handle either 
individual or collective grievances, their function being merely one of 
consultation, cooperation and communication, particularly between the 
shore-based union and its membership. Despite this rather anaemic
version of the rank and files' original concept, it must be seen as a
9a
major departue in maritime industrial relations.
During the period of pressure and negotiation for shipboard 
representation, the presence of leading figures from the Reform Movement 
on the National Executive was a factor in radicalizing union policy.
The first illustration of the extent of radicalization within the 
N.U.S. came early in 1964. During the N.M.B. negotiations, the employers 
made their final offer, an increase in basic and overtime rates, some
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important fringe benefits and a reduction in working hours, to A3 from 
January 1965 and to 42 the following January. Accepted by the N.U.S. 
negotiating committee, it was rejected by the full Executive Council,
29 votes to 18, the Shipping Federation and the Ministry of Labour 
being advised that a state of dispute existed and of the seamen's 
refusal to sign articles from 16 February 1964. The N.M.B.'s half a- 
century of immunity from official dispute appeared to be coming to an 
abrupt end, when a third party, in the form of the Ministry of Labour's 
Chief Conciliation Officer, was introduced into the N.M.B. negotiations for 
the first time. This was a development on which the recently retired
Director of the Shipping Federation commented with disappointment;
'the breakdown in negotiations between the shipowners and the National 
Union of Seamen in January of this year leading to a threatened 
official strike and to the use of the conciliation machinery of the 
Ministry of Labour, means that a proud tradition of half a century had 
been irretrievably destroyed, or was it a display of "brinkmanship"!.*®
The tradition was not destroyed, nor does it appear to have been a 
'display of brinkmanship'; for the preparations undertaken by the N.U.S. 
indicated a firm commitment to industrial action had no satisfactory 
solution been found. In the event, with the assistance of the conciliator, 
an improved offer was made which included the introduction of 
a 42 hour week on 1 April 1965. This was accepted by the N.U.S.
A further indication of the degree of change within the union and 
the industry came in the General Secretary's Presidential Address to the 
ACM in the same year (1964). This was unique in its extensive criticism 
of the shipping industry and suggested a comittee be established, on 
similar lines to other industries, with government sponsorship under 
the National Economic Development Council, for 'British seafarers and,
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Indeed, the British people, are entitled to know what is wrong with 
this vitally important industry, and to demand that it be put right.
If private enterprise cannot, or will not, fulfil its obligation to 
the nation, then State enterprise may have to step in before British 
shipping's relative decline becomes a b s o l u t e ' , T h e  suggestion proved 
unacceptable to the shipowners, but an informal N.U.S./Owner committee 
of inquiry was set up to report on the sixteen points put forward by the 
union. This presumably met with little success,for two years later the
union was to repeat their call for a National Economic Development 
12
Council for shipping.
At the same AGM, resolutions were passed committing the union 
to a 40 hour week by mid 1965, with substantial additions to basic rates.
During the months that followed the union negotiated a new agreement 
on this basis which was to prove highly contentious. It brought a flat 
increase for A.B.s of £1.10.0d. consolidated with the 16 hour overtime 
that might be earned during weekends, bringing the basic rate up to 
£59.7s.6d. a month (£13.18s.5d. a week). The aim of the agreement so 
far as the union was concerned was to increase the basic rate and, 
therefore, allow a substantial increase in the incomes of seamen's 
families, for sllotment to wives and mothers was taken from basic rates.
This they achieved,for allotment could be increased by £3 per week. The 
union had been pressing for improvement here, as it was claimed that 
the amount many ratings could allot to their families was below the 
government Supplementary Benefit subsistence level. The previous 
December (1964), the 'ceiling' for such allotment had been raised from
M
80 per cent to 90 per cent of basic wages, not including overtime and 
other additional payments, and after statutory deductions had been 
made. During the negotiations the N.U.S. had been conscious of the 
government's intention to introduce an Incomes policy, hence they
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wished to Increase the basic rate before this was established. The 
new agreement also effected working hours, these were limited to 40 
in port, and the General Secretary claimed 'It even means more than 
the achievement, at long last, of the 40 hour five day week principle'. 
The 'principle' meant that weekend work was to be confined to watch­
keeping and essential duties. He continued 'another thing; let's 
have no talk about "going" back to the 56 hour week'...'it is the 
forty hour, five day week which has been recognized'
This element in the agreement, as the union expected, brought 
an immediate response from the more militant section of the membership, 
and the cry of a return to the '56 hour' week did go up. What the 
union did not foresee was the extent and intensity of the opposition. 
The Executive Council which had voted twice on the agreement, found 
themselves picketed by groups of seamen outside the union headquarters. 
At branch meetings some 40 per cent of those attending voted against 
the agreement, the remainder being'for'or 'don't knows'» With such a 
reaction the union was forced into an intensive campaign explaining 
the situation; for example, a leaflet was produced entitled 'The 
Proof of the Pudding'. All this did not stop minor unofficial action 
in some ports. Executive Councillors, leading figures in the N.S.R.M. 
and the 1960 unofficial dispute, were despatched to those ports to 
convince mass meetings of the futility of unofficial action. It is 
perhaps ironic that those who had previously challenged the union now 
represented it in urging caution on its more militant members. 
Absorption of the leadership of the early 1960s and the resultant more 
'aggressive' policies of the union had failed to neutralize rank and 
file discontent. The union's insistence appears to have allayed many 
fears and a 'wait and see' attitude to the new agreement emerged.
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It soon became obvious that a large number of shipping companies 
and Masters were ignoring the spirit of the agreement and instituting 
a 56 hour week. The 'Members Write' column in The Seamen increasingly 
bore witness to the infringement of the agreement, some accusing ship's 
Masters of unreasonable use of Sunday for non-essential and even 
'manufactured' work. Discontent was particularly evident in vessels 
spending long periods at sea, tankers for example, and among those in 
the Catering Department who had special problems. This disregard of 
the agreement was largely conceded by the Shipping Federation who found 
themselves increasingly requesting companies to honour the agreement 
reasonably and not expect men to work for extremely long periods without 
let up. This acceptance of the situation by the Federation was 
illustrated during the new round of N.M.B. negotiations when they put 
forward as part of their offer a preparedness 'to make an agreement 
confining weekend work to necessary duties where a ship is at sea for 
two or more weekends during a sea passage',^ presumably intrinsic to 
the previous agreement.
The extent of the dissent within the N.U.S. membership was 
reflected in the Presidential Address to the 1965 ACM where the General 
Secretary took the unusual step of conceding that 'some of our policies 
may be unpopular with some members'.^ After a discussion of the 
agreement, the General Secretary put it to the AGM as a matter of 
confidence. The vote of 44 to 21 endorsed the agreement and the actions 
of the negotiating committee and Executive Council, seagoing members 
only voting. Since the agreement had been in operation since March, 
there was little to be gained at that juncture in rejecting it. The 
General Secretary had already said he considered the agreement aa a 
'springboard from which we could go forward to really do something for 
our members'.^
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Following recommendations from the AGM, the Executive Council 
in July 1965 brought a twelve item list for negotiations to the N.M.B. 
The most important item dealt with weekend work, wages, hours at sea 
and leave; some lesser items were discussed Informally with the ship­
owners. At the first joint Ratings Panel meeting of the N.M.B. in 
November, the Shipping Federation, whilst willing to negotiate on the 
minor issues, refused to discuss the two main points on hours and 
wages so soon after concluding the March agreement. The next N.M.B. 
meeting in January 1966 saw the shipowners asking for clarification of 
the union proposals. Increased dissatisfaction among the union members 
over the question of hours, and the threat of unofficial action 
necessitated the newly elected Executive Council adopting, by a 
substantial majority, at their meeting in January, a strongly worded 
resolution. 'That this Executive Council instructs the Negotiating 
Committee to go forward on 1 February and negotiate on the basis of 
£60 per month for an A.B., and a 40 hour week at sea worked in five 
days out of seven, with a maximum of eight hours in any one day. The 
Executive Council recommend the use of strike action to achieve these 
aims'.18
The Shipping Federation at the next N.M.B. meeting on 9 March, 
refused to consider any reductions in the working week, but proposed 
an additional £l,12s.6d. for A.Bs, pro rata for other ratings, to 
compensate for weekend work, overtime rates were to be increased by two 
pence an hour. On the acceptance of these, Improvements in fringe 
benefits would be considered. With no reduction in hours the Executive 
Council were bound to reject it. Later the same month the Shipping 
Federation put forward four Alternative proposals at the N.M.B. 
Basically!
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1. a return to the previous agreement, a 40 hour week with a cut 
in the basic rate of £8.2s.8d. and eight pence per hour 
overtime. If accepted, they would then renegotiate some 
unspecified increase in basic rates
2. reducing the working week in four yearly stages of four hours
3. a three stage reduction, with some loss of leave
19
4. a proposal slightly modifying number 3.
The Executive Council considered only the third proposal as a 
basis for further negotiations, but once again the claim was for £60 
per month for A.B.s and stress was laid on the aim of a 40 hour week 
which was regarded as the central issue. At the following N.M.B. meeting 
on 6 April, the Federation improved their third proposal. Briefly, this 
consisted of a reduction in the working week at sea to 40 hours in three 
yearly stages, without any reduction in the basic wage, but with a 
withdrawal of leave based on Sundays at sea, compensated for to some 
extent by an increase in annual leave allowances raised from 20 to 36 
days. The owners calculated the cost to the industry would be S per 
cent in the first year and 4 per cent in each subsequent year, later to 
be proved a somewhat high estimate. The Federation stressed that this 
wss their final offer, particularly as 'we shall be taking on, too, 
this year, as the first of three annual increases, an increase in costs 
well above what we contemplated when we began these negotiations, and 
well above the Government's norm',20 and was to cover a period of three 
years, until the middle of 1969, unless there was 'some dramatic change 
in the circumstances such as extraordinary increases in the cost of 
living'.21
The union negotiating committee reconmended acceptance of this 
final offer. To the Executive Council it proved unacceptable, on the 
grounds that there would be 37 days loss of leave in the three years
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delay before the 40 hour week, and the clause delaying further wage 
increases until 1969. Unofficial Rank and File Conmittees, which had 
spring up prior to the 1965 agreement and whose unofficial action had 
failed the previous March, were, with their prediction of a return to 
a 56 hour week largely justified, gaining considerable influence. The 
Executive Council was endeavouring to limit this influence, being 
acutely aware of the growing discontent within the membership. With 
the rejection of the owners final offer on 14 April, the Executive
22
Council instructed all members to withhold their labour from 16 May. 
There was a meeting between union officials and Mr, Gunter, Minister 
of Labour, on 18 April to report on the situation; nothing emerged 
from this.
It was, perhaps, fortuitous that the N.U.S. held its Annual 
General Meeting on 2 May, so that the union's supreme authority could 
approve the Executive Council's decision. From the wide-ranging debate 
came a firm commitment to strike action. The N.U.S. had,by the first 
week in May, been through all the procedures, and was heading for 
industrial action, while insisting the door was still open to any 
further offers from the shipowners. None was forthcoming and at mid­
night on 15 May 1966 a dispute, which was to last six weeks, began. 
Immediately some 6,500 seamen walked ashore, and 123 vessels were held 
up. These were in the main coasters or short sea traders, but with 
each tide the number of strike-bound ocean-going vessels, particularly 
liners, increased. The efficiency of the strikers organization, and 
their quiet resolution became obvious at once. As did the firm stand 
taken by both sides, which was only to be broken by some minor incidents. 
On the one hand, it was calculated that 11 small vessels including two 
colliers had broken the strike, all being manned by deck and engine- 
room officers. A form of activity on the part of a minority of officers
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which was to be a feature of the whole dispute. On the other hand, 
some shipping companies, and the number was to increase as the strike 
progressed, made approaches to the N.U.S. accepting their claim and 
offering to make private agreements. Principally these were short
sea ferry companies who were particularly vulnerable to a dispute at
23 * *
the height of the holiday season.
Any analysis of the 1966 strike cannot be confined merely to the
relationship between the N.U.S. and the Shipping Federation nor to the
shipping industry itself, since the situation was complicated by
external economic and political factors. In the first instance, the
Labour Government had implemented an incomes policy during the previous
year (1965) under which 3) per cent was regarded as the 'guiding light'
for any pay increase.2^Furthermore, the Government was anxious at the
time of the strike to impress the International Monetary Fund and the
international banking community with their firm attitude to trade
unions, particularly as an IMF mission was expected in May and a
meeting of the OECD vaa scheduled. Had the strike taken place in a
different political and economic climate, it is impossible to speculate
how long it would have lasted or indeed whether it would have taken
place at all. The importance with which it was regarded is perhaps
indicated by the considerable government activity in the period leading
up to the strike and it encouraged the TUC to intervene; its General
Secretary, George Woodcock, urged the 'seamen's leaders for over two
25
hours to reconsider their decision - but to no avail'.
The anxiety of the government was also reflected in the Minister 
of Labour's attempt to persuade the Executive Council to accept not the 
owners final offer but their previous one and the spurious advantage 
of a government sponsored enquiry into their grievances. Whilst the
seamen's claim was clearly in excess of the 3) per cent, the White Paper 
on Prices and Incomes Policy (April 1965) gave the government sufficient 
manoeuverability had it wished to avoid the strike or bring it to a 
rapid conclusion. The White Paper listed four classes to which except­
ional pay increases should be confined, these clauses had been used to 
justify recent generous increases to doctors, judges, senior civil 
servants, MPs and government ministers. The third clause 'where there
is general recognition that existing wages and salary levels are too
26
low to maintain a reasonable standard of living' could have been used 
with some justification in respect of the seamen's case. Suspicion of 
the government's motives were highlighted early in the strike, for 
example, by the New Statesman when it asked:
Is it true, as many trade unionists believe, that the 
government has been looking around for a sacrificial 
victim to impale on the altar of the policy - and has 
selected the seamen?27
The idea of the government seeking a sacrificial lamb was confirmed,
obliquely, by Harold Wilson, in his book on the period:
I believe that it was essential if we were to make a 
reality of prices and incomes policy, that the whole 
country including members of other unions, should know 
what was involved. This was the confrontation which 
in January I had recognised must one day be faced; 
the tragedy was thst it had to be done in an industry 
where a strike was so damaging to the nation.28
On the evening of the first day of the strike, in an action 
possibly unprecedented in trade union history, a Labour Prime Minister 
appeared on television and radio to denounce the strike. While making 
some attempt at impartiality, 'the government has not taken sides',
Mr. Wilson spoke of the 'ludicrous' Merchant Shipping Acts of 1894; 
and the 1965 N.M.B. agreement which 'Unfortunately, some of the ship­
owners, proceeded to interpret in a stupid and provocative way...'.
'Some employer« broke the spirit of the agreement by requiring the men 
to take on extra weekend duties, and virtually insisted on a full 
seven day week'. This played a 'major part in creating the feeling 
of exasperation which has driven a union notable for over a generation 
for industrial peace to take the action they have now taken'. He 
went on to point out that the shipowners offer had been rejected, and 
it is 'the duty of the government, indeed of any government, to resist 
the action taken, because this would be a strike against the state, 
against the community. But this is not all. What is at issue here is 
our national prices and incomes policy. To accept this demand would
breach the dykes of our prices and incomes policy.....  To abandon
prices and incomes policy would mean the end of our hopes of solving 
our national economic problems on a basis of maintaining full employ­
ment'. Mr. Wilson's overriding concern with the international iopression 
was made plain, 'But what is at issue is this. Our determination to 
insist on these principles when the cost is so great will be taken by 
everyone, here and abroad, as a proof of our determination to make 
the policy effective'. In conclusion, Mr. Wilson confirmed that the 
government had contingency plans to deal with the situation and the 
Royal Navy was standing ready. Any lingering belief in the government's 
impartiality was swiftly and firmly put aside. The speech also put 
the employers into a subsidiary role and Wilson made it clear that 
he, unlike the previous administration, would not lean on the employers. 
The N.U.S. was now confronted by a combination of the employers and the 
might of the State.
Harold Wilson's admonition appears to have stiffened the strikers' 
resolve, for after a week the Minister of Labour was informed by both 
employers and seamen that the situation remained deadlocked. On the
same day, 23 May, the Government declared a state of emergency under 
the Emergency Act of 1920. Its aim, the Prime Minister stated, was 
'to ensure the essentials of life to the country'.30 At the same time 
an announcement was made of the intention to set up a 'powerful,
thorough and independent enquiry into all the complex issues affecting
31
the terms and conditions of seagoing employment'. In the later 
debate, some confusion arose as to the extent of the Inquiry's 
independence. A Labour MP, after expressing his welcome to the Inquiry 
and the pledge that it was not to be restricted by the Prices and 
Incomes Board, stated 'the union was clear about this. This was why 
he had asked the Minister of Labour to give an undertaking that the 
outcome of the inquiry would not be subjected to the review by the 
Board. I think many members clearly understood the Minister to say 
"yes'".32
The terms of reference of the Court of Inquiry were as follows
To enquire into:
1. The immediate causes and circumstances of the dispute;
2. the terms and conditions of service of seamen, taking 
into account the national interest, technological change 
and the need for an efficient and competitive shipping 
industry;
3. relations between shipowners, officers and seamen;
4. the law, including the Merchant Shipping Act 1894,
33
relevant to paragraph 2 and 3 above.
The Chairman of the Conmlttee was a judge, Lord Pearson, Lord of Appeal 
in Ordinary, a Life Peer and Chairman of the Restrictive Practices 
Court, who had previously chaired an inquiry into a dispute within the 
electrical supply industry. The employers' interests were represented
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by A.J. Stephen Burn, President Elect of the Confederation of British 
Industries. The Trade Union representative was Joe O'Hagen, Chairman 
of the TUC Finance and General Purposes Committee. Finally came 
Hugh Armstrong Clegg, a member of both the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and the Prices and Incomes Board, an appointment which imnediately 
raised the question of the Independence of the Inquiry from the Board.
Lord Pearson made a final appeal to the N.U.S. for resumption of 
work, to enable the committee to sit in a more tranquil atmosphere.
This was, of course, unacceptable, as E.P. Thompson has pointed out.
'A seamen's strike, more than any other industrial dispute, must be 
carried through decisively. Once the men have put to sea once more, 
the possibility of solidarity on a national scale may not recur for a 
year or decades. Hence it is in the interest of the employers to 
parley, to procrastinate, to offer courts of inquiry, interim and
partial resolutions and it is in the logic of their situation that the
34
men will be intransigent demanding a maximum settlement'.
Lord Pearson and his committee set feverishly to work leaving 
the strikers in a state of limbo. Within ten days its first short 
interim report was published, which illustrated the impossibility of 
its task, to satisfy three sides in the dispute, the government, the 
shipowners and the union. The report was midly criticsl of the ship­
owners, but made, particularly in the circumstances, a rather odd 
statement, which was seen to equate the shipowners interest with that 
of tha nation, 'The owner's side stood firm on their last offer. In 
our view this was in the circumstances not an unreasonable attitude,
because they had already made or offered so much, and also they had to
35
bear in mind the national interest’.
The N.U.S. appeared to hold a sincere, if somewhat naive 
conviction of the rightness of its case, and was surprised when the
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report failed to vindicate them. Rather it chastised them for 
beginning the strike, then conceded some validity in their case, 
without actually discussing their aim of a 40 hour week. The chastise­
ment was not only for engaging in industrial activity, but in the 
union's failure to make a counter offer to the owner's final offer.
The argument recurs and in Pearson's conclusion the following confused 
statement appears. 'The Executive Council were, however, calling a 
strike, on the assumption that they would get their own way - that the 
owners, after all the concessions which they had made and offered, 
would eventually, under pressure from the strike threat, offer more.
That was not a safe assumption as the owners had said their final offer 
was final, that they might take their stand on that. In our view the 
Executive Council were not justified in using the strike weapon without 
further attempts to resolve the position, because there was nothing 
to call for the use of this dramatic and dangerous remedy. There was
no remaining issue of principle; there were only questions as to the 
36
terms of the offer'. A contradictory conclusion approving the 
employers' stand on their final offer, which Pearson improved, implicitly 
supporting the Executive Council's contention that to make a counter 
offer was not their prerogative. Finally the strike was condemned on 
the grounds that principles were presumed to be satisfied, the 'terms 
of the offer' being all that was left to discuss.
The Pearson interim analysis rested on figures supplied by 
the shipowners. On these figures was based the revised estimate of 
the respective cost of the claim and the final offer. This was needed 
because the owners' original assessment had been related to foreign- 
going shipping only, not to the whole industry. The result was the
cost of the claim declined from 17 per cent to 15) per cent and the
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three stage offer from 15 per cent to 12j per cent.
In analysing the cost structure Pearson expressed surprise at 
the exceptionally high levels of overtime worked. Using 1965 census
figures, 'seamen on foreign-going ships averaged 66 hours work a week
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and those on home trade averaged 73,6 hours'. In other words, an 
average 15J hours a week overtime foreign-going and 26 hours in home 
trade vessels. Pearson in these figures perceived an opportunity to. 
make substantial cost savings. 'A saving of an hour a week overall 
both at sea and in port would cut labour costs by about 1-y per cent.
We think a saving of two hours a week over the next twelve months is 
well within the industry's capacity'. They went on to point out that 
'General Purpose Manning' would cut it even further. On the question 
of overtime 'the evidence which we heard was in conflict. The owners 
believed that no more than marginal savings were possible'. 'From 
their point of view, a good deal of maintenance can be carried out in 
these hours more economically than on land'. 'The representatives of
the seamen thought the reorganization of work could yield substantial 
40
cuts in overtime'. The union argument, later amplified, pointed out 
that Pearson's analysis was based on a census of working hours taken 
in 1965, when the working week stood at 56 hours. Had the census been 
taken in 1964, when the standard week stod at 44 hours, the average 
number of working hours would have been substantially lower. It 
followed from this that the claim was considerably less than Pearson 
asserted and cuts in overtime could be achieved with relative ease.
The N.U.S. went further suggesting that Pearson had indirectly 
recognized this argument, in its comparative discussion of some 
European fleets; it stated that 'if their shipping industries remained 
competitive in spite of this the explanation must be that either their 
manning scales are lower, or they keep overtime under better control. 
Although no figures arc available the owners think that the latter is
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the probable explanation; and it is supported by the well-established 
fact that the level of overtime on the Continent is in industry 
generally, except France, one below that of Britain'/1
Pearson, on the basis of the reassessment of costs and the
potential saving, attempted to make the owners' offer more acceptable
without materially increasing its cost. The main element in the
recommendations was the introduction of the 40 hour week in two yearly
stages instead of three. The first reduction to 48 hours meant all
Sunday work would be overtime. Stage two coming into force a year
later with overtime for all work at sea on Saturday. Pearson also felt
that the loss of leave was excessive. Prior to the strike the seamen
received on average 37 days paid annual leave, an average total including
Sundays at sea of 53 days. The shipowners final offer resulted in 36
days leave, this Pearson increased by 3 days. The 12s.6d. increase in
effective pay of A.B.s after five years service demanded by the union
was omitted on the grounds of it being offset against the increased cost
in the other section of the offer. The cost of the first stage was
calculated to be a little under 5 per cent, the amalgamation of stages
two and three originally estimated as costing 8 per cent now became
4} per cent. The estimated total cost thus fell substantially, despite
the removal of stage three. 'The total cost of introducing the full
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40 hour week at sea, therefore, became 9) per cent over two years'.
There was an inmediate acceptance of the Report by Government, 
and a little later by the Shipping Federation. The government went 
further than mere acceptance; they made it plain that aside from some 
small adjustment of individual cost items, consistent with the same 
total cost, the Pearson findings were not negotiable, set up as it was 
under the Industrial Courts Act of 1919, there was no requirement of
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prior acceptance of the Court's report on either side. It was customary 
for the disputing parties to accept, often with considerable reluctance, 
such reports, but for the government to insist on such an acceptance 
was unprecedented. Pearson, it seems, was to be an imposed settlement.
The hardening of attitudes as the strike progressed and Pearson's 
failure to offer the seamen their rallying cry of '40 hours a week now', 
increase leave, or £60 a month ensured the rejection of its offer.
The N.U.S. General Secretary at a press conference criticized Pearson 
for failing to conaider the seamen's poor working conditions, the 
shipowners' hidden profits, and for having more thought for the prices 
and incomes policy.
With the report's publication the N.U.S. began a campaign to 
question its accuracy. This had two central themes, the apparent 
equating of the shipowners' and the national interests and the acceptance 
of the owners' assessment of the industry's low profitability. The 
basis of the union's argument was the Jenkins Report on Company Law 
(1962) which questioned the special 'exemption' position of shipping 
companies:
Para. 413 They claim that these exemptions are essential and that
disclosure of the full facts about the size of their inner reserves and 
their annual profits would cause serious injury to their interests and 
therefore to the national interest....'
Para. 414 '....  The exemptions are criticized on the ground that share­
holders are deprived of knowledge which would enable them to form a 
fairer view of the value of their investments, that they prejudice the 
bargaining position of employees, and that they can make it possible 
to conceal inefficiency of management. We cannot accept the argument 
advanced by the spokesmen of the shipping companies in oral evidence 
that shareholders are not prejudiced by the lack of full disclosure.
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The question is not whether they are prejudiced, but whether the 
prejudice they suffer must be accepted in the national interest',
Para. 415 'The shipping companies have based their case on the national 
interest. Their argument, however, is that disclosure would harm the 
national interest by harming the conraercial interests of the shipping 
companies'. . .
Para. 416 'We recommend, on the case presented to us, that the Board 
of Trade should revoke the Companies (Shipping Companies Exemption)
Order 1948'.43
Two days before Pearson was published the N.U.S. full Executive
Council met for the first time since the commencement of the strike on
7 June. The organization of the strike had been overseen by a small
national coordinating committee, each district having its own committee
consisting in the main, of lay members. The Executive Council was
attempting to harden the strike to counter 'strike-breaking tactics by
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British owners and foreign owners in alliance'. Three resolutions 
to this end were passed unanimously. That all affiliates of the I.T.F. 
....'place an embargo on all British flag ships in Britain and through­
out the world'. Secondly; '....all member unions of the TUC to place 
an embargo on all foreign flag ships trading on the British coast'.
Finally '....declares black all tankers arriving in and departing
45
from the UK carrying oil normally carried by British ships...'
In the initial stages of the strike the ITF General Secretary 
had written:
On behalf of millions of transport workers throughout the 
world, the International Transport Workers' Federation 
(ITF) declares its unequivocal support for the striking 
British seamen of the N.U.S. The seafarers' and dockers' 
affiliates of the ITF have expressed their support and 
solidarity in an unprecedented fashion; ....This is 
concrete evidence of what international solidarity means 
when an Affiliate has chosen to use the ultimate weapon 
in the hands of labour.
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Make no mistake when I say to you that the seamen of the 
entire world are united in the struggle to put you, the 
British seamen .... on an equal footing with your fellow 
workers ashore.*6
In Britain the main burden of this support had fallen on the Transport
and General Workers Union (T. & G.W.U.) with other unions, for example,
the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers, the Watermen’s Union
etc., taking a minor role. While the T. & G.W.U. at an official ancl
unofficial level assisted the N.U.S., they did not come out on strike,
on the simple expectation that within a few weeks the dispute would
cause the choking of the docks with 'dead' ships and the dockers, unable
4 7
to work, would go on 'fall back' pay. This did not occur for two
main reasons; firstly shipowners, where possible, diverted their vessels
away from British ports, often transferring cargo to foreign flag ships.
Secondly, because of the agreement between the N.U.S. and the T. & G.W.U.
to work normally. The T. & G.W.U. posted a circular letter instructing
its members that 'Shore gangs and riggers will continue to move vessels
within the port systems where this is normal practice, but will not
carry out this function or any other work if it was previously done by
the N.U.S. members'.^® Thus it became possible to prevent blockage of
the docks by double and triple banking ships or moving them to 'lay-up'
berths, unless the vessel was specifically blacked. In the Initial
stages of the dispute, in London at least, the N.U.S. members assisted
in this process. The Guardian reported, 'The astounding thing is that
the N.U.S. is cooperating in this work. Its members are doing so
because 'we are not at war with the public or the State and we do not
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want to see the public suffer'. At this early stage at least it would 
appear from the T, & G.W.U. circular that the N.U.S. had no wish to 
involve other unions. Such a policy avoided eventual dock congestion 
and the movement of dry-cargo continued virtually undisturbed. In 
the other area of transportation, oil, the companies were particularly
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astute, A6 a shipping journal was later to comments
The oil companies pulled off a feat of Insulation from 
the effect of a stoppage only equalled by some of the 
grand strategies of the Battle of the Atlantic. Plans 
were carefully laid well in advance, British tankers 
re-routed and foreign-owned tankers chartered for UK 
voyages. The oil continued to flow inwards and British 
tankers continued to trade almost without interruption.
It was not so much the immobilisation of British ships - -
which was feared - though that would have had unpleasant, 
financial consequences - as the insnobilisation of tanker 
berths should British vessels be discharging there when 
the strike order came. As successful as the re-routing 
exercise, was the blanket of silence which descended over 
the whole operation. Co-operating in this was the 
Government, anxious about our most vital of imports 
..... 50 F
The success of these operations by the shipowners impelled the N.U.S.
to stronger action. The Executive Council passed its resolutions to
this end, but the only way these could be converted to positive action
was through the TUC and ITF. Two bodies from which, with their affiliates,
the N.U.S. needed also to enlist financial aid.
On the rejection of the Pearson recommendations, the full 
Executive Council was summoned before the TUC Finance and General Purposes 
Committee, many of whose members had been recalled from holidays abroad 
in an attempt to alleviate a now critical situation. The meeting began 
a period of intense activity on the part of the TUC 'inner cabinet' and 
a small sub-committee of nine Executive Councillors specially constituted 
to meet them. Senior officiels of the TUC were also to visit the 
N.U.S. headquarters on numerous occasions during the ensuing weeks. In 
addition to this the central figure was the TUC General Secretary,
George Woodcock, who had Immediate access to the Minister of Labour 
and was a confidant of the Prime Minister. George Woodcock was eager 
to act as a conciliator, or in a liaison capacity, in the circumstances 
a task of some magnitude. For, on the one hand, the Labour Government,
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with the tacit support of the Shipping Federation, refused to contemplate 
any solution beyond the boundaries set by Pearson. On the other hand, 
the N.U.S. clung with equal tenacity to their original claim.
While the TUC was anxious not to lose the confidence of the 
N.U.S., they were keen to achieve a swift settlement. The tone of the 
relationship appears to have been established during the early meetings.
An N.U.S. pamphlet, discussing the role of Joe O'Hagan, Chairman of 
the TUC Finance and General Purposes Committee for 1966, commented,
'It was an astute political move to include him on the Pearson Inquiry, 
since it was obvious that if the seamen rejected the Report they would 
have to appeal to the TUC for support. Since the Report failed the 
seamen, it was rejected, and in their approach to the TUC met 
Joe O'Hagan in the Chair at the meeting. The seamen's delegation 
objected and asked for an independent chairman. This was overriden by 
the TUC Committee and most of their arguments were then put by either 
O'Hagan or W o o d c o c k ' . H a r o l d  Wilson had no illusions about the TUC 
role. 'A major struggle began between the Government - aided by the 
TUC - and the N.U.S..... '.52
As matters stood, the TUC had little room to manoeuvre; they
believed the only way of resolving the matter was for the N.U.S. to
make concessions. Their efforts were focussed on gaining such concessions.
Mr. Woodcock stated, when addressing the N.U.S. Executive Council on
10 June, 'this strike had reached the absolute limit of futility and he
asked that serious consideration be given towards making a move of some
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kind to relieve this futile position'. To this end, the TUC advised 
its affiliates to ignore both the appeals by the N.U.S. for financial 
assistance and the boycotting of all British and certain foreign 
vessels lying in UK ports. The latter appeal was directed mainly at
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Che T. & G.W.U. but their Assistant General Secretary was a member of
the Finance and General Purposes Committee, and he ensured that there
was no escalation of support for the seamen from his union, although
this failed to stop some of his members joining a one-day unofficial
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strike, in sympathy with the seamen, in the port of Hull. Neither 
did the TUC deter the Boilermakers Union's provision of a loan to the 
N.U.S. of £50,000 nor the Bakers Union issuing a statement of solidarity.
The TUC offered similar advice to the I.T.F. as the 10 unions 
in the British section of the I.T.F. included a number of General 
Secretaries who also sat on the TUC General Council. On meeting, they 
naturally accepted the TUC advice and acted on it. The I.T.F. was also 
irritated by the N.U.S. action of cabling appeals directly to foreign 
unions, rather than going through their agencies, and took steps to 
see that these were negated. The I.T.F. General Secretary told the 
press 'It is our attitude that the British strike should not be spread 
as long as there is hope of a settlement, which now exists*.^ The 
I.T.F. went on to instruct the few foreign unions boycotting British 
vessels, for example the Finnish Union, to allow the vessels to continue 
trading. So within a few days of the rejection of Pearson the N.U.S, 
found itself without any significant allies. As the Observer conmented, 
'Much will depend on the continued ability of the TUC to isolate the 
seamen and to maintain pressure on them to climb down'.^
These external pressures on the Executive Council were matched 
by internal pressure in the union. The membership,particularly in the 
major ports, was calling for 'no compromise' and for an intensification 
of the strike. There was, however, a dissenting voice coming from some 
of the minor railway ports on the South Coast, Where the men had been 
on strike from the first day, over a month before, and if there was no
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swift settlement, they would lose much of the extra work associated 
with the high Burner season of cross channel traffic. Further these 
men worked all the year round and were not interested to the same 
extent as their deep sea colleagues in the increased leave allowances.
Even so, in these ports resolutions were never stronger than a request 
that Pearson should be a basis for negotiations. The importance of 
these symptoms of strain is not so much in themselves but in their ' 
massive press coverage, and the accompanying claims of these resolutions 
as evidence of the strikes' imminent disintegration.
Such pressure for the ending of the dispute while cumulative 
was insignificant when compared with that emanating from the government 
and the TUC. Evidence of its bearing fruit came after the first visit 
of George Woodcock to the N.U.S. when there was a small movement within 
the Executive Council. This was the suggestion of a non-recurring 
1 year government subsidy being given to the shipowners to cover the 
imnediate cost of a 40 hour week.^7 The TUC saw little prospect in 
such a suggestion but felt perhaps it could break the existing stale­
mate. To the Executive Council it had much virtue, and on its strength they 
had put forward a resolution indicating their belief that 'they have 
a solution to the present dispute and that this will necessitate the 
bringing together of the four interested parties, the government, the
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shipowners, the Trade Union Congress and the National Union of seamen'.
As anticipated, the government refused to consider the suggested 
subsidy, re-affirming its commitment to Fcnrson. At this juncture the 
TUC considered there was little more they could do immediately and 
suggested that Harold Wilson met the nine man N.U.S. committee. A 
series of separate meetings were arranged between the N.U.S. committee 
and the Prime Minister and between him and the Shipping Federation
r
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over the next few days, 1A June to 17 June. The Executive Council
claimed that an easily achievable reduction in overtime would in cost
terms allow for increased leave. Dismissing this, the Prime Minister
put forward the suggestion of leave in lieu of overtime payments, or a
’copper bottomed' commitment on productivity. The Executive Council
rejected the former but, perceiving an impasse, decided to make an
important concession to satisfy the latter. The General Secretary
felt the only way out of the present situation was to 
give something away. He felt they all realised this.
He had a proposal to make where he felt they could give 
something away without losing much and possible gaining 
something on leave.59
The suggestion, based on the wide use of automatic steering within the 
industry, was that the standard sea watch of three be cut to two 
sailors. Thus allowing the transference of one man to day work and 
reducing the amount of overtime necessary on Sundays. They calculated 
a saving of some five hours a day, an annual saving of nine hundred 
hours per man no longer standing a sea watch. It is difficult to under­
stand why the Prime Minister and his advisers failed to grasp the 
significance of this offer, and the 'copper bottomed' immediate guarantee 
of increases in productivity it contained. Perhaps the explanation of 
such a failure lies in their preoccupation with gaining acceptance, 
and hence vindication, of Pearson with which to impress the international 
monetary authorities' imninent meeting at Basle. Had a suitable 
response been made to what was eventually to be the basis of a return 
to work, the termination of the dispute was presumably assured. This 
failure ended the period of intensive Ministerial activity, the only 
tangible result was what the press termed a 'tit-bit' for the seamen, 
a commitment to set up a Royal Contnission to inquire into the whole 
industry.
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With the rejection of what they considered as a substantial 
concession, the Executive Council re-assessed their situation. They, 
if not the majority of the strikers, had concluded, that the aim of an 
immediate 40 hour week was no longer feasible, and had lowered their 
sights to minimizing the loss of leave. A ballot of the membership 
was discussed, but this would have taken some time and an insnediate - - 
decision was needed. There was, in fact, little choice, either they 
allowed the strike to continue, capitulated, or stiffened their 
resistance. They chose the latter. The I.T.F. was again approached; 
it felt itself to be in an invidious position, conscious of the Labour 
Government's stance, combined with the TUC's strong advice for restraint, 
whilst the N.U.S. were pressing for immediate assistance. While 
persisting in its refusal to recommend to the member unions the blocking 
of all British ships, agreement was reached on an appeal for financial 
aid. The N.U.S. hoped this would come quickly.
On the Monday (20 June) following the unsuccessful intervention of 
the Prime Minister, one of the most remarkable episodes in contemporary 
labour history began. The Prime Minister chose to make a statement on 
the seamen's strike and the government's intention to seek a renewal of 
its Emergency Powers. What transpired was a denouncement of shipping's 
industrial relations and in particular of the Executive Council. Wilson 
summarized developments and said he believed that at the onset of the strike 
the seamen had gained considerable public support. But 'Public 
sympathy has been progressively alienated, firstly by their brusque 
rejection of the Pearson Report, secondly by their continuing refusal 
to follow the course urged upon them by the Trade Union Congress and 
the government'.**0 'This union has had an unhappy history and, as I 
told the owners on Friday, the owners bear a heavy responsibility for
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this by the cynical way in which for so many years they were content 
to transform the union into a creature of the c o m p a n i e s ' H a v i n g  
thus chastised the shipowners, Wilson turned to the problem of the 
union. 'A few individuals have brought pressure to bear on a select 
few on the Executive Council of the National Union of Seamen, who in 
turn have been able to dominate the majority of that otherwise sturdy 
union. It is difficult for us to appreciate pressures which are being 
put on men' ...'by this tightly knit group of politically motivated men
who, as the last election showed, utterly failed to secure acceptance
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of their views by the British electorate'. An obvious reference to
the Communist Party. When asked by the leaders of the Opposition to
press for a union secret ballot, Mr. Wilson pointed out some problems
here; for example, were all the members to be balloted or just those
participating in the strike, and the time such a ballot would take.
Mr. Wilson waa also apprehensive; what 'If the ballot were in favour
of continuing the dispute, it might be appealed to by those who felt it
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right to appeal to it for several weeks thereafter'.
Apparently taking their cue from the Prime Minister, the 
Shipping Federation sent a strongly worded letter on the implications 
of the strike to all ships and as many seamen as possible. Signed by 
Ford Ceddes, the Chairman, it was the first initiative the Federation 
had taken for some time. Quoting Harold Wilson's speech extensively, 
it appealed to seamen to use their democratic rights. His main points 
being:
The men of whom the Prime Minister spoke will destroy 
our Industry - your industry - unless you make your 
views heard.,..
Unless the strike stops quickly some British ships will 
never sail again, others will not be replaced and so there 
will be fewer jobs for seamen'....
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The Executive Council are not your masters, they are 
your servants'.......
Use your democratic rights to speak out loudly enough 
for the Executive Council to hear and take notice'.
The attitude of the Labour movement in general appears to have been 
summed up by the Prime Minister's confrere George Woodcock. 'The fact 
that the Communist Party is interested in the strike is something I am 
prepared to spend a lot of time not bothering about'.^
Wilson's denouncement,and the additional pressure this placed 
on the Executive Council, came at a time of a new initiative on the part 
of the TUC. The idea was to re-open negotiations under the chairman­
ship of Lord Pearson, and within the cost structure of his report 
recommendations. The Prime Minister encouraged the shipowners to 
participate; their acceptance was conditional on the meeting being purely 
explanatory and unconditional. With this assured, the TUC approached 
the N.U.S. They affirmed their continuing willingness throughout the 
dispute to negotiate, referring to their resolution of a week earlier. 
Once it was made explicit that Lord Pearson would act solely as an 
independent chairman, negotiations began, a meeting being arranged in 
the Ministry of Labour the same afternoon (24 June), which was used by 
both sides simply to present proposals. The union presented two, a 
radical lowering of overtime, and the reduction of sea watches to two 
men, both were to facilitate increased leave. The owners' proposals 
were that some additional leave be taken in lieu of overtime payment, 
and that only essential work be performed on public holidays, anything 
urgent to be treated as overtime. None of the proposals increased 
costa appreciably. The meeting broke up to allow each side to consider 
these proposals, a further meeting being arranged for the following 
morning. Here the shipowners claimed the union suggestion of reducing 
overtime was impractical, while the union refused to consider the system
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of leave in lieu of overtime payment. The negotiators concentrated 
on the union's proposal of reducing watches by a sailor, The amount 
of cost saving here was dependent on the number of vessels possessing 
automatic steering systems. The shipowners inquired if the vessels 
already operating two man watches could be also cut by one. The 
union replied in the negative, and a meeting was arranged for the - ■ 
following afternoon. At this meeting shipowners produced tentative figures 
suggesting that something in the region of 90 per cent of vessels above 
2,500 tons possessed automatic steering. Unlike the government earlier, 
the Shipping Federation was convinced of the important nature of the 
N.U.S. proposal, and as a quid pro produced a new offer, of an increase 
in leave of 9 days, bringing total leave to 48 days and a clear 
definition of essential work on public holidays. The Executive Council 
met to consider the new proposals in a complex situation.^ There 
were obvious signs of weariness among the Councillors, due to the long 
period of intense activity. Political and other pressures for a return 
to work were now enormous. Having just returned from their branches 
they were also acutely aware of continuous pressure from a large section 
of the rank and file to intensify the strike. Such ardent support 
caused apprehension about how to advise a complete and orderly return 
to work, when a settlement was reached. There was a discussion of a 
ballot of the membership or a delegate conference. For while the strike 
had been called by the Executive Council, its decision had been confirmed 
by the union's Annual General Meeting. The more militant of the 
Executive were for making the decision or any settlement a democratic 
one decided on by the membership. Another important problem was 
finance, the TUC had actively inhibited any substantial outside assistance, 
and there were estimates of the cost of the strike being as high as
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£400,000. Unless the I.T.F.'s recent efforts bore fruit fairly 
quickly, the situation would deteriorate rapidly. The Prime Minister's 
speech also made its influence felt. There was some conviction that 
no settlement could be considered until his accusations were proved.
The speech appears to have been a factor in prolonging the strike, for 
when the Executive Council met on 24 June, there could possibly have 
been an acceptance of the owners'offer, instead it was resolved 'as a 
basis for negotiations'. But the Prime Minister's efforts to divide the 
Executive Council were having some effect, for the vote was 26 for,
17 against, voting figures which brought considerable press speculation. 
The division appeared to be between union officials and lay members, 
for there were 17 professional officials and trustees, not including 
the chairman, on the Executive Council. A group, as with most unions, 
inherently more conservative, and sensitive to external pressures, not 
only conscious of its responsibility to the community at large and the 
membership, but also heavily committed to the continuation of a strong 
organization. They were, therefore, disposed to an acceptance of the 
owners' offer.
A further indicator of the delaying influence of the Prime 
Minister's speech was the decision to convene a meeting of the N.M.B. 
on the day announced for his next explanatory speech. This meeting, 
like the previous negotiations, was overshadowed by the expected 
denouncements. The employers presumably believed or hoped it would 
bring an end to an extremely costly dispute by causing a split within 
the Executive Council. While the Council appeared to be determined to 
illustrate their unity despite Ministerial slurs on their ability.
In such circumstances the meeting could only be marginally fruitful, but 
it made the negotiations official and within the N.M.B,
Harold Wilson's second speech on the seamen's strike on 28 June
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came in the opening of the debate to confirm the continuance of 
Emergency Powers under the 1920 Act. The prime aim was to enlarge on 
his previous 'tight knit group' allegations and to name names, yet a 
proportion of the speech was taken up by a largely accurate summary of 
the situation. Speaking of the need to curtail the abnormal amount of 
overtime worked, compared with foreign shipping, and how this was 
indicative of the inefficiency, and one of the reasons a Royal Commission 
was being set up. After some criticism of the Shipping Federation and 
the 'pathetic admission' that it could not speak for all its members 
and so guarantee an increase in productivity, he went on to recognize 
the problems of democratic control and comnunication in seafarers' 
organizations.
Turning to what was to be the most highly publicised section of 
the speech, the accusation of Communist intervention. He claimed that 
'The whole formidable power of the Communist Party's industrial apparatus 
has for some time been directed towards this end (a take-over of the 
N.U.S.) and the seamen's strike with all its background of justification 
for industrial action has provided the ground'.^ The spearhead of 
this, Mr. Wilson claimed, was Bert Ramelson, and two other Communist 
Party industrial organizers. Wilson made it clear that they had done 
nothing illegal in the pursuance of these aims.^ He also conceded 
that they had achieved little obvious success for there were 'no 
Communists on the Executive Council of this union and that the number
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of Coonunists among the membership of the union was extremely small*.
Discussing the evidence for this, one author suggests that the 
Communist industrial organizer, B. Ramelson, did attempt to influence 
the Executive Council, but in a totally different direction to that 
put forward by Mr. Wilson. 'In fact, on the occasion when Ramelson
visited Coward's flat, (J, Coward was a member of the Victoria and
Albert Dock Strike Comnittee, London) he surprised his hosts by
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advocating an immediate return to work*.
The immediate product of the speech was to give more publicity 
to the Communist Party, in one week, than it could normally hope for 
annually, with large well attended press conferences, Here its General 
Secretary took an arrogant somewhat superior stance. The Morning Star, 
29 June, reported 'The Prime Minister, a member of the Labour Party, 
should search his own conscience on the role he has played in this 
strike'. The press at the opposite end of the political spectrum 
remained unconvinced. The Daily Telegraph; 'The result is something 
of a damp squib'. The Daily Mail; 'The Prime Minister tried hard. But 
the gravy just did not thicken. It was a professional exhibition, but 
it soon became obvious that he didn't have enough facts to back up his 
allegations of last week'. On the evidence presented there is little 
to justify Wilson's later comment; 'The fact was that the moderate 
members of the seamen's executive were virtually terrorised by a small 
professional group of Communists or near Communists.,.'.^0
Even I.R.I.S., the industrial research body, whose raison d'etre 
has been seeking out and proclaiming Communist or near Communist 
influence within the trade union and labour movement, did not endorse 
Wilson's accusation, quite the opposite. 'There was no subtle fantasy 
about the seamen's strike. For decades the men have been exploited up 
to the hilt. No shore-based group of workers would have accepted such 
conditions passively. Frustrated workers are bound to rebel, and the 
more honest and sincere they are, the more fierce the struggle for what 
they believe is right and true. This has been clearly illustrated by 
the seamen who, far from being bounced by anybody, have almost to a man 
been solidly behind their union from the start',^
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The Pearson Committee, set up by Wilson, had earlier assured the
public of the absence of any malevolent influences. 'There is no need
to infer that the Executive Council wished to have a strike for the
72
sake of having a strike or from any sinister motive'.
The Opposition leader pointed out that Wilson had failed to make 
it clear how the Conmunists and the two militants named had controlled 
a 48 man executive. E.P. Thompson commented 'Even Edward Heath was 
unconvinced by this taradidole, or thought it politic to pretend to be
unconvinced. This distressed Wilson far more than the manifest and
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caustic scepticism of the entire non-communist labour movement'.
An omission from the speech, and one central to its argument,
was the failure to analyse the support given to the Executive Council
and its decisions, by the strikers. On the day of the 'tight knit
group' accusations a secret ballot of strikers in South Shields was
held, asking 'Do you support the decision of your Executive Council
in rejecting the Pearson Report' with Guardian reporters acting as
independent scrutineers. The vote, with few abstentions, was 609 in
favour and 43 against. On the same day a meeting in Liverpool of
1,500 members produced a unanimous vote in favour of the Executive
Council decision. Similar meetings in Glasgow produced 1,100 votes in
favour, Hull 600, Southampton 400, Sunderland 400 and in Manchester
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300. The majority of branches showed similar results.
The Prime Minister's speech was to have further ramifications, 
for the question arose whether the Executive Council should discuss the 
negotiations before making some arrangement to seek an explanation from 
Mr. Wilson for his apparently groundless allegations and unfortunate 
interference in the internal affairs of the union. Only the General 
Secretary's personal persuasion to discuss the official negotiations
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avoided the speech being the justification for further extending the 
strike. The N.M.B, meeting had affirmed the earlier unofficial 
negotiations under Pearson's chairmanship, more closely defining the 
proposals,for example, essential work on public holidays was specified 
in detail, and the following clause added 'The agreement must not be 
interpreted to allow work to be done and classed as essential where 
such work can be carried out at other times and if not immediately 
necessary for the safe operation of the ship'. What the Executive 
Council had to consider as its most simple was a 48 hour week immediately, 
and 40 hours a year later, a leave of 48 days a loss at its highest, 
in the tanker trade, of 16 days. Acceptance of this offer had to be 
placed against what could be gained by the continuation of the dispute. 
There was apprehension about the financial situation, estimates of the 
cost of the strike, although later to prove high, worried the Councillors. 
The fear, by some, of financial collapse, was combined with one of the 
union's disintegration, particularly with the South Coast railway ports 
breaking away, if the strike continued much longer.
A few days earlier an agreement accepting all the union's demands 
had been made with 'Townsend Ferries' who with other companies had been 
pressing for one since the strike began. This failed to bring the 
expected easing of the situation in the Southern porta, neither did it 
bring pressure on the Shipping Federation, for Townsend were not members. 
There was also apprehension About the continuation of the strike 
unofficially in many ports should the offer prove unacceptsble there.
In this situation while there appeared to be some inclination to accept 
the offer, the method of acceptance became the central problem, either 
by ballot, delegate conference or Executive Council decision. While 
there never appears to have been a formal decision, the latter was in
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fact decided upon, by the proposing of the following resolution, 'That 
this Executive Council, being aware of the hardship caused to the 
citizens of the United Kingdom, accept the shipowners improved offer 
of 28 June. Therefore, in the knowledge that a Court of Inquiry will 
fully investigate our other grievances and so allow further negotiations 
to take place, we adjourn strike action for a period of twelve months, 
to allow the Inquiry to proceed'.^ After considerable discussion this 
was put to the vote, and the strike ended 29 votes to 16, with the 
elected seagoing members divided 17 to 16 in favour of the decision.^
The press knowledge of this decision was to cause confusion in many 
ports for it was not clear how the return was to be organized. Eventually, 
a press statement made it clear, that the return was not for two days, 
until Friday 1 July, to allow time for branch meetings to take place.
The purpose of these meetings was for N.U.S. officials and 
Executive Councillors to explain to the membership the terms of the 
'victory' and above all to convince them of the paramount need for an 
impressive return to work. In nearly all the port meetings, the 
decision to return to work was met with hostility, strongly worded 
resolutions being passed requiring the resignation of the whole Executive 
Council, of the union officials on it, or of the General Secretary. At 
the same meetings, the union officials were met with varying degrees of 
contempt. The members,having vented their disapproval, and general 
disappointment, made an orderly return to work. For the N.U.S. the strike 
had finally exorcised the ghost of their industrial pacifism. In 
such circumstances, a strike which had lasted 45 days ended. It had 
affected 26,500 seamen, about one third of the N.U.S, membership and 
cost the union between 1300,000 and £400,000. Some 882 vessels were 
held up, placing an extra burden on the balance of payments of approx­
imately £ 171 million. That the commercial and economic effects were not
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more serious or nearly as significant as those forecast early in the 
dispute, is a comment on the declining importance of the shipping 
industry within the UK economy.
The most notable aspect of the dispute was the government mis­
judgement of the situation and of the course events would take. They were 
convinced of the need to bolster a wavering incomes policy with an _ . 
example to impress the trade unions, the general public and in particular, 
international monetary interests. The N.U.S. seem to have been chosen 
with little or no inquiry into the circumstances or attitudes prevailing 
among the disputants. A choice widely interpreted as an attack on a 
group of lower paid workers to support, when considering other more 
privileged groups, a wildly inconsistent incomes policy. Harold Wilson 
felt the need to take the unprecedent step of making explicit on the 
first day of the strike that the seamen were to be used as scapegoats.
Thus transforming it from a simple industrial dispute, which by all the 
signs would be swiftly and amicably settled, into the strike to make or 
break the incomes policy.
The government attitude and policy subjugated the Shipping 
Federation. Had they been allowed to engage in normal collective 
bargaining the estimated loss to the industry of £50m would have been 
considerably reduced. The Federation failed to recognise the potential 
danger in the situation during the early 1966 negotiations. Placing 
their trust, perhaps understandably, in the N.M.B. As one of the 
industry's journals put it:
With Its 'unique record of industrial relations' the N.M.B. 
could cope with this little problem quite easily. The 
complacency and traditional self-satisfaction of the 
Shipping Federation was in for a shock from which it may 
be hoped those particular characteristics may never 
recover..,. How far back should one go to find the true 
lessons of the 1966 seamen's strike? Perhaps to the end 
of the last war, when many shipowners were surprised at the 
moderation of the post-war wage settlement for men and
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officers. Perhaps to the later period of union 'boss- 
manship' which was notable for various things other than 
strong partisanship of the cause of the working man at 
sea. Perhaps to that very same 'unique record of good 
industrial relations' the Shipping Federation was always 
talking about. After all, the Prime Minister gave it a 
different interpretation. Over the years, he said, 
owners had tried to transform the union into a 'creature 
of the companies'.77
While few would now disagree with this analysis, there is also little 
doubt that had the Shipping Federation wished to take any positive action 
they were unable to do so because of government policy.
Nevertheless, there was certainly no immediate evidence that the 
strike caused the Federation to question the effectiveness of the 
industry's industrial relations. The Chairman, Ford Geddes, wrote at 
the end of 1966
I believe that if there were faults in the events leading 
up to the strike, the fault was not that our industrial 
relations were bad or outdated. They were in fact in 
advance of those of many other industries.78
This view was seriously challenged by the Final Report of the 
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Pearson Inquiry which criticized the industry's rigid centralisation
in respect of manpower and highlighted the need for flexibility and a
fresh approach in the face of change. The report pointed out that there
was a tendency for both sides 'to judge industrial relations in terms
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of the absence of overty conflict' and since in these terms the
institutions had been successful for almost half a century there had
been a failure 'to comprehend the very strong tendency to seek standard-
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ised solutions for new problems ns for old'.
This failure had been perceived by the major oil companies, 
although perhaps with hindsight, since they gave evidence to the Inquiry 
'that they now take the view that the National Maritime Board has not 
paid enough attention to their special problems' and the report
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commented 'It would seem that for many years the needs of the tanker
, companies went unrecognised because it did not occur to them that the
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prevailing centralisation could be challenged',
Pearson recognized that the industry had begun to be aware of
the need for modification and cited the grievance procedure and liaison
representatives as examples of movement in that direction. Nevertheless,
'The recent dispute, however, was a tragic demonstration that reform had
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been too slow and too limited'. The important point being that the
economic, technological and social environment in which the industry
operated had undergone and would continue to unergo dynamic change.
It was insufficient, therefore, merely to think in terms of reforming
the existing structure or of replacing it with one which would have a
similar rigidity. Any alteration to the industry's industrial relations
had to embody a degree of flexibility which would allow for continual
adaptation to change at both an industry and sectional level. This
necessitsted a fundamental change in attitude; 'As much as a change in
the institutions the industry needs a change in attitude, This change
has begun, but only begun. The old centralized agreements of the
Board tended to deter companies from facing up to their personnel
problems. As yet there is still a real danger than any reformed system
of negotiations at the centre would have a similar effect'.®^
The Merchant Shipping Acts were also criticized on the grounds
that 'They had outstayed their utility in a number of respects, and by
reason of their rigid and restrictive character they have become an
obstacle to progress. They need to be drastically revised.... Moreover,
the system is so firmly built into the Industry and so deeply founded
in tradition, that an effort of mind has to be made in order to see
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that large parts of it are no longer necessary or desirable'. The
need to challenge traditional views was highlighted in reference to
the seamen's Contract of Employment. 'The system of Articles of
Agreement, however ancient and well established it may be, is not part
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of the unchangeable order of nature'.
The main recommendations made in the Final Report stem from two
basic conclusions; firstly that
The most urgent need in the field of industrial relations 
is for Companies to plan, develop and Implement effective 
personnel policies. They must have latitude to do so 
and must not be restricted by, or rely on, the rigid 
centralised arrangement of the past'.
and secondly, in relation to the Merchant Shipping Act, 'There should
be a newly-drafted Act, not merely amendments of the existing provisions'
drawing particular attention to the provisions governing manning
contracts of employment and discipline.
The two conclusions question the basic premises of maritime
industrial relations with its centralized collective bargaining and joint
supply system and a legal framework regarded as essential to the proper
and safe functioning of the industry. Although they had been reached
following an examination of the grievances of the ratings, they made
it clear that the impact of change could no longer be the concern of one
representative organization. By the end of 1966 the shipping industry
had no choice but to recognize that issues had been raised which
necessitated a fundamental reappraisal of maritime industrial relations
structure and manpower policy.
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CHAPTER 9
REAPPRAISAL AND REFORM
In the late 1960s all sides of industry, and the government, 
recognised the necessity of re-assessing maritime industrial relations 
at all levels. The need was not only to deal with the contemporary 
problems but also to be equipped for future eventualities. The continuing 
rapid technological change, foreign competition, and uncertain economic 
trends made this imperative. The events of the 1970s were to highlight 
and compound the complexity of the task.
This reappraisal was to be against the wider background of the
need for reorganization of the industry as a whole. To this end, and as
part of the settlement of the 1966 strike, the government set up a
Committee of Inquiry into shipping, in July 1967, under the chairmanship
of the Rt. Hon. the Viscount Rochdale. Its terms of reference were:
To review, in the light of current commercial and 
technological development, the organisation and structure 
of the United Kingdom shipping industry, its methods of 
operation and any other factors which affect its efficiency 
and competitiveness and to recoranend what action should be 
taken by shipowners, seafarers and Government, to bring 
about changes which would improve the position of the 
industry in these respects.1
While the Rochdale Report, which was published in 1970, was 
concerned with wider issues than industrial relations, it reinforced the 
Pearson recommendations. The emphasis was put on legislative reform and 
the introduction of a more flexible personnel policy with specisl attention 
given to training. The need to prepare evidence for these two inquiries 
meant that the employers and employees had both to question and justify 
their traditional assumptions and proposals for the future. The 'shock' 
of the 1966 strike and this need to crystalise their ideas on industrial 
relations must have been important factors in the changes which occurred 
to the Shipping Federation, the N.U.S., and the officers' organizations.
213 -
This is not, of course, to deny that there had already been signs
of modification to individual organizations and industrial relations 
2
practice; these modifications continued during the second half of the 
1960s. For example, the oil companies, which had expressed their 
dissatisfaction with N.M.B, negotiations during the Pearson inquiry, 
continued to explore ways of developing their own policies, particularly 
in relation to ratings, through direct negotiations with the N.U.S. By 
July 1967, Esso, 'while remaining a member of the Federation, was able 
to conclude a productivity agreement with the National Union of Seamen 
which marked the introduction of a new marine personnel policy'. This 
was despite the previously stated disapproval of the Federation who 
regarded such individual action as detrimental to the introduction of 
general purpose crews as a matter of central policy.
Thus by solving the problems presented individually, the companies 
were threatening the central organization of the shipowners since their 
labour policy had always been based on a presumption of an over-riding 
homogeneity of interest. In order to remain a viable representative body, 
the organization had to embrace the new attitudes which the changing 
industry demanded. In 1967 the Federation had become the sole employers 
personnel organization when it merged with the Seafarers Committee of 
the Employers' Association of the Fort of Liverpool, at the same time 
changing its title to the British Shipping Federation, It then 
represented 200 shipping companies, or virtually the total ownership of 
vessels over 200 tons.
At about the same time, the BSF reorganized its constitution and 
structure following a report by a team of management consultants from
4
Booz, Allen and Hamilton. The members of the BSF were divided into 
seven regions, and each company with its head office in a particular 
region was represented on that Area Committee. The elected chairman of
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each Area Committee automatically became a member of the executive 
committee of the BSF. Thus, although the centralized nature of the 
Federation remained, the channel for communication with members was 
improved. However, the new structure also reflected an important change 
in policy. The decision-making structure previously based on departmental 
committees, i.e. deck, engineroom, etc,, reflected in the organization 
of the N.M.B., was replaced by trades committees. The areas elected 
representatives on these comnittees, the amount of representation being 
dependent on the area's share of tonnage in each type of trade. In 
forming trade conmittees, such as foreign-going passenger liners, foreign- 
going tankers and short sea traders, the B.S.F. reflected the changing 
needs and structure of the industry perhaps more than the established 
bargaining pattern in the N.M.B.
The N.U.S. had already recognized the need to modify its 
organization not least in reaction to the militancy of its members of the 
early 1960s. Furthermore, it realised that the altered employment and 
manpower situation necessitated a more flexible approach than that 
permitted under the uniform wage negotiations of the N.M.B. The officials 
therefore attempted to broaden the basis of their negotiations outside 
the collective bargaining structure, as the officers were able to do with 
company negotiations. The General Purpose Manning or interdepartmental 
flexibility agreements are an example of this, However, this method of 
adaptation has not been entirely successful. This is perhaps due more 
to the fact that General Purpose Manning may not be the answer to the 
problems posed by the technological advances rather than the inappropriat- 
ness of company bargaining at rating level.
The experience of the N.U.S. has been that in addition to 
reassessing its relationship with the other participant organizations 
and its own plsce in the system it has had to recognise the need for a
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restructuring and reassessment of its own organization in order to cope 
adequately with the dynamics and pressures produced by a changing and 
developing industry.
Effective communication with the rank and file had assumed great 
importance, prior to the 1966 strike, with increasing demands for some 
form of shipboard representation. Initially it was hoped that shore 
based union practice would be extended to the maritime industry. The 
scheme eventually negotiated within the N.M.B. did not provide the type 
of work-place representation envisaged by its original proposers which is 
perhaps indicated by its title the 'Shipboard Liaison Scheme'. Unlike 
the shop steward, the liaison representative has no point of reference, 
no work-place rules exist, even on such matters as safety or normal 
overtime working. This omission leaves him without the capability to 
influence orders from above or ameliorate dissatisfaction from below. 
Furthermore, living in a close knit community renders him liable to 
experience feelings of alienation. Therefore, in the context of a 
discussion of the shop stewards' movement, whatever the initial intention 
may have been, the Shipboard Representative does not, and indeed cannot, 
fulfil the role of a shop steward. This may explain why after the initial 
impetus of the scheme being set up there has been a decline in the number 
of vessels in which it operates.
Another movement towards democratization took place in 1967 with 
the abolition of the union's gérontocratie voting system. This was due 
largely to the pressure from the more militant sections of the Executive 
Council and the adverse publicity the system had received. It was 
replaced by a single non-transferable vote after a year's membership.
The following year the union decided to embark on a thorough 
reappraisal of its whole structure. The Executive Council established 
for this purpose a 'Streamlining Conraittee' with wide terms of references
To enquire into the subject of re-organising the structure 
of the union at all administrative levels for the 
purpose of streamlining the organisation to better meet 
the changing pattern of the shipping industry and to 
maintain an efficient service to members, keeping in mind 
declining income, increasing costs and the need to make 
constructive recommendations compatible with good trade 
union practice.5
In addition, the Council made it clear that the committee's work should 
take the long view and be designed to anticipate circumstances prevailing 
within the next five to ten years. The committee produced a series of 
interim reports which were submitted to the Annual General Meeting of 
1974. With minimal modifications these recommendations were accepted and 
acted on. The most important being the contraction in the number of union 
branches, the replacement of districts by larger regions, which were also 
electoral regions, the reduction in Executive Council members, and the 
abolition of the Finance and General Purposes Committee.
There has been a continuing recognition of the need to adapt to 
changing circumstances. In 1974 the union stated that part of its policy 
was:-
a) To obtain five groupings by trade for the purposes of 
negotiations, one of which must allow for a national container 
agreement.
b) To maintain individual company and individual ahip 
bargaining procedures where applicable.
c) To allow local committee negotiations to operate with
head office approval. Local port committee to be regarded as
negotiating bodies rather than advisory bodies to the union 
6
secretary.
These were very similar conclusions to those arrived at by the employers 
and to some extent incorporated in the Federation reorganization in 
1968/9.
The officers organization) although they had not been directly
involved in the conflict of 1966, were concerned with the changes in the
industry and the need for modification and adaptation. For, in addition
to the scrutiny of both Pearson and Rochdale, they had to justify their
position to the Prices and Incomes Board-, ^ Any changes taking place in
industrial relations would have implications for the officers and they
would, of course, be anxious to be able to press their own case. The
MMSA underwent a major rules revision in 1968 which endeavoured to make
the Council more representative of the younger sea-going members and
8
to establish a balance of representation between trades.
The MNAOA in the same period attempted to improve its communication 
with members by broadening the role of the sea-going councillors with the 
introduction in 1967 of the Correspondents Scheme. The Correspondents 
number about 150 and they are volunteers whose function is in no way 
comparable with the position of shop stewards, They are merely, as their 
title implies, two-way communicators; conveying to officials the opinions 
of the membership, receiving and distributing circulars, pamphlets, 
questionnaires and the like, a task made easy by the Association's 
monthly journal 'The Telegraph'.
The position of the officers in the 1960s was to some extent a 
reflection of the general trend in respect of white collar unionization 
and concomitant militancy, but it was also a more specific reaction by 
merchant navy officers to changes within their own industry. The question 
increasingly being raised was whether the MNAOA should regard itself as 
a professional association or a trade union. It was suggested in 1967 
that 'whereas the great majority of members look upon the MNAOA as a 
professional association, the officials are probably evenly divided as 
to whether it is that, or a trade union, Indeed most officials, in my
Q
experience, style themselves "trade union officials'", In this respect
it is perhaps significant that the MNAOA negotiated a pre-entry and re­
entry closed shop in 1969, which came into operation in April 1971.*®
The movement in the early 1970s was certainly towards more overtly 
'trade union' activity with the unions first official strike taking place 
in August 1973. While limited to the Cross Channel Ferries and only 
called for 24 hours in support of the re-establishment of differentials, 
it was successfully concluded. Insignificant by any numerical calculation, 
it is in its unique nature that its importance lies. The trend towards 
methods of open confrontation has continued during the 1970s,
In addition to the efforts of the individual organizations to 
adapt to a changing social, technological and economic environment, there 
were continued efforts to improve industrial relations. Action.was, 
however, being taken to conmence a review of the Merchant Shipping Acts, 
with Pearson's recomnendations as a basis. The Board of Trade, the 
British Shipping Federation and the unions commenced negotiations early 
in 1968,
There was very little disagreement over wages and the Articles of
Agreement but the stumbling block was the disciplinary clauses, A Bill
was introduced in the House of Comnons in July 1969** but lapsed due to
the ending of the session. The discussions continued therefore and a
12
new Bill containing a number of changes, was introduced in November,
Much of the Victorian minutiae from previous legislation was removed and
the new Act achieved a degree of codification concentrated on central
principles of seamen's rights rather than on detailed regulations. These
were left in the hands of the Department of Trade.
The general principles are not as far removed from previous
legislation as some had hoped. As one author caustically put it*
The Merchant Shipping Act (1970) has dragged the 
employment conditions of merchant seamen ... kicking 
and screaming into the nineteenth century.
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This is perhaps too drastic an assessment. For example, in respect of 
the seaman’s Contract of Employment, there was a significant attempt to 
bring the Articles of Agreement into line with shore-based practice. The 
Act does away with 'articles' and removes the statutory provisions as to 
their content. These were replaced by 'crew agreements', although the 
provision for signing of the agreement and government supervision remain. 
Furthermore, the Act took account of the comment made by the Pearson. 
Court of Inquiry that
Section 113 jot the 1894 Act7 gives the impression that 
the master is the contracting party; contracting on his 
own behalf as the employer of seamen ... We think this is 
out of date and unrealistic for modern conditions. In 
the great majority of cases the employers are a large 
company employing both the master and the crew as their 
'servants'.1^
The 1970 Act in Section 1(1) makes it clear that the crew agreement is 
a Contract of Employment between the seafarer as a workman, and the 
person employing him who is not necessarily the ship's master. A similar 
up-dating took place in respect of wages; a provision was 'included for 
seamen to sue for recovery of wages through the County Court in the same 
manner as shore-based workers.^
In providing for the implementation of the Act to be largely through 
regulations, some of the rigidity which the law had had previously was 
removed. This was, of course, in line with the general recommendations 
of the Pearson Inquiry, that the industry needed a more flexible attitude 
if it was to adapt successfully to continuing change. However, the 
use of regulations also enabled the legislators to evade the issue of 
discipline which is directly related to and reflects the quasi military 
structure of the ship. It was the penal clauses of the Act which were 
the most contentious; the B.S.F. and the officers' organizations accepted 
the Pearson Report in this respect but the N.U.S. wanted the question of 
discipline removed from the ship to the shore. They felt that there was
22 0  -
really no change in the attitude towards discipline. One member of the 
N.U.S. asked:
Why must seamen always be a race apart? Why must we be 
somebody different to everybody else? ... If we accept 
these penal Clauses in the Merchant Shipping Act, why 
not go a step further and bring back corporal punishment 
and hanging from the yardarm?
There was certainly no doubt that the N.U.S. were extremely unhappy 
with the disciplinary provisions under the Act. They did, however, extract 
a promise from the Prime Minister that these Clauses would be reviewed 
in three years' time. In addition, the flexibility of a system of 
regulations ensured discussion of these issues would continue.
An opportunity for further legislation came in 1974, This new Act 
did not fundamentally alter the principle of discipline; it repealed 
some penal clauses and modified others to the extent that they only 
applied when the ship was at sea. On the other hand, fines were increased, 
particularly where they were concerned with safety. The most important 
outcome of the Act was that during the debate the government announced 
the intention to set up a Working Group 'to examine in depth the 
disciplinary needs of seagoing employment in merchant ship'.^
One of the first tasks which the Working Group had to undertake
was to define the problem. It was faced, as previous inquiries had been,
with a lack of objective facts and statistics, on this occasion about
18
the nature and frequency of offences committed at sea. The Department 
of Trade undertook to provide statistical information, whilst the 
Tavistock Institute was commissioned to carry out a special study of the 
sociological implications of the existing disciplinary procedures, In 
addition, the group collected information informally on board ship and 
at meetings ashore. From all this evidence, the group concluded that 
there was no concensus of opinion as to the most satisfactory method 
of discipline and that in any event 'only a small minority of seafarers 
actually undergo any form of disciplinary action'. Furthermore,
Trwrr" " • f PI 99iv
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There Is no clear evidence to show whether or not the 
present masters' fining system is a general deterrent, 
but if it is, it is probably confined in its effect to 
occasional or minor offenders who would probably regard 
formal warnings by the master, backed by action ashore, 
as an equally effective deterrent',*-®
The Group's main recommendations were that persistent or serious
offenders should suffer either temproary or permanent exclusion from the
industry and that
The present system of shipboard fines should be abolished 
and a new system of discipline should be instituted 
consisting of recorded warnings, reprimands and dismissal 
from the ship after the offence and action ashore by joint 
disciplinary conmittees.
This disciplinary procedure was incorporated in the Established Service 
22
Scheme.
The E.S. Scheme had already been modified in 1968 with a tentative 
movement in the direction of decasualisation. The contract was now 
offered to a wider group of seamen, requiring a time qualification of only 
11 months at sea; furthermore, the contract was to be continuous and not
to be limited to two years as previously. In addition the Established
23
Service Scheme benefits were increased.
The complete decasualiaation of the scheme took place early in 1973, 
This new scheme abolished the 25 year old distinctions between the 
established and unestablished seafarer both in respect of allocation to 
employment as well as entitlement to cash benefits. The classification
established and unestablished ceased to exist and were replaced by the
24
concept of a registered seafarer.
The N.M.B. itself did not reflect the movement by both the 
Federation and the NUS away from the hierarchical structure of the ship 
ns the patter for their organization towards trade panels, It would 
perhaps be unrealistic to see such changes occurring at the same time or 
directly after they were taking place in the individual organizations.
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The N.M.B. concerned itself more immediately with the problems apper­
taining to the concept of long-term manpower planning. The Pearson 
committee had highlighted the concern felt in the industry at the degree 
of wastage compared with shore based industry 'particularly as new
entrants require extensive and costly training and adequate experience
25
can only be gained after a good many years at sea'. The Final Report 
also made the point that seafaring was regarded by many as casual employ­
ment before settling down to more regular employment on shore, or at
26
any rate transferring to shore jobs. The N.M.B. established a wastage 
sub-committee but it soon became obvious that there was insufficient 
well-researched information to consider the advisability of any remedial 
action.
In order to rectify this position, the Centre for Applied Social
Research of the Tavistock Institute was invited in 1968 to undertake
the necessary research. Unfortunately, the project took four years to
complete and their Report was not available to be submitted as evidence
to the Rochdale Inquiry. The latter did, however, commission a survey
to investigate the attitudes of the seafarer to his work and also to
attempt to discover the causes for high labour turnover in the industry.
The report of the survey did recognise that the maritime labour force
presented special problems in that a high proportion only went into the
industry for a limited period; and many left the industry only to return
later,27 and further, that family ties put a strain on the seagoing
employee. Their evidence convinced Rochdale 'of the importance of
continuing the current trend to better social and living conditions on
board ship ... and the need to get rid of unnecessary differences in the
28
treatment of officers and ratings'. However, until the Tavistock 
Institute completed its study little could be achieved.
In any event further modifications or reforms of the central 
institutions of the industry were pre-empted by the 1971 Industrial
Relations Act and the establishment of the National Industrial Relations
Court. A central tenet of the Act was the abolition of the closed shop
29
which was to be replaced by Agency Shop Agreements, By this time, of 
course, both officers and ratings were operating a closed shop and the 
system of supply operating in the industry depended heavily on a closed 
shop for ratings.
Faced with the threatened loss of the closed shop agreement, the 
N.U.S.'s first, and perhaps instinctive ploy, was to seek exception from 
the Act on the grounds of what it considered were its unique problems of 
recruiting and serving its members. This tactic had, after all, gained 
for the industry, over time, exemptions from numerous other Acts; for 
example, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, Trade 
Disputes Act, 1906, the Race Relations Act, 1968, and the Sexual Offences 
Act 1967.
The government refused to make an exception of the N.U.S, but was 
impressed by the industry's argument that one of the objectives of the 
Act, free and responsible collective bargaining, had in fact been 
achieved.
It is probable that this line of argument, backed up 
with evidence that the Union would collapse financially 
due to the Bill, and thus obviate its ability to negotiate 
credibly with the shipowners, that prompted the Government 
to present on March 14, 1971, the amendments to the Bill 
that as Section 17 and 18 and Schedule 1 of the Act were 
to become the approved closed shop provision. Taken in 
connection with the amendment that a union would negotiate 
directly with an employers' federation (an amendment 
which the British Shipping Federation were consulted on 
and actively supported, although they took no part at all 
in pressing for the approved closed shop provisions) 
although they were undoubtedly introduced to cater for the 
seamens' union.30
The attitude of the B.S.F. to applying an approved closed shop to 
the shipping industry was not uniform. While they were not only prepared, 
but anxious to facilitate the approval of a closed shop for ratings by 
the National Industrial Relations Court, they were not prepared to do so
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for the officers. As the General Secretary of the MNAOA stated in his 
opening speech to the Association's Biennial Meeting of 1971, in 
respect of the recently negotiated pre-entry and re-entry closed shop 
for officers:
The Shipowners wasted absolutely no time at all in 
withdrawing from that Agreement because the new Act 
made it 'unenforceable'. There are a number of 
agreements which are legally unenforceable but we do 
not rush to denounce them, I think their action in 
this respect was much too precipitate.31
This division of support of the closed shop in the industry, illustrates
the importance the BSF placed on the supply of ratings. The employers
saw the maintenance of the institutionalised supply system as vital to
their main concern of getting the ship to sea.
It is not difficult to understand the concern which the N.U.S. felt 
at the threat to the existing closed shop. The General Secretary wrote 
in 'The Seaman'
The disunity implicit in the abolition of the existing 
membership agreement could therefore very well spawn 
splinter organisations and company unionism, thus 
exposing unionists and non-unionists alike to the 
deterioration of their conditions of employment as well 
as endangering the capability of all seamen to combine 
effectively for their own advancement.32
This implied that such a spawning would mean the loss by the N.U.S. of 
its authority and perhaps eventually its position within the N.M.B. as the 
sole representative of ratings' interests. It would follow from this that 
the N.U.S. would also lose its position in the N.M.B.'s satellite 
organizations, in particular the M.N.E.S. This is the central element in 
the joint supply scheme, the N.U.S. absence would mean the single control 
of the B.S.F. and perhaps the abandoning of the whole structure by some 
shipowners. Hence 'control over entry would have been entirely within 
the hands of the (M.N.E.S.) Administration, which is staffed by the 
Federation, and the union would not have been able to take effective 
counter-measures if an individual employer sought to recruit casual workers
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from outside the scheme'. Such a situation would be full of potential 
danger for the union. It would cause further financial difficulties with 
the loss of much of the shipowners supervised 'check off' system. In 
addition, it raised the persistent and basic union fear of an alternative 
labour force and, in particular, an increase in the number of vessels 
signing non-U.K. Articles, recruiting crews in Africa and Asia, or perhaps 
a movement towards the signing of Spanish and Portuguese crews at lower 
wage rates.
A further example of the importance with which the NUS regarded the
closed shop is the fact that when they were faced with the choice of
seeking approval of the closed shop or remaining within the labour move-
34
ment they had little hesitation in choosing the former. As a result
they were expelled from the T.U.C. and were ostracised by the wider labour
movement. On the other hand, the officers' organizations, apart from the
MMSA, were prepared to support the T.U.C. Whilst the REOU and the AUEW
did so enthusiastically, the MNAOA were under some pressure from a
35
vociferous section of its membership to comply with the Act. The main 
criticism being that any opposition was a political act and therefore 
against the Association's constitution.
36
With the threat of their closed shop becoming illegal, the
N.U.S. swiftly entered into informal talks with the BSF, presumably with
the hope of gaining some form of unofficial agreement on similar lines to
those which appear to have been made in other industries.
The British Shipping Federation was of the opinion that 
no informal arrangements could be made to stick - a 
challenge was bound to be made since the whole joint supply 
system depended on an open acknowledgement of the Union's role.
And they were not going to 'break the law' or encourage any 
individual shipowner to 'break the law'. It was after these 
meetings that the Union discreetly, but formally, asked the 
British Shipping Federation to join with the Union in a joint 
application for an approved closed shop, On December 9, 1971, 
the British Shipping Federation's Council decided to support 
such an application and circularised Its member companies of 
its decision. Not one British shipping company dissented from 
its Federation's decision.37
33
It was essential under the Act for both the union and the 
employers to apply jointly for an approved closed shop. The main reason 
why the shipowners and their Federation cooperated appears to have been 
their apprehension about the lack of closed shop facilities, forcing the 
N.U.S. into an amalgamation with the much larger T. & G.W.U. This had 
been mooted during the late 1960s when some shipowners had publicly 
expressed their fear of such a merger with, what they considered, the ' 
more militant T. & G.W.U, Alternatively, now without the protection of 
the Bridlington Agreement the T. & G.W.U. would simply recruit seamen.
The Shipping Federation's reasons were more basic. It had a vested 
interest in preserving a closed shop since failure to do so could not 
only result in fragmentation for the union but also in disunity and 
sectionalism among the employers. It was not just the case of a closed 
shop but a closed shop with the 'responsible' N.U.S, The B.S.F. were 
also perturbed in case the presence of non-unionist ratings in a vessel's 
complement caused discontent which could erupt into some form of 
industrial dispute. Further, the loss by the N.U.S, of its authority 
and influence among all ratings would place in jeopardy the Industry's 
Joint Disciplinary System on which the Federation placed a high value.
The final stage of the approved closed shop procedure was an
application to the National Industrial Relations Court, which referred it
38
to the Conmission of Industrial Relations (C.I.R,). The Federation's 
submission to the C.I.R. was similar in many ways to that of the N.U.S., 
but the latter was a much more suhstontial document. The basic argument 
was that the democratic nature of the union, which gave its members at 
least a de jure access to decision making and thus gained 
the respect and support of the seamen, could only continue 
within an approved closed shop situation. An agency shop, available to 
all registered unions, was unsuitable. The basic main difference in the
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two arrangements was that in addition to being a normal union member an
individual may elect, in an agency shop, to pay a sum equivalent to a
union contribution to the union, but still decline to join and so remain
a non-unionist. The other course open to him was to pay the same amount
to a charity on the grounds of conscientious objection. This was the only
alternative available in the approved closed shop situation. In no case
was it possible to avoid payment. The N.U.S. argued that the presence of
non-unionists, allowed under an agency shop would, in the enclosed and
isolated community of a ship, create social discontent and dissent. This
would destroy the Liaison Representation Scheme, and undermine the union's
position in the shipping industrial relations structure. It was further
pointed out that the presence of non-unionists would necessitate a
permanent recruiting system, which was completely beyond the financial
capacity of the union. All these points substantiated their central
theme: the casual nature of employment within the industry created
unique problems which could only be solved by an approved closed shop.
39
The C.I.R. published a report of its findings with reference to 
the Act. It is difficult to escape the impression that the findings, set 
out in a rather repetitive report, in favour of the approved closed shop 
agreement, were not a foregone conclusion. It discussed at length the 
casual nature of the industry and the difficulties of recruiting, and 
pointed out that recruitment and collection of contributions were outside 
the function of the Liaison Representatives; should these be included in 
their function, serious strain would be placed on the harmonious relation­
ship between crew members. This reflected the N.U.S. view, of the 
problems of ships as closed communities.
The N.U.S. and the closed shop agreement in operation 
until February have also been influences in favour of 
social stability and cohesion among crews, The fact 
that membership or non-membership of the Union was not 
an issue meant that a possible focus of dissent was 
absent. The fact that the Union has played a full part
in building much of the institutional framework of the 
industry - the N.M.B. agreements, the M.N.E.S.S. and the 
registration and disciplinary procedures - and that its 
services have been available within that framework to 
represent all seamen individually and collectively has also 
been a factor of stability.^0
Furthermore, since the N.U.S. were contravening the T.U.C. policy, both the 
B.S.F. and the N.U.S. were jeopardising the operation of the N.M.B. and 
its ancillary organizations since the officers' associations were instructed 
to ostracise the N.U.S.
Thus the opportunity for contributing non-members under the agency 
shop agreements was seen to hold potential dangers not only on board the 
individual ship, but for the whole industry. Further, the N.U.S. was 
worthy of an approved closed shop, having shown itself to be a 'responsible 
organization' capable of securing observance by its members of collective 
agreements. This element was combined with the union's disciplinary role, 
which, presumably much to the union's embarrassment, the report extolled.
The C.I.R. saw this function in two overlapping areas. Firstly,
where one or more ships' crews had threatened or begun some form of
industrial action, the union had served as a 'de-fuser' of these 'potent-
ially critical situations'. Secondly, the union's involvement in the
industry's joint disciplinary arrangement gave it an impartial authority
since all offending ratings were automatically members of the union.
Without the closed shop the Union's position would become 
more exposed and vulnerable, A member dissatisfied with 
the outcome of disciplinary proceedings or with a merely 
general objection to the disciplinary code might feel 
reluctant to continue in membership of the Union which in 
his eyes is identified with the disciplinary arrangements.
He would be free to leave the Union without this affecting 
in any way his future prospects of employment in the industry.
For seamen who were non-tnembcrs there would be little reason 
for compunction about attacking the disciplinary system and 
the Union for taking part in it. This would hardly encourage 
N.U.S. officials to approach their duties under the industry's 
joint disciplinary procedure with judicial detachment, a sense 
of responsibility and a feeling of freedom from outside 
pressure .*2
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The report also emphasised the strength, authority, and stability which 
the closed shop gave, not only to the N.U.S. and through it to the N.M.B. 
and its satellite organizations, but also to the B.S.F. by preventing 
particular sections of employers seceding from it because of the problem 
it would cause them in recruiting labour.
Among the report's omissions, there are two which stand out as 
being of particular importance. The first and most difficult to justify 
is the virtual absence of any discussion of the Merchant Shipping Act, 
and its extensive influence on maritime industrial relations at all levels. 
The second is the failure to analyse the seagoing member's attitude to 
the union, or the reasons for his participation, or lack of it, in union 
policy making and elections. Both these omissions can, perhaps, be best 
explained by the political situation which gave rise to the appearance of 
the approved closed shop. The government had, after all, contravened its 
own Act's central principle by introducing the approved closed shop 
amendment specifically for seamen.
The approved closed shop agreement came into operation on 
January 1st, 1973. Despite all the interesting and enlightening manoeuvring, 
which in particular revealed the extremely high value the union places 
on the joint control of labour supply, what could not be foreseen was 
the series of events which would end the agreement just over a year later.
The most important of these was the sudden death of the union's General 
Secretary, William Hogarth, in May 1973, precipitating a six-months' long 
election for his successor. One of the three candidates, James Slater, 
comnitted himself to compliance with the T.U.C. ruling. How far this was 
an influence in his victory it is impossible to estimate. He took up his 
new post in February 1974, A snap General Election in the following month 
returned a minority Labour Government, ronmitted to repealing the 
Industrial Relations Act as one of its first priorities. Although the 
Act had a matter of weeks of existence left, the N.U.S. went through the
now academic, if symbolic, process of de-registering. Once the Act 
was finally removed, the union re-negotiated its closed shop agreement 
with the B.S.F. on very similar lines to those existing before the 
approved closed shop. The union's re-affiliation to the T.II.C. may he 
seen as a return to its previous position within the wider labour move­
ment .
The repeal of the Industrial Relations Act allowed the industry 
to return to the problem of the adequacy of maritime industrial relations 
to meet the changed and changing circumstances. If anything, the 
problems had become more acute. For ratings, the decline in job 
opportunities continued, not only in terms of a reduction in the crew 
requirements of the U.K, fleet but also because of the increasing move­
ment towards crews of convenience. The officers were experiencing a 
smaller but still important reduction in job opportunity, particularly 
if they wished to remain within the U.K. fleet. In addition, there was 
pressure from the employers for changes in the certificates of competency.
Both these issues must have influenced the officers' decision to re-
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negotiate the closed shop since this would not only increase member­
ship but greatly strengthen their negotiating position and influence and 
make sure their voice was heard.
The need to have a strong voice in order to influence changes
affecting the industry, was also felt by the employers. The amalgamation
of the B.S.F. with the Chamber of Shipping may be seen in this light.
We have been finding that the interests of the two 
separate bodiea arc beginning to overlap and the single 
organisation in place of two is a more efficient way of 
running the industry... The merger will enable shipping 
to present a united front to the Government and demonstrate 
the value of shipping to the national economy.^
The employers' position had also been adversely affected by the downturn
in freights following a long boom from 1968 to 1973 and they were,
therefore, in 1974 increasingly conscious of anything that influenced costs
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By this time the emphasis had changed from a desire to re­
shape industrial relations to meet a new and dynamic situation to a 
concern with efficient manpower planning. The general conclusion had 
been reached, especially by the G.C.B.S., that the ideal solution to what 
was now regarded as the manpower problem was to create a well-trained, 
stable, career-orientated labour force. However, the report of the 
Tavistock Institute showed how unrealistic this was without major changes 
in social attitudes and conditions of work at sea.**
To this end the Sealife progranme was initiated in March 1975 by 
the employers, the unions and Department of Trade,
To examine ways in which life at sea in the U.K, shipping 
industry can be made more attractive to the U.K. seafarer, 
from which the effective use of manpower can be developed.^
Although the programme was jointly controlled it was funded by the Ship­
owners. The programme was designed to last for five years, and its main 
conclusion appears to have been that individual companies should be 
encouraged to develop their own manpower policies based on three essential 
principles. These principles were: direct employment, that is labour 
being directly employed by individual companies rather than through the 
central pool; crew stability, that is to reduce changes in crew member­
ship; and ship autonomy, increased shipboard involvement in day-to-day 
management and control of ship requirements.
This emphasis on individual action would not, however, obviate 
the need for a central supply system. Quite apart from the vested interest 
in centralized supply which had been illustrated by the reaction of all 
sides to the 1971 Act, the system ensured the retention of the casual 
labour on which the industry ultimately depended. The 1973 changes to 
the Established Service Scheme had decasualised the labour force at
Industry level but for the individual employer it ensured that he could
47
still take on and discard labour at will.
K S im
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The programme was unable to offer any solution to the dual
problem of the need to have flexible manpower planning, which required
individual action, and the necessity and desire to maintain central
joint control of supply. As the Chief Executive of Sealife pointed outj
Whether there will ever be an irresistible case for 
wholesale change of the centre piece of impermanence 
which holds together the whole set of manpower systems 
this industry has built up is difficult to judge. The 
author used to think it was self-evident but experience 
in Sealife has chastened his conviction about the U.K. 
industry's need, or indeed its ability to transform its 
central employment philosophy ... No-one can thus expect 
wholesale change in the industry's overall practice over 
other than a very long time-scale. These practices are 
there because they fill a need for the majority of those 
they represent and are necessarily characterised by a 
higher level of inertia because of the various represent­
ative structures which control them and the number of 
people involved.48
The failure to grasp the opportunities offered by Sealife for a 
restructuring of the central industrial relations institutions is perhaps 
less a lack of an irresistable case than because for the majority of the 
industry, the practice still filled a need. It is only in the last two 
or three years that the balance of advantage has moved away from the 
subjugation of individual freedom in centralised bargaining and towards 
company or small group bargaining, of which the North Sea oil rig supply 
ships were a first example.
This movement, brought about by connercial pressure and increasing 
emphasis on the quality and cost of labour, has challenged the central 
tenets of the collective bargaining structure; joint supply and the 
uniform wage. As far as joint supply ia concerned, the Merchant Navy 
Establishment Scheme no longer fulfils the same need for all shipowners. 
The companies who contribute most are the large operators such as oil 
companies and container lines, yet it is this group who use the pool 
facilities least as they have individual manpower policies and employ 
their own company contract men. The small and medium sired companies in
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the coastal and tramp trades depend more heavily on the centralised
supply. These companies release crews when they return to the U.K.,
only retaining senior officers on their permanent staff; new crews are
recruited from the pool just prior to sailing. These companies reap
two advantages: they save the cost of retaining crews, which has
become increasingly expensive as levels of pay have risen, and the cost
per individual supplied from the central pool is lower. An analysis of
this cost showed that over the whole industry, costs ranged from '£45
to £776 per individual supplied. The lower figure was the cost to a
frequent user of the pool who employed many registered seafarers for
seasonal work, The higher figure was the cost per individual supplied
to a company that made relatively infrequent use of the pool, and which
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had a high proportion of permanent seafarers'.
There is a dislike of cross-subsidisation on the part of the large 
companies and, therefore, no longer an industry-wide commitment to 
centralised joint supply by the employers. While a section of the 
industry is still anxious to retain joint supply and casual labour 
because of the cost advantage to them, there is no such commitment to the 
necessity to maintain a uniform wage for ratings through central 
bargaining. The uniform wage has never been a reality for officers, and 
for the ratings the loss of job opportunity has made security of employ­
ment a more important concern than wage levels or indeed joint supply.
In spite of the diversity of interest and labour cost within the industry, 
there is almost general agreement that little is now to be gained by 
the uniform wage. The companies with large, technologically sophisticated 
capital, and in percentage terms low labour cost, recognise that the 
importance of retaining staff with high levels of skill Justifies high 
wages, certainly above what would be negotiated within the N.M.B. On 
the other hand, companies with high labour costs such as cruise liners,
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vessels engaged in the coastal, middle and ferry trades, are concerned 
that the level of the uniform wage will be influenced by the companies 
whose labour costs are low, as happened in the N.M.B. negotiations in 
the summer of 1981, Each company, therefore, tends to see the level of 
wages as an individual problem, requiring an individual solution. The 
N.U.S. are prepared to consider the individual company's situation and 
perhaps concede separate negotiations, because this approach is like.ly to 
result in a greater gain for security of employment than loss in terms 
of wages. The N.U.S. has for example, agreed to give consideration to 
the individual situation of the hard pressed shortsea and coastal companies 
who have sought exemption from the latest N.M.B. 8 per cent pay award.
The principle of industry-wide negotiations has become increasingly 
unwieldly now that different parts of the industry face varying financial 
prospects. Furthermore, the uniform wage no longer achieves the 
industrial peace which was the aim when the N.M.B. was created, now the 
problems of establishing a uniform wage are such that its maintenance is 
more likely to encourage disputes than avoid them. The recent agreement 
between the Esso Company and the N.U.S. that the company should not be 
bound by national pay agreements, and should be exempt from strike 
action involving other companies, illustrstes this point.51 This appears 
to be a trend which is likely to continue, and which is being encouraged 
by the N.U.S. as a National Secretary commented:
The Esso deal is a model of agreements which other
shipping companies can work out with the union.^2
During the decade and a half since the 1966 strike, the shipping 
industry has become increasingly aware of the need for change in its 
industrial relations and manpower policies. The process which was begun 
ns a result of the Penrson and Rochdale Inquiries has continued to 
emphasise, particularly through Sealife, the need for modifications in 
order to meet the challenge of the U.K. fleet's loss of competitiveness.
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It has now become obvious that the benefits to be gained from centralised 
bargaining, so important following the First World War, are rapidly 
diminishing for a large part of the industry.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION
The N.M.B., core of shipping industrial relations and a product 
of the reconstruction period and a consnitment to Whitleyism following the 
First World War, is shaped by the industry it serves; its structure 
reflects the structure of the labour force, the nature of the workplace 
and the technology of the period. Apart from the political considerations 
the Board was established to meet a number of needs, the most important one 
being to avoid the economic and social consequences of a return to the 
pre-war experience of industrial relations by confrontation. The setting 
up of the bi-partite N.M.B. had advantages for both sides. For the 
ratings it provided the opportunity to consolidate the position of their 
main representative organisation, the N.S.F.U. (later the N.U.S.) and so 
improve the pay and conditions of their members. The officers' organisations 
recognised the possible advantages of national bargaining and therefore 
also participated. In the case of the employers the establishment of a 
uniform wage and the joint control of the supply of ratings, central 
elements of the N.M.B,, meant they were prepared to sacrifice the advantages 
of individual national competitiveness in order that they could pursue 
their own consaercial business and concentrate on the increasing inter­
national competition.
The initial success of the N.M.B. was in part due to the economic 
climate of the inter-war years and only small modifications were made to 
meet post second world war needs. The Established Service Scheme 
extended and strengthened the principle of joint supply institutionalising 
the degree of casuality on which the industry depended, and for the next 
two decades, industrial relations in the industry remained virtually
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unchanged. These two decades were, however, ones which saw the industry 
undergo major changes both nationally and internationally as a result 
of a redefinition of the patterns of world trade, particularly with 
reference to bulk cargoes and the opening up of new markets, together 
with the emergence of fleets belonging to countries not regarded as 
being traditionally maritime nations. The U.K, lost her maritime 
supremacy despite the growth in world seaborne trade. This appears'to 
have been due to her inability,or unwillingness,to take early advantage 
of technological change or venture into new trade areas apart from the 
development of containerisation, thus allowing competitors to usurp 
her position.
The result has been a decline in the demand for labour and an 
increasing concern with labour unit cost exacerbated more recently either 
by U.K. shipowners taking the benefits of economies of scale or by their 
moving to cheaper crew flags. Furthermore, the need to respond to 
increasing specialisation has brought a greater diversity of interest 
with a number of companies merely seeing shipping either as part of a 
production process or one element in a broad spectrum of company interests, 
providing less cotnnon ground on which to bargain nationally. This 
individualistic approach is,to a large extent,due to the fact that change 
has not affected all sections of the industry equally. For example, 
although all shipowners felt the impact of the new technology, the 
implications in terms of capital costs was greater, say, for the liner 
companies than for coastal shipping, snd the interests of the employers have 
became increasingly diverse. In the case of the employees, it was the 
ratings who bore the brunt of change with drastic loss of Job opportunity, 
while the officers were much less seriously affected. They have been 
concerned with maintaining their traditional position, whilst attempting 
to reconcile it with a more militant approach to collective bargaining.
This latter attitude owes as much to change* in the wider society, such
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as the growth of white collar unionism, as it does to causes within 
, the shipping industry itself.
It is perhaps to the credit of the N.M.B, and the participant 
organizations that the industry has undergone these changes and the 
pressures they have created with only one major dispute, the official 
strike of 1966. Nevertheless, to judge the success of the N.M.B. in 
a period of change merely on the criteria of the lack of official strikes, 
denies the pressure on and dynamics within the other industrial relations 
organizations. An examination of the experience of the ratings 
illustrates the existence of underlying discontent for at least a decade 
before its culmination in the official strike. In part, the spasmodic 
unofficial agitation was against the N.U.S. itself, as the rank and 
file felt the shore-based officials were unprepared to recognise the 
extent to which they were out of touch with the membership. There was 
also a discontent with the general conditions and status of the seamen, 
which were not keeping pace with the changes ashore. Throughout the 
period three main issues regularly re-emerged; the 56 hour week, low 
wages and the discipline imposed by the Merchant Shipping Acts. While 
the 1966 strike was a culmination of long run discontent with the N.U.S., 
complicated by the existence of an incomes policy, it also highlighted 
the wide range of problems all sectors of the industry were facing. It 
could be argued that the peace experienced within the industry until 
that time, was harmony by default. The Pearson Inquiry and the Rochdale 
Report confirmed the extent to which the Industry was being challenged 
and the strains this had created for the existing industrial relations 
organizations.
The industry, and to some extent the government, were forced to 
recognise that the traditional concept of the seaman, and the centralised 
and uniform solutions of the N.M.B., were not necessarily suited to the 
demands of the 1980s, This is perhaps epitomised by the modifications
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to the Merchant Shipping Acts. There is no doubt that the upheavals in 
the industry in the second half of the 1960s gave the impetus for the 
Acts of 1970 and 1974; they also reflect the contemporary attitude of 
the wider society that seamen should be awarded similar rights to shore 
workers. The industry attempted to resolve some of its problems by 
setting up the Sealife programme and its demise may be seen as an 
indication of the industry's unpreparedness at that stage to accept the 
challenge and make radical changes in the industrial relations structure. 
In the mid-1970s it seemed likely that continuing technological change 
and foreign competition would result in substantial changes to the 
structure of the workplace and would in turn require a reorganization of 
the N.M.B, based as it was on a steam technology. However, this 
'evolution' has been pre-empted by the commercial realities of a national 
and international recession.
The central position of the N.M.B, and joint supply have remained 
unchallenged until recently. It is only with the incontrovertible 
evidence of the differing and to a large extent unattractive financial 
prospects of individual companies, and the continuing loss of job opport­
unities, that new approaches have become imperative. This appears to be 
resulting in a positive movement away from central to company bargaining 
rather than attempting modifications to the N.M.B. The joint supply 
scheme which married reliability to casuality is no longer of prime 
importance with the establishment of all seafarers and the increase of all 
grades on company contracts, and, of course, the availability of a cheap 
alternative labour force, The same is true of wage levels; the advantages 
offered by uniformity in 1921 no longer apply to shipping operating in 
the international economy of the 1980a, The growth in capital cost has 
emphasised the importance of flexibility and the need for priority to 
be given to individual operating and consequently labour costa, The 
question of manpower policy in respect of both recruitment and reward
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becomes therefore an individual rather than a collective concern. The 
principles of joint supply and a uniform wage on which the N.M.B. was 
founded and which solved the problems existing following the First 
World War no longer achieve the coninercial freedom which is necessary 
for survival in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
APPENDIX I
DETAILS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN THE NATIONAL MARITIME BOARD 
THE EMPLOYERS' ORGANIZATION
General Council of British Shipping
(formerly known as the British Shipping Federation)
( " " as the Shipping Federation Limited)
Until 1975 the employers had two main national representative 
bodies, the Chamber of Shipping and the Shipping Federation. The former 
was created in 1878 in order to coordinate the view of shipowners on 
important matters of policy and to provide a channel to make these known 
to the government and the general public. The Shipping Federation was 
established in 1890 to combat the emergence of New Unionism among sea­
farers and in particular to indemnify owners involved in labour disputes. 
It has formulated and implemented the shipowners'manpower policy ever 
since. The Federation has been influenced extensively by its relation­
ship with the N.M.B. The establishment of a uniform wage scale for 
ratings removed the opportunity for competitive, individual wage 
bargaining and therefore, the ability of Individual shipowners to dissent 
from Federation policy.
Whilst the Federation represents the majority of shipowners, 
there are some exceptions. For example, they do not represent some short 
sea traders, in particular the British Rail Ferries. But the most 
important group outside the Federation until 1967 was the Employers' 
Association of the Port of Liverpool, an association formed for a similar 
purpose but one which in the main preferred to pursue its own Independent 
course. However, in 1967 the two associations amalgamated in the 
British Shipping Federation.
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The basis of the original organization of the Federation was in 
the local Protection and Indemnity Associations, and even in 1949 when 
12.4M tons were entered into the Federation, 64 per cent were still 
entered through club membership, the remainder being entered direct 
by individual companies. The method of finance was the same for both 
groups, a levy on tonnage entered. Until its reorganization in 1968, 
after it became the British Shipping Federation, its authority came- 
from twenty-three district shipowner conmittees. The committees were 
consulted on the issues under consideration by the Federation. In 
addition to this, the chairmen of the principle Federation districts were 
members of the main administrative body, the General Purooses Committee. 
The ultimate policy maker, the Executive Council, had 140 members, 49 
appointed by the Protection and Indemnity Clubs, 9 by the District 
Committees and 42 from the individually entered companies. In 1968 the 
membership was grouped into five geographical areas, each of which has 
its own committee and elects representatives to the five national trade 
committees. The Chairman of each area committee, and the Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman of each trade committee, make up the 28 members of the 
Central Executive Committee. This is now the main decision making body 
but it is responsible to the Annual General Meeting.
In 1975, the Chamber of Shipping and the British Shipping 
Federation amalgamated into the General Council of British Shipping.
Since the First World War, the Federation has been involved 
directly with the training of ratinge related to its concern for 
controlling supply. For example, in 1918 the Gravesend Sea School for 
deck and catering boys was established. It was administered by the 
Federation with substantial financial support from the Treasury, and 
the Board of Governors had representatives from the ratings union and 
the Board of Trade. Within a short time this school supplied two 
thirds of the trained ratings entering the industry. The introduction
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of a statutory 'Lifeboat Certificate' necessitated the opening of 
additional seamanship schools under Federation administration. The 
first was established in London in 1927, others being opened later in 
five major ports. The function of these schools was broadened by the 
government's belated ratification of the Seattle Convention (1946) 
which insisted that in future any seaman wishing to become an Able 
Seaman must first be successful in a practical examination, known in 
the U.K. as the Efficient Deck Hand's Certificate. A rating would 
serve as an Efficient Deck Hand until he had sufficient sea time 
(4 years actually at sea) to qualify as an A.B. They were also 
indirectly concerned with apprenticeship and cadet schemes for potential 
officers although their recruitment was generally carried out by 
individual companies. In 1934, the Federation set up an Advisory 
Committee to study and develop a basic system of apprentices and cadets 
training. The outcome was establishment if the Central Board for the 
Training of Officers for the Merchant Services which in 1942 became 
the Merchant Navy Training Board. In 1947, the Federation widened its 
functions to include the Administration of the newly implemented 
Established Service Scheme.
EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATIONS
Officers' Organisations
Whilst there is some overlap in the areas from which membership 
is drawn, the officers' organizations attempt to satisfy what they 
regard as their particular field of concern and recruitment. What is 
evident, to differing degrees, within these organizations, is the 
largely unresolved conflict as to whether they are merely professional 
bodies or trade unions. The problem is one of ideological duality 
between being equated with professionals in terms of the quasi-military
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hierarchy, yet being an employee with a status not necessarily accepted 
outside the industry. Superficially at one extreme is the Mercantile 
Marine Services Association (M.M.S.A.) considering itself purely a 
professional body with the massive Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers (A.U.E.W.) unquestionably a trade union standing at the other 
extreme.
The Mercantile Marine Services Association
The Mercantile Marine Services Association was formed in 1857 
and in 1942 it entered into an agreement to limit its areas of recruit­
ment to Masters to minimize competition between the various officers' 
organizations. It is not affiliated to the Trades Union Congress, there 
fore long term figures of membership are not easily accessible. In 
1975 their potential sea-going membership was 1,900 plus some 1,500 
'retired' members making an estimated possible membership of 3,400. On 
this basis it may be assumed that their potential membership, during 
the period under consideration, was in the region of 4,000 to 5,000.
The Association's general administration is conducted by a 
professional General Secretary and a small staff of officials. The 
governing body is the Executive Council, with one-third being nominated 
and, if necessary elected, each year. Elections take place by way of 
a postal ballot but this is a very rare occurrence. The membership of 
the Council falls into two categories, sea-going and retired members, 
and it is difficult to achieve a balance between them, by the nature 
of their profession the sea-going members are hard to attract. The 
Association dedicates a substantial part of its Annual Report and its 
quarterly journal The M.M.S.A. Reporter, to encouraging them to become 
Council members, emphasising that whilst it may be Impossible for them 
to attend all but a minority of Council meetings, their use as
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correspondents and as a line of communication is of foremost importance. 
The campaign has achieved some success for since the early 1960s the 
majority has been reversed from one overwhelmingly of retired members 
to a Council containing somewhere in the region of 75 per cent seagoing 
members. Nevertheless, this percentage may belie the actual influence 
of these members within the Council because of their irregular attendance, 
while the admittedly now smaller group of retired members would be able 
to attend the Council's ten meetings a year providing a consistent 
element and presumably a strongly conservative influence. It is 
interesting to look at the age range of the councillors; taking 1973, 
for example, there were none under 43 years of age and out of a Council 
numbering 43, no less than 26 were over 53, of those four were in excess 
of 75 years of age. An age distribution further emphasising the 
traditional outlook of the M.M.S.A.
The retired members of the Council have a particularly important 
role in that they occupy the vast majority of seats on the independent 
Welfare Branch Connittee. This Conmittee controls the extensive 
philanthropic element of the M.M.S.A.'s work, which includes a number 
of pension funds, residential and other properties in Mariner's Park, 
Wallasey, and until 1968 it was responsible for the educational role of 
the Association through the training school H.M.S. Conway. The 
Association's function as protector of its members professional status 
remains important; indemnity is paid to members whose certificate are 
cancelled or suspended, legal aid is also provided.
While the Association's representations to government and other 
seafaring organizations has been adequate, its collective bargaining 
representation has been seriously limited. For while the Association 
was represented at the infrequent meetings of the whole National 
Maritime Board, the Masters' Panel itself was only rarely convened. Hence 
when the Association wished to negotiate on the expansion of Masters
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clerical work and other matters it was confronted with substantial 
difficulties. The M.M.S.A. 115th Annual Report in 1962 commented on 
the Masters' Panel:
This Panel comprises twelve members on either side, and
of the Shipmasters twelve representatives only six come
from the M.M.S.A. and other interested officers'
organisations. The remaining six must be serving
shipmasters elected by seagoing shipmasters by means of
a ballot conducted by their colleagues 'in accordance . .
with a system to be mutually agreed' between the shipowners
and the shipmasters' and officers' organisations. The
difficulties confronting any who wish to convene a meeting
of the Shipmasters' Panel explains why no meetings were
held between 1921 and 1943. and no meeting has been held
since 1945.
The Shipmasters' Panel was reconstituted in 1964 giving the 
M.M.S.A. similar negotiating rights on the Board as are enjoyed by other 
representative organizations. Not only did the lack of a specific 
Masters' Panel meeting inhibit collective negotiations as directly 
related to the officers, but it must be remembered that it also impaired 
the societies ability to make its views felt on general questions 
particularly important when they impinged on what might be regarded as 
the Masters' prerogative, for example, the desire of the National Union 
of Seamen to introduce shipboard representation in 1963.
The Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association
(formerly known as The Navigation and Airline Officers' Union 
" " " The Navigation and Engineer Officers' Union)
This Association developed out of the N.E.O.U. which was formed 
in 1935 by the Navigators' and General Insurance Company, which was 
established in 1921 to provide insurance and legal defence for officers 
against the cancellation and suspension of certificates of competency 
and which soon developed wider interest in the welfare of its members, 
necessitating the formation of a union. It became known as the 
Navigation and Airline Officers' Union when a group of officers employed 
by the British Overseas Airways Corporation became members in 1946.
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The N.A.O.U. remained one of the officers' representative
organizations until 1956 when it amalgamated with the Marine Engineers
Union and it then became known as the Merchant Navy and Airline Officers'
Association. The daily administration of the M.N.A.O.A. is under the
control of the General Secretary and his national assistants based in
London. There are also eleven district offices situated in the major
ports, and an office in Rotterdam, all combined with the N.M.S.A. The
supreme authority within the association is the Biennial General Melting,
which elects the General Secretary on a permanent basis, although he
can be dismissed by a 75 per cent vote of the Executive Council. All
members are invited to the meeting with some 70 volunteers having their
expenses paid. Between Biennial Meetings, the Executive Council is the
controlling body and the only one with the right to call an official
strike. The Council consists of a President (when. one is appointed)
and thirty-six members, four, the General Secretary and three trustees,
being non-elected. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman are elected by the
Council from its membership. The Council is composed of 24 national
members, these are formed into sections in a manner suitable to provide
for the representation of Navigation, Engineers and Air Section officers
and pursers and catering department officers. There are also a maximum
of 8 area members, these represent overseas areas and their function is
to secure as fsr as possible equalization of representation. In
addition to the non-elected members, officials of the Association can
be elected to the Council. The Association, like its predecessor, has
no political affiliation and collects no political levy and no union
rule exists for the creation of such a levy, Membership of the T.U.C.
does not interfere with this aim for delegates are expressly prohibited 
from participation in, and of the political debates. Since the
amalgamation, the M.N.A.O.A. has stressed its position as a professional
association without jeopardising its efficiency as a trade union.
The Association affiliated to the T.U.C, 10,320 members in 
1948 and 35,050 in 1980, For details see Appendix below,
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (A.U.E.W.)
(formerly known as the Amalgamated Engineering Union)
The Amalgamated Engineering Union, since known as the A.U.E.W., 
represents seagoing engineers which are a small proportion of their total 
union membership. The number of seagoing engineers in the union is. 
extremely difficult to estimate since records of this specific group are 
not maintained. Members are deemed to be working or residing in the 
branch or district where contributions are paid, and this may well be 
an inland branch. Seagoing members do have special benefits in that 
there are facilities for the payment of changes of contribution due to 
absence at sea, shipwreck benefits and unemployment benefit while 
sitting for a Department of Trade certificate of competence. However, 
the provision made for seagoing members is limited; there is no 
provision for insurance nor is the A.U.E.W. a member of the officers' 
international organization.
The basic difference between the A.U.E.W. and the other maritime 
unions and associations is that whilst the latter perceive themselves 
firstly as guardians of a unique group of members, seafarers, and 
secondly as protectors of a grade or group within the industry, the 
A.U.E.W. consider their members' professional positions as engineers 
pre-eminent and the fact that they happen to be in the seagoing section 
as of minor importance. An element emphasised by the main line of 
communication members are encouraged to use, which is to write to their 
home branch or district secretary. There is no special newsheet or 
publication specifically for seagoing members.
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Radio and Electronic Officer» Union 
(formerly known as the Radio Officers' Union)
(formerly known as the Association of Wireless and Cable Telegraphists)
The Radio Officers' Union came into being in 1938 and was formerly 
known as the Association of Wireless and Cable Telegraphists. It did 
not join the reconstituted National Maritime Board until 1942, when a 
Radio Officers' Panel was established. In 1967 the union changed its 
title to the Radio and Electronic Officers' Union. The union's basic 
strength lies in the legal requirements that the majority of vessels 
must carry radio operators. To qualify for membership, an individual 
must hold a Department of Trade Certificate of Competency or its 
equivalent. The governing body of the union is an elected Executive 
Committee, consisting of 18 members representing different areas of the 
union's activity; of these 12 are full members from the Marine Section, 
one member each from the Trawler Fishing section and the Civil Service 
section, with two members each coming from the Air section and the 
Inspectors and Technical employees section.
Executive elections are held annually, members being allowed to 
hold office for a period not exceeding three years, except in certain 
circumstances when a further two years can be added. Candidates must 
be nominated by at least ten members of good standing. In the Marine 
section difficulties sre experienced in securing enough candidates to 
fill the vacancies and elections in this section are often foregone.
This is despite official encouragement, assistance being offered to 
secure the necessary ten signatures for nomination, since a single 
deep sea operator may find the problem of procuring these an insuperable 
task.
The Executive Council, in addition to the 18 elected members, has 
a number of union officials as ex-officio members, these are the 
General Secretary, the Treasurer and the three Assistant Secretaries,
with the four district secretaries being co-opted when necessary. The 
voting power of these officials is at the discretion of the lay chairman 
at each meeting. Both Chairman and Vice-Chairman being elected annually 
from their own number, and these are positions which paid officials 
cannot occupy by rule. The Council is notable in possessing full power 
to alter, amend or rescind rules without reference to any other body.
Such authority over the rules is unusual.
The administration of the union is under the control of the 
General Secretary and his assistant in the London headquarters, the needs 
of the other major ports being catered for by their own District 
Secretaries. It is affiliated to both the British and the Scottish T.U.C. 
but has no political affiliations. Internationally, it is an affiliate 
of the I.T.F. and the International Federation of Radio Officers.
The union does not appear to suffer from the conflict of attitudes 
evident in the other officers' organizations, as to whether they are a 
professional association or a trade union; their first rule states its 
objective is 'To promote and extend the adoption of trade union principles 
and to affiliate with such other Trade Unions and Federation of Trade 
Unions as in the opinion of the Executive Committee may appear desirable'. 
Another unusual feature of an officers' union, or any maritime union in 
the U.K,, was the very early introduction (1920) of a scheme of 
maintaining contact between the central office and the widely dispersed 
membership, known as the honorary delegate scheme. The duties of these 
delegates are to assist and recruit members and to facilitate a two-way 
flow of information. A process assisted by the publication in the same 
year of the Radiograph, in the following year renamed the Signal, a 
bi-monthly journal. In addition, honorary delegates receive 
monthly and special bulletins. Contact with the membership is 
also possible through the occasional General Meeting and the regular
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monthly district meetings. In the Autumn of 1971, a collective call 
sign for the N.M.B. was allocated and while costs are still high it is 
now possible to conmuinicate swiftly on matters of immediate interest to 
the membership of all the industry's unions while at sea.
The union affiliated to the T.U.C. 5,291 members in 1948 and 
3,691 in 1980. For details see Appendix below.
THE RATINGS
The National Union of Seamen
(formerly known as the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union)
( " " " the National Amalgamated Sailors' and Firemen's Union)
The National Union of Seamen has had a continuous existence since 
the NA.S.F.U. was formed in 1887. It achieved permanent national status 
during the 1914-1918 war and became known as the N.U.S. in 1926. The 
union has a long standing pre-entry closed shop agreement with the 
employers negotiated through the N.M.B. in the 1920s. The union represents 
all ratings, although the catering department was not completely organized 
until 1942.
The branch is the focal point of union activity and it is at 
branch meetings that resolutions formulated and delegates elected to the 
General Meeting. The General Meeting is the principal policy making 
body and the supreme authority within the union. Since 1974, the 
meetings have been biennial; prior to that they were held every year.
The branches, through their regions, elect 66 delegates, 51 seagoing 
members who are eligible if they have three or more years sea service, 
the remaining 15 being union officials. The Executive Council are allowed 
to determine the number of officials attending within an upper limit of 
30 per cent of the total delegation from an electoral region. Every 
third biennial meeting possesses the power to alter, amend, rescind or 
introduce new rules, a special meeting may be constituted in the interim 
should it prove necessary.
MAM u w »  » i «
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Between General Meetings, the Executive Council is the manage­
ment and policy making body within the union. The Council is elected 
every two years and consists of 17 seagoing members, representing the 
three departments chosen by ballot of each region, and five senior 
officials. The whole membership only directly elects one official, the 
General Secretary. This is a permanent appointment, although dismissal 
is theoretically possible by the Executive Council convening a special 
meeting.
Since the Second World War the union has experienced a severe 
contraction in membership, see Appendix below. This has resulted in a 
contraction in the number of union branches and the professional officials 
necessary to administer them. In 1966, the number of these officials 
was 160 or one official to every 340 members; by 1974 it had declined to 
93 officials, 1 to every 480 members. This is still an exceptionally 
high ratio when compared to the average of all U.K. trade unions of 
one official to every 3,800 and is, of course, a reflection of the 
difficulties of organizing seafarers. In the early 1960s there were 
50 branches, 40 of them in Britain; by 1978 this has contracted to 25.
The union affiliated to the T.U.C. 55,000 members in 1948 and 
47,040 in 1980. For details see Appendix below.
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TABLE A.l
AN INDICATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF SEAFARERS' UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 
AS AFFILIATED TO THE T.U.C. 1948 TO 19&Q---------------- •
Year
National Union 
of Seamen
Merchant Navy and® 
Airline Officers' 
Association
Radio and Electronic 
Officers' Union
1948 55,000 10,320 5,291
1949 55,000 11,000 5,300
1950 60,000 11,000 5,300
1951 60,000 11,000 6,023
1952 60,000 12,000 4,461
1953 62,500 12,000 4,331
1954 62,500 12,000 4,434
1955 62,500 12,000 4,499
1956 62,500 12,000 4,528
1957 62,500 14,500 4,482
1958 62,500 14,500 4,403
1959 62,500 14,500 4,332
1960 62,500 15,500 4,029
1961 62,500 15,500 3,890
1962 62,500 16,000 3,854
1963 62,500 16,000 3,521
1964 62,500 17,000 3,504
1965 62,500 18,300 3,489
1966 62,500 20,000 3,354
1967 • 62,500 20,000 3,070
1968 62,500 20,000 2,959
1969 56,000 20,000 2,823
1970 56,000 20,000 2,716
1971 54,000 21,000 2,963
1972 54,000 21,000 3,214
1973 (43,136)° 25,024 3,188
1974 43,386 25,024 3,151
1975 43,300 26,100 3,441
1976 43,300 30,050 3,548
1977 41,919 36,005 3,600
1978 44,400 42,200 4,360
1979 40,000 43,750 3,926
1980 47,040 35,050 3,691
•• Including some airline personnel and after 1970 some employees of 
shipping companies. See Appendix I Table A,2.
b. Including some shore radio operators.
c. Expelled in that year.
N.B. The M.M.S.A. is not affiliated. The A.U.E.W. affiliates its total 
membership of over 1 million and therefore is meaningless in 
seafaring terms.
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M.N.A.O.A. MEMBERSHIP FIGURES
TABLE A.2
1969 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Navigating Officers 
(Master*)
10,200 10,000 9,252 11,023 13,056
(970)
10,760
(1.349)
Engineer Officers 
(Electrical)
9,000 10,000 10,883 14,960
(1,694)
17,935
(2,458)
14,363
(1,805)
Deck Cadet* 1,800 2,000 3,334 4,613 5,275 2,793
Engineer Cadets 600 750 984 1,551 2,057 1,630
Pursers, Catering Etc. 
(Medical Officers)
- 1,000 1,040 1,778
(12)
2,158
(16)
1,778
(28)
Air 600 1,000 793 827 888 779
Shore Staff - 400 298 539 707 486
Fishing Officers - - - - 58 106
Associate - Retired 
(Reduced Rate)
2,500 1,000 1,506 1,540 1,624
(137)
1,507
(77)
Total 24,700 26,150 28,090 36,831 43,758 34,202
SOURCE! Rochdale, Privately supplied information, M.N.A.O.A, and M.N.A.O.A. 
Council'* Report to the General Meeting 1975, 77, 79 and 1981,
a.
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APPENDIX II
TABLE A.3
U.K. FLEET TONNAGE AND X OF WORLD TONNAGE FOR 
SELECTED YEARS 1919 - 1979
100 Gross Registered Tons and over (000)
Non Tankers Tankers Total
Year
(Dec)
X of
U.K. Tons World U.K. Tons
X of 
World U.K, Tons
X of 
World
1919 15,300 34.0 1,000 34.5 16,300 34.1
1929 17,800 30.0 2,200 31.0 20,000 30.2
1939 14,936 26.2 2,955 25.5 17,891 26.1
1949 14,328 21.6 3,765 23.4 18,093 21.9
1959 14,368 16.5 6,389 16.9 20,757 16.6
1969 13,659 10.2 10,187 13.2 23,844 11.3
1979 14,638 6.1 13,312 7.6 27,951 6.7
SOURCE: Lloyds Register
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APPENDIX III
TABLE A.4
TOTAL SEAMEN. RATINGS AND OFFICERS 1949-1980 
(Total in 000a)
All Seamen Ratings Officers ant
Jan 1949 140.56 93.35 44.84
50 143.44 95.62 45.22
51 144.77 95.40 46.55
52 145.70 95.81 47.03
53 144.69 94.02 47.66
54 144.54 93.22 48.35
55 149.01 95.48 50.12
56 151.19 97.09 50.38
57 152.18 96.94 51.51
58 151.52 94.84 53.18
59 143.08 87.75 52.02
60 141.45 86.51 51.74
61 144.81 89.83 51.71
62 146.71 90.51 52.98
63 133.31 79.27 51.29
64 125.28 73.17 49.56
65 122.83 71.81 48.49
66 119.09 68.97 47.38
67 113.38 64.77 45.97
68 107.18 59.33 45.47
69 99.41 54.62 42.71
70 98.48 53.77 42.57
71 98.93 52.62 44.17
72 95.90 49.49 44.37
Dec 72 89.58 44.67 43.09
73 89.97 39.81 47.67
74 88.72 40.54 46.74
75 88.98 39.16 48.68
76 81.81 34.81 45.96
77 78.12 32.60 44.62
78 76.70 32.50 43.07
79 72.06 31.63 39.47
80 69.16 30.32 37.29
X Change 1980
1949-100 49.2 32.5 83.2
1957-100 45.4 31.3 72.4
SOURCEi Register of Seamen and G.C.B.S.
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TABLE A.5
TOTAL OFFICERS AND BY DEPARTMENT (INCLUDING CADETS AND APPRENTICES)
1949-1980
(Total in 000s)
All Officers
Masters and 
Deck Engine Room Radio
Jan 49 44.84 20.14 21.58 3.12
50 45.22 19.96 22.14 3.12
51 46.55 20.37 22.94 3,24
52 47.03 20.47 23.35 3.21
53 47.66 20.67 23.77 3.22
54 48.35 20.87 24.12 3.35
55 50.12 21.06 25.55 3.51
56 50.38 20.94 26.00 3.44
57 51.51 20.97 27.12 3.41
58 53.18 21.39 28.44 3.35
59 52.02 21.10 27.46 3.46
60 51.74 20.72 27.58 3.44
61 51.71 20.74 27.54 3.43
62 52.98 20.75 28.73 3.50
63 51.29 20.36 27.50 3.44
64 49.56 19.97 26.27 3.37
65 48.49 19.55 25.57 3.37
66 47.38 18.88 25.23 3.27
67 45.97 18.16 24.65 3.16
68 45.47 17.45 24.91 3.11
69 42.71 16.51 23.28 2.92
70 42.57 16.27 23.34 2.96
71 44.17 16.48 24.73 2.96
72 44.37 16.70 24.73 2.94
Dec 72 43.09 16.74 23.47 2.88
73 47.67 16.12 25.02 3.02
74 46.74 15.90 25.71 3.01
75 48.68 17.00 26.28 3.24
76 45.96 16.52 24.34 3.01
77 44.62 15.99 23.68 3.00
78 43.07 15.59 22.73 2.84
79 39.47 14.93 20.36 2.50
80 37.29 14.17 16.87 2.33
X Change 1980
1949-100 83.2 70.4 78.2 79.7
1957-100 72.4 67.6 62.2 68.3
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TOTAL RATINGS AND BY DEPARTMENT 1949-1980 
(Total in 000s)
TABLE A.6
All Ratings Deck Engine Room Catering
Jan 49 93.35 39.90 23.94 36.50
50 95.62 33.14 23.03 39.44
51 95.40 33.02 21.42 40.96
52 95.81 33.46 20.32 42.04
. 53 94.02 33.08 19.43 41.51
54 93.22 32.96 19.00 41.27
55 95.48 33.11 18.86 43.51
56 97.09 33.16 18.74 45.20
57 96.94 33.65 18.57 44.72
58 94.84 33.27 17.81 43.77
59 87.75 31.30 16.12 40.32
60 86.51 30.99 15.72 39.80
61 89.83 31.94 15.95 41.94
62 90.51 31.95 15.40 43.16
63 79.27 28.68 13.58 37.01
64 73.17 26.46 12.41 34.30
65 71.81 25.77 11.55 34.49
66 68.97 24.92 10,78 33.27
67 64.77 23.66 10.02 31.09
68 59.33 21.73 9.44 28.16
69 54.62 20.14 8.87 25.61
70 53.77 19.60 8.73 25.44
71 52.62 19.01 8.38 25.23
72 49.49 18.10 8.05 23.35
Dec 72 44.67 16.74 7.35 20.58
73 39.81 14.35 5.42 18.01
74 40.54 14.61 5.77 18.83
75 39.16 14.59 5.50 17.28
76 34.81 13.32 4.87 14.80
77 32.60 12.62 4.43 13.73
78 32.50 12.80 4.27 13.66
79 31.63 11.78 3.96 13.40
80 30.32 11.23 3.62 12.93
2 Change 1980
1949-100 32.50 34.13 15.12 35.43
1957-100 31.30 33.37 19.49 28.95
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APPENDIX IV
TABLE A.7
ATTRIBUTABLE TO CHANGES IN FLEET SIZE (i.e. assuming 
constant manning)
Tanker 
(+ 10 ships)
Passenger 
(-22 ships)
Dry Cargo 
(-185 ships)
Specials 
(+22 ships)
Total
(-175 ships)
Officers ♦ 141 -719 -2,315 ♦ 164 -2,729
UK Ratings + 140 -2,918 -2,131 +196 -4-, 713
Non-UK Ratings +140 -2,126 -2,688 ♦ 27 -4,647
Totals ♦ 421 -5,763 -7,134 ♦ 387 -12,089
TABLE A.8
ATTRIBUTABLE TO FACTORS OTHER THAN CHANCES IN FLEET SIZE 
(i.e. reductions or changes in manning)
Tanker Passenger Dry Cargo Specials Total
Officers -134 ♦ 147 ♦ 106 a. ♦ 119
UK Ratings -717 -317 -1,771 - -2,805
Non-UK Ratings -627 ♦ 438 ♦ 156 -33
Totals -1,478 ♦ 268 -1,509 - -2,719
TABLE A.9
NET CHANCES IN FOREIGN-GOING JOBS AT SEA
Tanker Passenger Dry Cargo Specials Total
Officers ♦7 -572 -2,209 ♦ 164 -2,610
UK Ratings -579 -3,235 -3,902 ♦ 196 -7,518
Non-UK Ratings -487 -1,688 -2,532 ♦ 27 -4,680
Totals -1,057 -5,495 -8,643 ♦ 387 -14,808
SOURCE! Sea Life.
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APPENDIX VII
LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES SCHEME
Qualificatlona of Liaison Representative 
Original Scheme 1966
a) Prior to departure of vessel union 
official appoints a convenor whose duty 
to convene meeting and election for 
representative who musts-
b) have at least S years continuous 
union membership and 5 years sea service
c) be at least 23 years of age
d) have a clear record of conduct for 
at least 12 months immediately prior
e) be willing to take union training co<
f) if election must be by two-thirds of 
members eligible to vote
- Summary
Modifications: Sept. 1970 
Election before vessel sails
2 years continuous union member­
ship - 3 years sea service as 
and adult rating.
cancelled
still stands
se " "
50Z of those eligible to vote
The Shipboard Liaison Scheme does not provide the type of workplace 
representation enviaaged by its original proposera. Initially, it was 
hoped that shore based union practice would be extended to the maritime 
industry. This, however, has not been the case since rather than developing 
from below the ahipboard liaison, representatives are imposed from above.
The representatives have little, if any, authority; their function is to 
facilitate communication between N.U.S. officials and the seagoing member­
ship whilst encouraging co-operation and welfare onboard.
The emasculated role of the representative owes much to the 
tradition encruated policies and attitudes prevalent in the shipping 
industry. This was evidenced in the length of the negotiations within the 
N.M.B. which specified his role and function. For the N.U.S. these 
negotiations were the product of a rapid conversion Lo the idea of 
representatives after over two decades of firm opposition. This was 
brought about by the need of the official candidate (in an unexpected
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election for General Secretary) having to gain popular support to fend 
off a serious challenge from the first lay candidate in such elections. 
Following the official candidate's victory, he was held to his commitment 
by a vocal and militant section of the membership. The extent of the 
officials' genuine conversion may be questioned since it could have 
provided the foundation for a shipboard rather than heavily shore based 
professional union structure. A possibility which was heightened by the 
union's financial difficulties, forcing it to curtail, or what wa6 termed 
'streamline' its function and activity. In addition, there was anxiety 
lest some representatives incited crews to harass the professional 
officials when vessels entered U.K. ports. These must have been important 
considerations for the N.U.S. when negotiating with the N.M.B.
Opposition to any form of representation came from the Officers' 
Associations. Most vociferous was the Masters' (Mercantile Marine Services 
Association) who feared that the Masters' authority would be undermined, 
a fear shared by the Employers' Association, known at that time as the 
Shipping Federation. Such negotiations, perhaps inevitably, produced a 
scheme which failed to have an impact or take root in the industry. At its
peak, 1970—71f it operated in only a small number of vessels (see below), The 
original rules of eligibility prohibited all but a minority of ratings 
from participating, either through the method of voting, the candidate's 
age or his recent conduct. Later modificationa only marginally changed 
this. Union officials select the candidates and if an election is 
necessary, confirm them in office. They are presented from above rather 
than emerging from below. Masters and officers are suspicious or openly 
hostile to representatives. Even the most open-minded officer feels 
apprehensive at the hint of a rating seeking to influence, or question, 
their authority. Circumstances which cause the representatives to be 
anxious about victimisation, whether real or imaginery; anxiety heightened
- 269 -
by the fact that he is in an industry where he can easily be paid off 
and has little recourse by being exempt from much of the Employment 
Protection Act.
The kernel to an understanding of the liaison representative's 
situation is the recognition of his absolute lack of any point of reference; 
no work place rules exist, even on such matters as safety and normal over­
time working. This ommission leaves him without authority to modify, 
orders from above, or ameliorate dissatisfaction from below. Living in a 
close knit conmunity, he can easily become exposed to alienation.
TABLE A.10
NUMBER OF SHIPS OPERATING SHIPBOARD LIAISON SCHEME
Date No. of Ships
1966-1975*
No. of U.K. Flag* Source
Vessels b
1966 12 - Trial Scheme
1968 256 2,074 N.U.S. A.G.M. Report 1968 p.18
1969 A 00 2,042 N.U.S. The Seaman Oct 1969 p.238
1970 500 2,017 J.M.C. Estimates
1971 482 2,048 N.U.S, A.G.M. Report 1972 p.26
1972 200 2,020 N.U.S. A.G.M. Report 1974 p,26
1975 240 1,966 N.U.S. A.G.M. Report 1976 p.18
NOTES!
a, Latest available figures.
b. Source! Chamber of Shipping Annual Reports.
* A small number of ships do not qualify as crewed by "lascars".
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